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FOREWORD

"Power, like the diamond, dazzles the beholder, and also the wearer; it dignifies meanness; it magnifies littleness; to what is contemptible, it gives authority; to what is low, exaltation."

—COLTON.

Freedom, "with liberty and justice for all," is a cherished American tradition.

Yet we neglect its protection; blissfully ignore the acts of power-mad despots and tyrants in whom, as Tacitus said, "the lust of dominion burns with a flame so fierce as to overpower all other affections of the human breast."

This is the story of such a "lust of dominion." It is the story of the ruthless, arrogant and avaricious Times-Mirror dynasty . . . the story of the huge political and financial empire founded by Gen. Harrison Gray Otis; passed down to his son-in-law Harry Chandler, and inherited by a third generation of heirs headed by Norman Chandler.

It is a sordid story. The history of the Otis-Chandler drive to incredible wealth and power is full of human misery, the lot of those crushed by the insensate passion of the Chandlers to rule or ruin.

For almost three quarters of a century, the Times-Mirror hierarchy has stolen from the many to enhance the power and fortune of its few. Impudence and hypocrisy have been its weapons; arrogance and vindictiveness its trademarks.

Honest public officials who resisted the Chandler "lust for dominion" have been blasted with vindictive reprisals by the outraged tyrant.

The corrosive effect of the Chandler creed to rule or ruin reaches into every home; touches the life of every person in California. Taxpayers struggle under the added burden of hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxes sloughed off by the Chandler Times-Mirror dynasty with the connivance of political officials it is able to dominate.

Yet the public goes about, seemingly unaware of the smothering greed of the Chandlers and their henchmen.

Cato pointed out that "some have said that it is not the business of private men to meddle with government—a bold and dishonest saying, which is fit to come from no mouth but that of a tyrant or a slave. To say that private men have nothing to do with government is to say that private men have nothing to do with their own happiness or misery; that people ought not to concern themselves whether they be naked or clothed, fed or starved, deceived or instructed, protected or destroyed."

With those words, Cato, thousands of years before our time, damned the creed of the Chandlers as the bold and dishonest creed of the tyrant.

It is time—it is past time for the telling of the full story of the Chandlers and their greed. It is time people knew that beneath the bush of concealing hypocrisy a rattlesnake lurks, deadly but not always silent, ready to strike viciously and venomously at any person unwary enough to cross its path.

That, then, is why this story of the Chandlers and their poisonous, destructive empire is told.

—W. G. B.

CHAPTER 1 THE INDICTMENT

In an armored tower at First and Spring Streets in Los Angeles, there sits today the third in the line of financial and political kings who have ruled Southern California for almost three quarters of a century. He is a shadow man, virtually unknown to the six million people whose government and livelihoods often are shaped by his desires.

His is a domain larger, and more populated, than many states of this country and many foreign lands. It is a broad and rich expanse, extending from the rugged Tehachapi Mountains in the north to the warm and friendly Mexican border on the south; from the Arizona desert on the east, to the waters of the Pacific Ocean on the west.

It is a land replete with natural resources, with great industries, with a thriving agriculture and covered with the symbols of American prosperity.

Its inhabitants include descendants of the Spanish dons who first explored and settled in California, raw-boned farmers from the middlewest, migrants from every one of the other American states and from virtually every foreign country.

These inhabitants, when they think of it, regard themselves as being like other Americans, free to choose those who will govern them, make their laws and enforce them. They believe they are free to follow their own course in the pursuit of happiness.

This belief is as unreal as a mirage in the Mojave desert,

which, too, is a part of the empire of Southern California.

For the evidence shows a dynasty long ago arrogated this power unto itself. It decided to rule without constitutional right, to exact tribute and to impose its will and its desires on all who made their homes in Southern California.

The dynasty was founded in 1882 by a Civil War veteran named Harrison Gray Otis who held the firm belief that what was good for General Otis was good for the general welfare. On his death, Otis was succeeded by his son-in-law, Harry Chandler, whose rule was more absolute, more corrupt and more profitable.

Today, by right of inheritance, the dynasty is headed by the shadow man, Norman Chandler, grandson of Harrison Otis and son of Harry Chandler. The treasury of the empire has grown through the years, so that it is today more than \$100,000,000 and the total assets of the Chandler empire, direct and indirect, have grown beyond the mystic billion-dollar mark by alliances stemming from marriage, merger and infiltration.

Southern California is a land of oil, shipbuilding, heavy industry, railroads, banks, motion pictures, and real estate. In every one of these fields the Chandlers own or control a part.

But their largest investment, their most potent weapon, is a newspaper—the Los Angeles Times—which they have turned into a black-jack, a bludgeon, a weapon to be used in behalf of their friends and against their enemies.

It is the largest newspaper west of St. Louis. It is the most profitable newspaper west of Chicago. It is the

voice of reaction, of hate, and of special privilege. It is a loud, clamorous, demagogic voice. It is a voice that pays no attention to truth, only to self-interest—the self-interest of King Norman the First, and the members of the Chandler royal family.

The Los Angeles Times is dedicated to the principle that what it says is right. Years ago, a great editor declared that a newspaper is a public trust. Long since, the Chandlers decided that a newspaper is a private affair.

By using this voice, the Chandlers have been able to dominate not only Los Angeles and Southern California, but the State itself. Their influence has spread across state lines and reaches into Washington. They are political bosses in the same sense that the Hagues, the Vares, the Crockers, and the Tweeds were political bosses. They operate, as all political bosses and all political machines operate, for their own profit.

Whereas in the old days political bosses stole votes, money, and public property, the Chandlers merely twist and torture the law to make it subservient to their interests, so that while the legality of their actions can usually be upheld by high-priced lawyers, the morality cannot be justified even by the best friends of the Chandlers.

In this book I shall cite chapter and verse; I shall make many charges and shall substantiate all of them, frequently with the words of their blatant mouthpiece, the Times. It is my premise that the United States, the State of California, and Southern California, cannot afford the luxury of a feudal barony.

It is my sincere belief that the Constitution and the rights given the citizens of the United States cannot be

abridged by one man, one family, or one dynasty. It is my belief that the public interest is paramount to any private interest, and that the rights of all the people are superior to the rights of some of the people.

I intend to prove that the Chandlers have subverted, elected, and appointed officials, through the years, in order to make personal profits from public contracts.

I will show how the Chandlers have sought, too often successfully, to maintain a solid and lasting grip on the municipal government of Los Angeles; how they have acted to nominate and elect candidates chosen by the court circle of the Chandlers and dedicated to the personal interests of the Chandlers. I will show how the personal anti-labor philosophy of the Chandlers has become an instrument of policy in Southern California, in opposition to Federal and State laws.

I will show how the Chandlers have dedicated themselves to aligning class against class, race against race, in an attempt to make bigger profits for themselves.

I will show how the Chandlers have violated civil rights of all Americans and will prove it with an official report of a United States Senate Committee.

I will show how the Chandlers have attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of a friendly foreign government, and how they sought to start a revolution in a foreign government in order to protect their own vast realty and cattle holdings.

I will show how the Chandlers have used their power to subvert the courts in the interest of their friends.

I will show how the Chandlers have fought, consistently and successfully, to limit democracy and the democratic

process in California, by retaining out-moded constitutional provisions.

I will show how the Chandlers have dedicated themselves to creating a no-party system in California in order to dominate the political picture in the state.

I will show how their personal animosity, their venom, has been used against the people of the State in order that they might obtain petty revenge at the expense of the people.

These are serious charges. I do not make them lightly. I have known the Chandlers all my life. The Bonellis were Westerners long before the arrival of Harrison Gray Otis. The Bonellis have seen the dynasty begun by Otis gain power, financial and political, and use that power for the purposes of empire.

I have known both Harry Chandler and his son, Norman. There have been times, when it suited their purpose, when they gave me kind words and public support. And there have been other times, also when it suited their purpose, when they attacked me bitterly, viciously and, I have charged, libelously.

I have always been the same man. But my actions—always, I sincerely believe, in strict conformity with the law and my sworn oath to defend that law—have not always been satisfactory to the Chandlers and their satellites. My oath—any man's oath—means nothing to the Chandlers when it interferes with their desires and their profits. They have no concern with my duty; they are concerned only with their personal power and profit.

The Chandler interests are so many, so diverse that there is not a public official in California who does not find

himself at some time taking an action which affects them. Whenever this situation arises, he runs head-on into the power and influence of a financial empire.

In this era of corporate anonymity, where management is separated from ownership and dummy officers are common, it is impossible to pinpoint all the holdings of any one man or one group. What follows is a list, admittedly incomplete, of firms which Norman Chandler owns outright, or over which he exercises some measure of control, either as a director or other officer:

Times-Mirror Company, which publishes the Los Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Mirror.

Publishers' Paper Company, Oregon City, Oregon, manufacturers of newsprint.

Emett and Chandler, insurance.

Buffum's department store, Long Beach.

Tejon Ranch Co.

Rancho Santa Anita.

Chandis Securities Co.

Chandler Sherman Corp.

Dresser Industries, Inc.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.

Yosemite Park & Curry Co.

Pacific American Investors, Inc.

Farmers & Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles.

KTTV Television.

Safeway Stores, Inc.

Kaiser Steel Corp.

Greater Los Angeles Plans, Inc.

F. X. Pfaffinger Foundation.

Associated Press.

In addition, the Chandler family has had a vital interest in the Los Angeles Civic Center, the Aqueduct, Union Railroad Station, the Mission Play, the Pilgrim Play, development of the Hollywood Bowl, the Los Angeles Grand Opera Association, the development of Imperial Valley in California, the Diamond Bar Ranch, the Bartlett Ranch in Colorado, and the Morris Plan Co.

This, of course, is only a partial list of the interests held by the Chandlers. It does not include their vast stock holdings in public utilities, banks and security organizations. It offers, however, a picture of the diverse and complicated financial structure which is the solid base of the Chandler dynasty.

It is apparent, then, that no action taken by any administrative, legislative or judicial body which affects finances, railroads, utilities, power, water or communications, fails to affect the interests of the Chandlers. Certainly, few things are as important to Norman Chandler, his family and his associates, as the taxation policies of any governmental body.

This point is stressed because one of the fundamental agencies which deals with taxation in the State of California is the Board of Equalization of which I am a member.

It is important to the Chandlers, their friends, and their associates that members of this Board either be friendly to them or subservient. When they encounter a man who refuses to place their interest above that of the people as a whole, then they begin a campaign whose purpose it is to remove that man from the Board of Equalization.

They are now engaged in just such a battle. They use camouflage to hide their vital interests. After all, it would be difficult, even for the Chandlers, to ask the defeat of a man in an election because that man is more interested in the general welfare than in the special interests of the Chandlers.

Upon the outcome of this present battle depends whether the Chandler interests will pay their full share of taxation or whether that burden will be placed upon the great mass of taxpayers.

In this battle the Chandlers will utilize both of their newspapers, their vast array of corporate friends, and the unlimited power of a billion dollars worth of business and banking influences. They will use the weapon of monopoly and the black-jack of fear on too-easily frightened officials and "peace at any price" politicians.

There is one way in which the Chandlers can be beaten. That is by telling the truth about them. The people have a wisdom for which the Chandlers do not give them credit. I believe that when the people are given the facts about this dynasty, shown how it has grown into an evil force aligned with lawlessness and corruption, they will defeat the Chandlers and their puppets.

What follows is the documented and heretofore untold story of the California empire over which the Chandlers have enforced their rule.

The story had its beginning more than seventy years ago. . . .

CHAPTER 2

"ARISTOCRAT AMONG BIRDS"

In 1882, a 44-year-old itinerant printer, former Union soldier and disappointed Republican patronage seeker, moved south from Santa Barbara to the sleepy, sparsely-populated locality of Los Angeles.

He was only one of hundreds of failures, semi-failures, and dreamers, but the imprint he was to leave on Los Angeles was probably greater than that of any other of the millions of individuals ever to have lived here.

His name was Harrison Gray Otis. He was a big man physically, with a walrus mustache, a goatee, and an over-powering manner. There had been one great experience in Harrison Gray Otis' life and that was the Civil War.

There are some men to whom war is a terrible thing, destroying the bright flame of individuality, coarsening the humane impulses and turning the individual into a robot controlled from some distant place and assigned to duties whose reasons are never explained to him. There are others, however, to whom war is the great liberator, freeing them of individual responsibility and endowing them with unquestioned authority. War gives these men an opportunity to use power, boldly and unashamedly. The psychologists have often referred to the striving for such power as "the Napoleon complex," and say those who suffer from it are rarely cured.

Certainly Harrison Gray Otis was one of this latter group. The Civil War transformed him from farm-boy turned printer into a man who, once having experienced power, lusted after it evermore.

Otis was born on a farm near Marietta, Ohio, and attended a country school until he was fourteen. He then left home to work in a printer's shop at Sarahsville. Three years later he was back home, once again attending school, this time at Lowell. Shortly thereafter he completed his formal education with a commercial course at Columbus.

At twenty, he married Eliza Wetherby, a local belle.

It is quite probable that had not the Civil War been declared, he would have remained the rest of his life in rural Ohio. Certainly during his youth and early manhood he showed no signs of a roving disposition, of daring or boldness, or of an interest that extended beyond the nearby county line.

The Civil War, however, changed all this. Otis enlisted as a private on the Union side and proved a brave and valorous soldier. He was wounded several times and was commissioned out of the ranks, leaving the service a Captain.

In the light of the editorial position of the Los Angeles Times in the past generations, it is interesting to know that Otis wanted, sought, and got, certain privileges because he had borne arms in defense of his country. Like those veterans of World War I and World War II, so scathingly attacked by the Los Angeles Times, he felt that the government owed him a living.

Upon his return to civilian life, he served for a time as a clerk in the Ohio House of Representatives, then ob-

tained government employment as a compositor in the Government Printing Office where he later was promoted to foreman. For a short time he was editor of the Grand Army Journal.

Otis felt that he was entitled to far more than these picayune jobs. He sought a federal sinecure, wanted to become a bureaucrat. Finally, after exerting every possible influence, he was rewarded by appointment as treasury agent in the Seal Islands, those two bleak dots in the Bering Sea.

For three years he held this job and his principal responsibility was to prevent seal-poaching. At the end of that period he returned to the United States, once more seeking a government position more befitting his war record, his ambitions, and his vanity.

It seemed, however, that the Federal Administration had other and more important matters on its mind, and Otis, reluctantly but of necessity, had to find private employment. He took a job as editor of the Santa Barbara Press, a weekly newspaper in what was then a snobbish resort town of 2,000 people. This was Otis' first connection with actual newspaper work. For the first time he was in the position of a man who held power in private life. True, he was a subordinate, but indirectly he could make the citizens of Santa Barbara aware of his importance. He quickly realized that a newspaper was more than a profit-making enterprise; it was a power-creating bludgeon.

Nonetheless, Otis was not yet ready to remain in private initiative. He was unwilling to take his chance in the bullring of free enterprise. Instead, he used his po-

sition as editor of the Press in an attempt to obtain from the government an appointment as Collector of the Port of San Diego. He received a brusque turn-down. As a sop, he was offered the position of United States Consul at Apia and Tientsin.

He considered the offer an affront to his dignity, his sense of self-importance, and his war record. Besides, the pay was too small. So he refused the proposal and from that day onward dedicated himself to the pursuit of power through ownership and control of newspapers.

There have been a number of stories explaining why Otis left Santa Barbara and the relatively—for those days—well-paying position he held. The consensus of belief is that the tightly-knit community of Santa Barbara, with its already stratified social system, gave Otis no encouragement when he sought to enter its top echelons.

Certainly from a psychological point of view, this consensus seems a correct one. Otis sought thereafter, and his heirs have sought ever since, to be part of the top echelon of so-called society.

For more than three-quarters of a century, the Otis-Chandler family has sought acceptance by the "better" people. At times this has been almost pathetic. Otis, and later Chandler, sacrificed editorial power in order to gain social acceptance. They have condoned bribery, dishonesty, corruption, on the part of these "better" people in the hope that the social circles of which these people were a part would accept them.

When Harrison Gray Otis arrived in Los Angeles, he had little money, an enduring grudge against those who

he felt had slighted him, and a determination to show the people of Santa Barbara that he was a better man than they believed him to be. He found Los Angeles a sleepy, struggling town of 11,000, without industry, without plan, without pride, and, most important, a town where there was no work for job-printers or editors. The only way in which he could find work was to buy a part interest in the Los Angeles Times.

The paper at this time was virtually bankrupt and the few dollars that Otis invested gave it new life. The Times had been started on December 4, 1881, outgrowth of a weekly called The Mirror. That paper had been started in 1873 in the hope that it might attract business to a moribund job-printing plant.

When Otis became one-fourth owner, his immediate concern was not with the editorial content of the paper, not with policy, but with the business office. The title he demanded and received was that of Treasurer.

Harrison Gray Otis had already learned that he belonged, and was happiest, where the money was.

He was industrious, hard-working, driving. As he became aware that his small investment was all that had saved the paper from discontinuance, his attitude toward his partners grew more and more belligerent. By 1886 he had bought them out and obtained complete control of the paper. Immediately, he set a policy of reaction that has not varied in almost seventy years.

Harrison Gray Otis, by 1886, was a big frog in a small pond. However, he sensed that he could become a big frog in a big pond and the only limit that could be set on his size would be the size of Los Angeles.

be abridged if it served his purpose. The right of trial before conviction did not apply to his kingdom.

The Los Angeles Times has never altered its belief that it stood above the law of the land. In the 1930s it declared the Wagner Labor Relations Act unconstitutional. In the 1950s it insists upon the nullification of parts of the Bill of Rights.

Here are edicts laid down by Otis. First was the list of persons he barred from Los Angeles:

"Dudes, loafers, paupers.

"Folks who expect to astonish the natives and make money out of the resident gullibles. (They will be astonished themselves by finding smarter men ahead of them.)

"Folks who do not wish to obey highgrounded and wholesome laws.

"People who have no means and no situation assured, and who trust to luck for something to do.

"People too near death to be saved by anything short of a miracle.

"Cheap Politicians.

"Men with shady reputations 'back east.'

"People who are failures wherever they go.

"People who are afraid to pull off their coats.

"People who expect to lie on their backs and let the ravens feed them. (The ravens are all engaged.)

"People who haven't the patience and pocket to wait for an opening in the procession.

"People for whose blood the Garden of Eden is not sufficiently rich.

"Bummers. Scrubs. Impecunious clerks, bookkeepers, lawyers, doctors. The market is over-stocked already."

The second listed the types he encouraged:

"Workers. Hustlers, men of brains, brawn and grit.

"Fruit growers and farmers.

"Capitalists who seek large returns on honest transactions.

"Men who have a little capital and a good deal of energy.

"Men with a good deal of capital who wish 'to take life easy.'

"First class men in almost any line of business."

By January 1, 1886, the embittered, defeated man who had come down from Santa Barbara had become the cocky, boastful community leader. On that New Year's day, Otis printed the first "Annual Trade Number" of the Times, a feature which continues down to the present. Otis had no intention of letting this event go unnoticed. He wrote:

"It is with some satisfaction that we, this morning, lay before the readers of the Los Angeles Times and the public, its Annual Trade Number. It is a paper upon which much care and labor have been expended. We believe we can justly make claim that it is, all things considered, by far the best piece of newspaper work, editorially, reportorially, and typographically ever done in Los Angeles, or in the state of California, outside of its chief city, and it might even be shown, without fear, alongside the best journalistic work of more pretentious cities."

Otis realized, furthermore, that he could play an important part in the growth of his adopted city. He could turn his newspaper into a propaganda instrument for Los Angeles. He saw a tremendous expanse of land, worthless because it was unpopulated, and realized that here was untold wealth, provided he could turn the wasteland into a city.

With an acumen worthy of the Madison Avenue hucksters of today, he developed a combination public relations and selling program built around the advantages which Nature had given Southern California. Harrison Gray Otis began to take equal credit with the good Lord for the climate. Otis was able to reap material profit.

A series of fortunate coincidences helped him to push his sales promotion campaign. In 1886, the Southern Pacific and the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Railroads engaged in a vitriolic fare and rate war. One day, in the spring of 1886, both railroads offered to transport passengers from Kansas City to Los Angeles for one dollar. Loaded trains pulled into town carrying a motley crowd.

There were the sick, lured by the advertisements which declared that the sunshine and the pure air of Los Angeles could cure all the ills of man. The tubercular came, the rheumatic and the arthritic, and there came, too, the farmers from Kansas and Nebraska and Iowa, drawn to California by the alluring phrase "year-round farming."

There arrived also, in this new boom town, the slickers and the sharpers, the land pirates and the speculators.

During 1886, the volume of real estate sales reached the fantastic figure of \$100,000,000. Otis' newspaper

was lush with real estate advertising. Otis did not care then, as through the years he and his successors have not cared, what promises the ads contained, what falsities they employed. So long as they were paid for, in advance, the advertisements could run in his paper.

No longer did he have time to go into the composing room and set type. He delegated this to his employees, while he stood behind the counter, unctuously treating with the advertisers. From that day to this the editorial department has been subservient to the business department. From that day to this, the Los Angeles Times has ignored its responsibility to its readers when the interests of those readers came into conflict with the interests of the advertisers.

Harrison Gray Otis, the almost-broke hobo printer of 1882, was now, in 1886, a man of stature and importance. His bankbook proved it. And Harrison Gray Otis, a stranger to Los Angeles four years earlier, now assumed that he was capable of setting policy for the growing city. He decided that Los Angeles was his fief and that his will would be done.

It was in 1886 that Otis established what he called a "bum blockade."

In his editorials, titled at various times "Shall I Go To Los Angeles?", "The Times Gives Honest Advice", and "People Who Should Not Come To Los Angeles", Otis laid down his own rules for the populating of Los Angeles. Even then the Constitution of the United States was not very important to Otis. The right of free men to travel where they would within the United States must

Pride, in this case Otis', did not go before, or with, the fall. The real estate boom, for which he was in so great a part responsible, collapsed in the summer of 1888. The sick had discovered that there was no exceptional curative power in the sunshine of Los Angeles. The farmers had learned that water, fertilizer, and hard work were as essential for good crops in California as they had been in the corn belt. The smarter land sharks and land speculators had already made their killings and turned to newer ventures.

It was, as usual, the little man who suffered most and benefited least from the orgy of speculation.

It should have been obvious that the real estate boom, so completely out of hand, was being fed by falsehoods and nurtured by complaisance on the part of Los Angeles boosters. But the biggest booster remained Otis, from whose newspaper all pessimism was banned, all reports of collapse censored.

A picture of the boom, at its height, was given by Harris Newmark in his memoirs. Newmark estimated that enough subdivisions had been theoretically created to accommodate a theoretical population of ten million; that enough management syndicates had been formed to manage the affairs of the entire nation. He disclosed that \$50,000 worth of building lots which had been sold were located on a mountain top that only a half-dozen persons had ever visited.

The collapse came after a hundred warnings that no one heeded. The result of the boom-and-bust was panic. The president of a bank and the owner of one newspaper

fled to Mexico. The most popular preacher in town departed one black night with the savings of many of his parishioners. Yesterday's millionaires were today's bankrupts. A dozen men committed suicide. The only busy people in Los Angeles were the lawyers and the jailers; the courts were overwhelmed with litigation and the jails taxed to capacity.

One man, however, could look about him and see hope, not despair. Harrison Gray Otis was untouched, financially and spiritually. He could say, on April 4, 1889, "Let our wide pasture be changed into highly improved farms. Let the arid wastes be provided with an abundance of water. Plant new orchards and vineyards. Build new railroads."

And a month later he could write, "Suppose we go back to work. We are standing still. We have been waiting to bring order out of chaos left by the boom. We have a very fine climate but we can't live on climate alone. What are our wealthy, intelligent, and once enterprising fellow citizens going to do about it?"

Harrison Gray Otis didn't wait to find out what the others would do. He began organizing the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. But, if he hoped that his own enthusiasm would kindle enthusiasm in others he was, for the time being, mistaken. It was necessary for the Times to report that "there was a slim gathering at the Chamber of Commerce yesterday afternoon."

The boom had made Los Angeles a city of approximately 100,000 people. The collapse had halved that population. Otis, alone, was sure that he could replace

the vanished thousands. He began a fresh booster campaign. He appealed to "good, plain, middle-class, God-fearing men and women." He wrote many letters to old friends and acquaintances, persons he had met in army re-unions, urging them to come to this new Garden of Eden and start life anew.

By this time Otis had already managed to impose his personality upon the city. During the boom he had built a new Times building, and placed atop it a bronze eagle which he regarded as symbolic both of himself and his paper.

Lest the point be missed, the Times had editorially observed, "Every human being has its counterpart in the bird creation . . . The eagle is a noble, a far-sighted and an aristocratic bird . . ."

The scars of his social ostracism in Santa Barbara had obviously burned deep. If Otis could not be an aristocrat among people, he was going to insist upon being one among birds.

In one decade in Los Angeles, Harrison Gray Otis had established himself as the city's leading citizen. He had turned a quiet, forlorn locality into a hectic city. He had helped create a boom from which he had profited greatly, and a collapse which had cost him nothing.

He had laid the groundwork for an insularity which still marks his newspaper, the city, and the descendants of his fellow citizens. If he did not write the apocryphal headline, "L. A. DOG CHASES L. A. CAT OVER L. A. FENCE," then it was only because he had not thought of it. Yet, dominant and domineering as Harrison Gray Otis

was, he had already encountered and been bested by a younger man who had arrived during the boom era.

That young man eventually became Otis's right-hand man, his son-in-law, and owner of the Los Angeles Times. His name was Harry Chandler.

CHAPTER 3

THE CHANDLER WAY

—OR ELSE

There are certain combinations — either of men or things — which appear to have been ordained by some natural law. These would include ham and eggs, hot dogs and mustard, Sodom and Gomorrah, and Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler.

These two men created something bigger than the sum of their parts when they joined. They were able, by pooling their talents, their ambitions, and their drive for power, to attain far more than they might have attained individually. It is interesting to wonder what might have resulted had they been competitors, rather than partners. The face of Southern California would be far different today had that been the case.

However, there is no point to guessing at what might have been. The actuality is sad enough to contemplate.

Harry Chandler arrived in Los Angeles in 1881, a tubercular schoolboy from Landaff, New Hampshire. He had no past and, according to the doctors of his native New England, little hope of a future. His trip west was based on the hope that the booster ads concerning the climate of Southern California had some semblance of truth. These ads maintained the clear, fresh ozone was capable of curing anything—even tuberculosis.

Chandler had few assets. Not even by stretching the

imagination would he fit into the list of desirable immigrants named by Otis in his Times editorials. He was to prove that the list was far from infallible.

Chandler's first home was a cheap boarding house. About the time his money ran out, his landlady suggested that he move because his hacking cough kept the other boarders awake at night. It was not a happy situation for a lad of seventeen, homeless, almost without funds, and suffering from a serious illness.

Southern California had proved, so far, unfriendly and without much heart.

Then he encountered a stroke of luck. He met a doctor, also a tubercular, who invited Chandler to pitch a tent on some orchard property the doctor owned near Calhuenaga Pass, at the head of the San Fernando Valley.

Overnight, Chandler's health began to improve. His coughing ceased. He put some weight on his bony frame. He began to think of earning money. That thought was never far from his mind, even then, and was to dominate both his mind and his actions all the rest of his life.

Chandler had been farm-born and farm-bred. He found the orchards of his benefactor as familiar as the orchards of New Hampshire. Chandler was quick to make a deal with the doctor whereby he performed chores in return for his board. Later, he suggested a share-cropping arrangement. He would harvest the fruit and sell it to workers employed on the vast Van Nuys ranch in the Valley.

In one year he accumulated \$3,000, a great deal of money in those by-gone days. The profit had come from

the San Fernando Valley and, young and callow as Chandler was, he sensed immediately that the Valley could make a fortune for any smart man. He knew he was a smart man.

In 1882, Harry Chandler took a mental mortgage on the Valley. Some twenty years later he was to collect it at a profit high in the millions.

Bolstered by better health and ready cash, Chandler decided to return to New England and finish his education at Dartmouth, where he had just matriculated when he contracted his illness.

That illness, by the way, stemmed from one of the few foolish chances Chandler ever took. It may well have set a pattern for his future, a pattern which called for him never to take a chance when you can create a sure thing for yourself.

The risk he took was foolish, thoughtless, and completely out of character with all else Chandler is known to have done. On a dare from a fellow-student, he jumped into an icy starch vat. It was always believed that this caused his lung infection.

When he returned to school, such chances were behind him. By the standards of his time, he was well-to-do. He had more than enough money to see him through his schooling. But, he soon learned, he did not have the physical stamina. The rugged climate of New Hampshire was too much for him. His cough returned.

Immediately, Chandler left college. He would far rather be an uneducated live man than an educated corpse

—and who can blame him? He had made an important decision—he would spend the rest of his life in Southern California.

Chandler was not interested in returning to fruit-picking. It was hard work and called for much physical labor. Perhaps he felt he was not strong enough for such labor but, whatever the reason, he never again engaged in work which called for muscular rather than intellectual effort.

A study of available job opportunities resulted in his becoming a circulation solicitor for Otis and the Los Angeles Times. This was at a time when Otis and the Times were engaged in a bitter circulation fight with H. H. Boyce's newly established Los Angeles Tribune.

Boyce had been one of the original owners of the Times whom Otis had bought out. His new paper, the Tribune, was just beginning to establish itself to the greater detriment of the Times and the lesser detriment of the Express. It appeared that Los Angeles citizens, even then, found it hard to stomach the imperiousness, the reactionary editorial policy, and the contempt for facts which marked every issue of the Times.

All three newspapers were distributed by district circulators who owned their own routes and held exclusive contracts with the publishers. These district managers employed the newsboys and acted as independent contractors.

The system exists in almost the same form today because it has been discovered by the publishers that it enables the newspapers to subvert child labor and social security

laws. The Los Angeles Times has long maintained this is freedom of the press. It actually means the right to employ minors at sub-standard wages and work them sub-standard hours.

Harry Chandler's rise to wealth and eminence stemmed directly from this circulation system. Of course, it also required a dose of chicanery, mixed with a lack of ethics, but Chandler could always produce these at the drop of a dollar bill.

Soon after Chandler became a circulation director he realized that the circulation franchises would inevitably increase in value. They were monopolies granting a fixed territory. The men who held these monopolies actually controlled the newspapers since they could boost or weaken each newspaper's circulation.

Chandler felt that here was an opportunity to establish himself. Being a man of vision, he foresaw the day when newspaper circulation would be increased ten-fold, twenty-fold, a hundred-fold. And every paper sold would yield a profit to the franchise-holder.

He immediately began buying up circulation routes. Within a few months he owned every franchise in metropolitan Los Angeles, for all three papers.

Having accumulated an instrument of power, he put it to use. He became an active participant in the battle between Otis of the Times and Boyce of the Tribune, throwing his weight on Otis' side.

Chandler took the initiative by paying a visit to Otis. He told Otis, and proved with documents, that he had a stranglehold on the circulation of the three Los An-

geles newspapers. He suggested that he could arrange the destruction of the Tribune. His plan was simple.

When a Times subscriber wanted to change his paper, Chandler would switch him to the Express. If an Express reader wanted to change his paper, Chandler would convert him into a Times subscriber. Furthermore, Chandler promised that he would work on Tribune subscribers to drop that paper.

The idea appealed to Otis. It was simple and fool-proof. He arranged with Chandler that the freeze-out of the Tribune be begun immediately. The financial terms have never been revealed.

Within a short time, Boyce began to feel the circulation pinch. His subscription lists began to dwindle and, even though he discussed the matter with young, hustling Harry Chandler, the circulation boss, he was unable to find a means of halting the downward plunge.

Chandler reported his conversations with Boyce to Otis. He even informed Otis that it appeared Boyce would have either to sell his paper or suspend its publication. He promised to tell Otis when Boyce reached the end of his rope.

One day Chandler told Otis that he had heard Boyce was preparing to sell the Tribune. Otis immediately made an offer for the paper but learned he was too late; the paper had already been sold. When Otis asked the name of the new owner, Boyce said he had promised to keep it a secret.

A few days later the secret was revealed. Chandler told Otis that he was the new owner of the Tribune.

Otis' immediate reaction was anger and a blustering declaration that he would destroy this young upstart. A little investigation, however, resulted in a less belligerent second thought. Otis realized that, in a battle with Chandler, he might well come off the loser.

First of all, Chandler had a stranglehold on the Times' circulation. He might, if he wished, team up with the Express to do to the Times what he had done to the Tribune, at Otis' behest.

Secondly, Boyce had been operating on a shoe-string, but Chandler's income was greater than that of Otis by \$500 a month. And, irony of all ironies, a goodly share of Chandler's income derived from his sales of the Times.

Otis sat down with Chandler and worked out a deal. Chandler promised to junk the Tribune in return for a partnership in the Times. However, as a safeguard, he held on to his circulation franchises. Neither man quite completely trusted the other.

Few partnerships have ever begun so inauspiciously. Even fewer have proved so successful.

It would have been hard to find two men more dissimilar. The senior partner was middle-aged, florid, spectacularly healthy. He was marked by a lack of finesse, a distrust of culture, and a paucity of imagination. What success he had attained had been small. And he was entering into a partnership with a man less than half his age who had made a fool of him in a business deal.

The junior partner was shrewd, unscrupulous, ambitious, a sick farm boy from New England. A drive for wealth was paramount in him. He had no newspaper

background and was interested in the Times only in so far as he might use it to accumulate wealth from other sources. His mind was as quick as an electric calculating machine and about as involved.

Both men wanted the same thing—money. Otis wanted it in small amounts and primarily for its own sake. There was no sense of the gambler in Otis.

Chandler, on the other hand, knew that money could be used to attain power. He realized that money was self-propagating. Already his mind was at work on how best to use money to make more money, on how best to use power to create more power.

Actually, both men were to attain tremendous money and power. Since their interests were one and the same, they were to prove in partnership the truth of Lord Acton's maxim, "All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Millions of persons were to suffer from the corruption of these two individuals. Others have worshipped Mammon as did these two, but few have ever had the Midas touch of Harry Chandler. From the one newspaper he was to build for himself, for his partner who later became his father-in-law, and for his family a money-producing empire of land, of stocks, and of corporate holdings. He was to use and pervert the freedom of the press. He was to place himself above the laws he could not influence. And for more than forty years he was to be a political boss, selecting and electing candidates for public office, and then using these puppets as a means of draining the public purse for his personal profit.

All this was, of course, years in the future, a dream in the mind of Harry Chandler.

First it was necessary to strengthen the Times, which was easy to do since Chandler held all the circulation monopolies. The Express found itself, and its circulation, dominated by its competitor.

In a short while the Times was the dominant newspaper in Los Angeles.

The next step called for Chandler to change the Times from the end, which it represented to Otis, to the means that Chandler was determined to make it. Chandler saw the Times as the beginning of his career, not as its culmination.

This was a period of personal journalism; the heritage of Bennett and Greeley and Dana and Watterson. Newspapers were not outstanding business properties. It was an era when a man with a few dollars could start a newspaper and mere ownership did not make a man important. It was the new generation of publishers, men like Adolph Ochs, Joseph Pulitzer, William Randolph Hearst and Harry Chandler, who were to turn publishing into big business. Of all these men, the only one who made publishing a sideline was Chandler. He would use his ownership of the Times to branch into other fields.

There was another big difference between Chandler and his contemporaries. These latter then thought in terms of public interest. The young Hearst was a fighting crusader, a semi-Socialist. Pulitzer was the embodiment of the liberal tradition. Ochs, conservative in many ways, was a radical when the public was endangered.

But Chandler cared nothing about the public or the great mass of people. From the first day when he entered the Times, he had only one interest—his own.

It was Commodore Vanderbilt who first uttered the classic doctrine of the Robber Barons, "The public be damned." No one ever took this axiom more seriously than Harry Chandler. In all his long tenure at the Times, it is impossible to find a single act that ever was motivated solely in the public interest.

Nearly always, Chandler acted in the hope and expectation of financial profit. Sometimes, it was to gain social prestige; sometimes, merely to demonstrate his power. But there is no record of a purely altruistic act.

There are few newspapers in the United States as old and as important as the Times which cannot point to at least one crusade against special interests. The Times cannot.

There are few newspapers in the United States which have not found it necessary, at least once, to forget partisanship in the interests of the people of the United States. The Times has not.

The man responsible for this record was Harry Chandler. He gave the Times its personality, its policy and its strength. Even during the lifetime of Otis, he dominated the paper. However, there were a few ideological concepts that he picked up from Otis.

These included:

A lasting hatred of labor and labor unions.

An editorial policy that property rights are always superior to human rights.

A "booster" philosophy.

A subservience to advertisers.

Chandler found no fault with these four points. He devoted his life to implementing them; after all, they were directed at making money and anything that made money for Harry Chandler was automatically right.

I do not wish to paint Harry Chandler as an ogre. I met him many times during his life and found him charming, urbane, hard-headed. He was a man who knew what he wanted and was willing to tolerate your reasons for not wanting the same thing. Beyond that, however, he would not let you go. He made it plain that what he wanted must always prevail over what you wanted.

There was nothing crass about Harry Chandler in action or words. When, in his level voice, he let you know that he would have his way or destroy you, there was always an over-larding of regret. It was as though you were forcing him to do something he didn't really want to do and whatever happened to you was your fault.

I saw him take the same tone with some of his closest associates. Men who, when they were away from him, seemed to have an individuality of their own, became pale and faceless when they stood beside him. These men included top reporters and editors.

He never went out of his way for you. You saw him at his choice, in a place of his choosing, at a time of his choosing. Since the Times was a morning newspaper, Chandler's work day didn't begin until after lunch and stretched into the early hours of the morning. He made appointments for the hours after midnight—and you kept them or else.

Many times, when I was in the City Council of Los Angeles, I was called by a reporter or editor and told that Harry Chandler wanted to see me. I went. Harry Chandler was, by then, an institution, a force that could destroy whatever annoyed it.

You sensed this the moment you came into his presence. He was power incarnate. It did not matter that you represented the people; Harry Chandler was above the people.

There was no false modesty about him. He never said "we," or "the Times." It was always "I," and the word was accented.

But, by the time I paid him these nocturnal visits, he had good reason to say "I." Long since, he had married the boss' daughter, inherited the paper and made it the instrument of his own desires.

He was no longer the shrewd country boy, worried about his health, worried about money, worried about his partner. He was the most important man in Southern California, a millionaire so many times over that millions were merely numbers, a land-holder in two or more countries, a power in banking, politics, utilities and industry.

He had set a pattern of power and followed it. He chose "public" officials and boasted that he kept them in office. He reached into the State Capitol, into City Hall, into the offices of the County Supervisors. He influenced both state and national policy.

All this from a part interest in one newspaper. But, then, he was a remarkable man and Southern California a rather remarkable place.

LOS ANGELES TIMES: BLACKOUT ON TRUTH

The cornerstone of the Chandler fortune and of the Chandler influence is the Los Angeles Times. It is the well-spring from which all material blessings flowed to Harrison Gray Otis, to his son-in-law, Harry Chandler, and to their descendants.

There was a time when the men who ran the Times dominated it, shaped it and made it an extension of their personalities. Today, that is no longer true. Frankenstein's monster has taken control.

The present head of the Chandler dynasty, the man who nominally holds its great power in his hands, is Norman Chandler. To understand Norman Chandler, it is necessary to trace the history of his newspaper through the years. This is because Norman Chandler does not run the Times and the Chandler empire. They run him.

He is their creature; his character and actions are molded by their history.

So, before going into the story of Norman Chandler, and an examination of what he is, it is necessary to show the forces which have molded him. Then, with a proper perspective, it will be possible to examine the man.

First and foremost of these forces is the Los Angeles Times.

The Times, to give it just due, ranks high on any list of important papers in the United States. It has a

large circulation and a larger income. It is the most influential newspaper west of St. Louis, the most important in California, and a power in the politics of both Nevada and Arizona.

It is the official mouthpiece of the reactionary wing of the Republican party. Norman Chandler and his triumvirate of political reporters, Kyle Palmer, Chester G. Hanson, and Carleton B. Williams, are kingmakers within the party. They choose the candidates for local, county, state, and national offices. The Republican party, almost without exception, accepts their hand-picked slate and endorses it with avidity.

In recent years they have chosen such figures as Richard M. Nixon, who was boosted from Congressman, to Senator, to Vice-President, and Norris Poulson, moved from Congress to City Hall because the Times wanted it that way.

The Times, then, is admittedly big and powerful. Few can question its influence. But it is also something else. It is one of the most despised papers in this country.

The men who know newspapers best—the working newspapermen—have, in every poll ever taken on the subject, placed the Los Angeles Times among the worst papers published in America today.

The evaluation has come from groups such as the Washington correspondents, the membership of the Newspaper Guild, and composing room workers. They reached their unanimous decision on the basis of the Times' editorial policy, its handling of the news, and its treatment of the hundreds of men and women who work for it.

Newspapermen have a pride in their vocation. They will applaud a Christian Science Monitor, a New York Times, and a St. Louis Post-Dispatch, even when they disagree with the editorial position taken by those papers. They know that what they read in the news columns of these great papers is fair, objective and honest reporting. They know the reporters working for these papers have been told to report the facts and, disagreeable though these facts might be to publisher and editor, they will be published.

But the Los Angeles Times is a different kind of newspaper. In certain fields, the Times makes its own news, perverting facts, inventing lies. This is known to everyone in the newspaper world.

Leo C. Rosten, preparing his book, "The Washington Correspondents," polled the newspapermen in the nation's capitol on which papers were the "most fair and reliable" and which the "least fair and reliable." The Times did not get one vote (even though its own staff members were included in the poll), for "most fair and reliable." It ranked among the first three, however, of those papers listed as "least fair and reliable."

The Times has a long history of being held in contempt by newspapermen. Some twenty-five years ago, the late Paul Y. Anderson, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his work in revealing the facts in the Teapot Dome scandal, said:

"It required no particular courage to write the truth for . . . the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Such a newspaper expects it. But imagine what would happen to the cor-

respondent who tried to write the truth for . . . the Los Angeles Times?"

The history of the Times shows that there are certain types of stories which are always written from the standpoint of what the Chandlers want the facts to be, not what they are. These include:

Politics, local, state and national.

Labor news, whether local, national or international.

Corruption.

The continual battle between public power and private power groups.

There are other fields, but these are the more important.

It may be recalled that, during the 1952 Presidential campaign, the charge was made that a "one-party press" existed in this country. The Times took great umbrage and its political commentators, including Kyle Palmer and Bill Henry, beheld the charge a falsehood. If there were lies anywhere, the lies were in the columns of Palmer and Henry. The paper for which they worked offered the best proof of how certain papers distorted, censored and colored political news.

For example, one of the most important stories of the 1952 campaign involved Richard Nixon and his private fund, amounting to more than \$18,000. The story broke in the New York Post on October 18. It gave the facts, including the admission by Pasadena Attorney Dana C. Smith that he had handled the fund. It was, undoubtedly, the most talked about development in the entire campaign.

Within hours after the story appeared in the Post, it had been picked up by the wire services, was being re-

printed in newspapers throughout the country, and was the subject of bulletins on radio and television.

Regardless of political viewpoint, there was almost complete unanimity among newspaper editors that this was a big story. They printed it on Page One, and, for the next week, it dominated the political picture.

However, there was one noticeable exception—The Los Angeles Times. That paper buried the story for three consecutive days, using only a paragraph, hidden in its political stories. The readers of the Los Angeles Times, if they had no other source of information, would have been almost completely without knowledge of this important development, involving the Times' protege and many of its biggest advertisers and closest friends.

Four days after the appearance of the story in the Post, the Times finally took some recognition of it. However, the Times did so in a column by Kyle Palmer, which distorted facts, made it appear that the expose was a "smear" and otherwise sought to negate the story.

This is an example of how the Times reacts when a news story will not meet its editorial requirements.

Later on, during the campaign, the Times was caught in another act of vicious distortion. The Times, of course, was one of the newspapers which carried to an extreme the McCarthy technique of seeking to tie Alger Hiss, the convicted Red and perjurer, to Adlai Stevenson. Repeatedly, the Times carried the statement that Stevenson,

under subpoena, testified as a character witness in the Hiss trial.

The Times, of course, did not mention that the law required his testimony. It did not want its readers to know that Stevenson, a lawyer, would have faced disciplinary action had he failed to honor the subpoena served upon him.

In October, Stevenson made a speech in which he pointed out, and documented, that among those who had given support to Hiss were two well-known Republicans. One of them was Dwight Eisenhower, running for President, and the other was John Foster Dulles, already known to be Eisenhower's choice for Secretary of State in the event Eisenhower was elected.

The Times, going through the pretense of fairness, was printing "complete" texts of Stevenson's speeches. However, when this particular speech was printed, the paragraphs dealing with the Hiss-Eisenhower-Dulles relationship were censored. There was not a single line of this part of the speech in the Los Angeles Times.

This was too much, even for the Times' readers who, fortunately, had other newspapers which they could read and the radio and television to which they could hear and watch.

The Times switchboard was tied up with telephone calls from irate readers. A radio program picked up the censorship, and other examples of distortion and, as a result, there was a storm of letters to the Times.

The next day the Times printed the excised portion of the Stevenson speech, together with a lame explanation that it had been eliminated because of a shortage of space.

More recently, Walter Lippman, the outstanding political columnist in the country, wrote a series of articles evaluating the Eisenhower administration. He gave a frank and objective report. He made no secret of the fact that he felt the administration had been, thus far, impotent and cowardly in many fields.

The Times, when it printed the Lippman pieces, placed a disclaimer above the articles, saying that they represented the opinions of Lippman, but not of the Times.

This was the first time in recent memory that the Times had used such a disclaimer. During the long period when Lippman's writings were attacks on the Democrats and on Harry Truman, the Times made no disclaimer. The Times was quite willing to have its readers think Lippman spoke for them.

Political partisanship, so biased and distorted, is understandable, if not pardonable. The Times places its reactionary point of view above facts. Many persons may agree with such practices. They may be willing to have a distorted press, so long as it is a distortion they favor. And there are other newspapers, notably the Chicago Tribune and the Communist Daily Worker which are as guilty as the Times.

However, there is one field in which the Los Angeles

Times has a preeminence—almost a monopoly—unenvied by any other newspaper. That is in its constant, repeated, defense of corruption.

The Times, of all newspapers, is unable to take a stand against sin when the sinners are either reactionary Republicans or representatives of big business.

This is the most shocking aspect in the shocking history of the Los Angeles Times. The Chandler dynasty has excused, pardoned and condoned venality, dishonesty and bribery when the perpetrators were aligned with it in the interest of either reaction or big business.

Such a severe charge requires proof. Herewith, the evidence —

In the early years of this century, the city of San Francisco was looted by the worst gang of plunderers since the Tweed Ring which operated in New York in the 1880s. Its leaders were Abe Ruef and his puppet, Mayor Eugene E. Schmitz.

Their depredations were so crass, so obvious, that even their control of the political machinery of San Francisco could not prevent a public outcry.

A group headed by editor Fremont Older, millionaire Rudolph Spreckels and former San Francisco Mayor James D. Phelan obtained the services of famed detective William J. Burns and prosecutor Francis J. Heney, both in government service, but loaned to the citizens' group by President Theodore Roosevelt.

When the first revelations were made public, there was a cry of indignation throughout California, even from Los Angeles, where the Times said that Ruef was "as

watchful of his acts as a prowling coyote and as skillful at covering up his tracks as a prowling Indian."

In the first days, the Times was all on the side of the investigators. So long as those who were charged with crimes were cheap politicians, Jews, labor officials, and ordinary office-holders, the Times was on the side of righteousness.

Then, however, it was revealed that for every bribe-taker there was a bribe-giver. And the bribe-givers turned out to be leaders of San Francisco industry and business and society. They turned out to be officials of utility companies and railroads. They proved to be men who had close financial links with investors in utility and railroad securities like Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler.

The famous journalist, Will Irwin, reporting this development in American Magazine, wrote: "In the first moment of attack on municipal corruption, when it was simply a case of putting in jail Abe Ruef . . . Mayor Schmitz and, perhaps, some of the supervisors who took bribes to give away public utilities, Spreckels, the financier, Heney, the prosecutor, and Burns, the detective, had the 'united decency' of the city behind them. From the time that they went beyond these smaller fry and reached, not the men who took the bribes, but the pillars of finance who gave them or sanctioned their giving, they faced a powerful opposition from the forces that govern business . . ."

Among those who led the new opposition was the Los Angeles Times. It could, and did, attack and excoriate Abe Ruef and Eugene Schmitz, but it could not take a stand against such as Patrick Calhoun, Thornwall Mulally and their fellow aristocrats of the United Railroads. The Times was willing to see small, unimportant people go to prison, but could not bear to have the "good name" of the Southern Pacific Railroad impugned, not when its inner circle held stock in that railroad and was tied up with its political machinations. (Of which, more later.)

Now that the bribers were being investigated and indicted, the Times reversed itself. It no longer wanted corruption punished. Instead, it launched a campaign against the investigators. The paper probably reached bottom, even for the Times, in an editorial it printed about Francis Heney.

That young man had been a brilliant prosecutor for the government in a case involving timber-land frauds in the Northwest, hardly a recommendation to the Times to start with. Now, he was showing no respect for wealth or position.

In the middle of the trial, Heney was shot, and seriously wounded, by an ex-convict named Haas. The shooting took place in the courtroom and was almost as much of a shock as many of the revelations. Heney was taken to the hospital, critically ill. While his life was still in the balance, the Los Angeles Times printed an editorial, on November 22, 1908, which declared:

"He (Heney) is ignorant of the law, violent in disposition, a bluffer by breeding and long practice. He is as

tempestuous a bundle of selfishness, seeking after vain glory, merciless in his cruelty . . ."

This, the Times could write about a man who was on the side of the angels. Heney was guilty of a heinous offense in the eyes of the Times; he was against special privilege.

The Times, and those who thought like the Times and its owners, won a victory in the case of the San Francisco scandals. The lords of property never served a day in jail. The Times could take pleasure in proving to itself, as well as to the rest of the world, that its concept of two kinds of law, one for the rich and powerful and another for the ordinary man, existed in California.

Some twenty years later, the Times once again fought the same hard fight for privilege and once again won a victory. This was in the Julian Petroleum scandal which ranks in the annals of financial crime with the great South Sea Bubble of John Law in England, the Stavisky pawn shop scandals of France, and the Charles Ponzi defalcation, which it so much resembled, in New York and Boston.

In the case of the Julian Petroleum Company, it was proved that thousands of small investors had been mulcted of millions of dollars. Hundreds of thousands of shares of fraudulent stock were sold. Millions of dollars disappeared in a sleight-of-hand that involved bankers and security organizations with which Chandler and his friends were connected.

As a result of the Julian Petroleum financial holocaust, there were suicides, bankruptcies, prison sentences, and even murders. A scandal of such magnitude should have

aroused the indignation and conscience of a newspaper that believed in printing the facts. Unfortunately, the Los Angeles Times was not such a newspaper. Instead, the Times maintained a policy of dignified silence and wrote pious editorials about the integrity of the business community.

When, finally, the full story could no longer be concealed, the Times began a violent attack on C. C. Julian, the founder of the gutted corporation. This was beating a dead horse, for Julian had long since been ousted from his company by the "respectable" banking interests of Los Angeles.

Concerning these latter and especially bankers Motley H. Flint and Henry M. Robinson, the Times was silent. Flint was a one-time postmaster, brother of a former United States Senator, and a man high in financial, political and social circles. Robinson, a much more quiet type, was active in politics and associated with Harry Chandler in both the Security-First National Bank and the Community Development Association.

In this instance, as in the San Francisco scandal, the Times was anxious to castigate whipping boys, men with no financial or social background. It had, in addition to Julian, two other such whipping boys, Sheridan C. Lewis, an attorney, and Jack Bennett, a mathematical prodigy with a genius for promotion.

When Lewis and Bennett were indicted for various crimes, the Times applauded District Attorney Asa Keyes. When, however, 41 "outstanding citizens" were indicted for their part in the swindle, the Times once again placed class interest and self-interest above the general good.

For, included in this list, were bankers, stock-brokers, movie magnates, oil tycoons, men who were daily associates of Harry Chandler. They were men who controlled tremendous advertising appropriations.

Immediately after the indictments, Asa Keyes, who had been so lavishly praised for securing the indictments of Lewis and Bennett, became the object of an attack by the Los Angeles Times. In a moment of anger and despair, Keyes said: "I have been marked by the Times for vilification because I will not do its bidding."

Not long afterward, Keyes found himself under arrest, charged with accepting bribes. It is a typical irony of Los Angeles justice that Keyes went to jail, but that not a single one of the 41 prominent citizens charged with being responsible for the theft of millions of dollars ever was found guilty of any crime.

Now, back to the method in which the Times treated the Julian scandal. When finally the Times had to admit that there was such a thing as a Julian scandal, it ran a long two-column editorial which said, in part:

"The Julian Petroleum scandal, serious as it is, is being made ten times worse by unprincipled rumor-mongers.

"The actual damage done by the collapse of the oil company itself is trifling in comparison to the injury which is being attempted by willful wreckers whose activities are aimed at the financial foundations of the city.

"The sums lost by innocent investors in the stock of Julian Petroleum Corporation are inconsiderable in contrast with those placed in jeopardy by the present studied

effort to unsettle public confidence in institutions which form the corner-stone of the business structure of Los Angeles.

"Rumors of the wildest and most irresponsible character are being broadcast by carrion buzzards seeking to feather their own nests with the wreckage which they hope to compass. . . .

"There were several thousand shares of forged stock and stock endorsed with fictitious names to facilitate marketing. The names of those responsible for these crimes are known to the authorities and they will be punished.

"A large number of investors either lost their money through forced sales of stock on a falling market or are left with shares of doubtful value on their hands.

"But very little of the money paid for this stock actually left the community. The great bulk of it is still here, in active and useful circulation. Added to it are the proceeds from the sale of stock in other cities, which was of considerable volume. . . .

"Nothing is being 'covered up' for any improper purpose. Many details of the involved affairs of the Julian Company are yet to be unraveled. Others cannot yet be made public by the authorities without jeopardizing the results of their investigation. The proceedings of the grand jury are inviolate.

"Any talk of willful suppression of the facts by the newspapers is poppy-cock. . . ."

"No one is being 'protected' or will be, if the Times can prevent it. Everyone criminally involved in the Julian mess will answer for his acts, without regard for his position in the community. . . .

"The factor chiefly imperiling the future of the Julian Petroleum Corporation and constituting an active menace to the financial welfare of the city and community as a whole is the feeling of uncertainty and distrust on the part of the public, a condition directly traceable to the groundless scandal-mongering of unscrupulous persons carried on with the calculated purpose of destroying public confidence in the institutions to which the public must look for financial protection and for honest and unbiased information. . . .

"The man who, for his own purposes and without justification, deliberately sets out to sap public confidence in a bank is a criminal more dangerous than a bomb-thrower."

Here, in the Times' own words, is a virtually complete exposition of its political, financial, and social point of view. No concern for the thousands of little people whose savings were lost, whose homes were foreclosed, whose hopes of a secure future were destroyed.

What must be protected, the Times says unctuously, are the banks and financial institutions and the men who run them, because, as the Times points out, "the man who . . . sets out to sap public confidence in a bank is a criminal more dangerous than a bomb-thrower."

After all, what does it matter if thousands were cheated and defrauded. Does not the Times remark piously, ". . . very little of the money paid for this stock actually left the community. The great bulk of it is still here, in active and useful circulation. Added to it are the proceeds from the sale of stock in other cities, which was of considerable volume."

Yes, if the heart of the Times bled little for its fellow-citizens, it bled even less for those of other cities.

What mattered to Harry Chandler was that there was more money in Los Angeles, more money in circulation. There was no question that some part of it was bound to end up in his pockets, and that, after all, proved that even this cloud would have a silver lining, albeit a tarnished one.

The callousness and immorality of the Times and its owners are amply proved by the editorial position taken in relation to, first the San Francisco scandals; and, second, the Julian Petroleum scandal. But, in neither instance did the Times and its owners descend quite so low as they did in the case of Mayor Frank L. Shaw.

Here the Times sold out the city upon which it batten, the citizens who were made the innocent victims of gang-ruled administration, and the collective conscience of a million people. The Times was willing to shut its eyes to every type of corruption, so long as that corruption did not affect the interests of the Chandlers. It was willing to accept gang rule in Los Angeles provided that the politicians and their gang bosses united with the Times in a solid anti-union, anti-labor front.

The history of the Shaw-Chandler-gangster tie-up shows what can happen in a city controlled by a self-serving newspaper dynasty.

CHAPTER 5

DEFENDERS OF CORRUPTION

Frank L. Shaw became Mayor of Los Angeles in 1933. His election was opposed by the Los Angeles Times, but his administration soon became a pet of the Times, its publisher, and its allied interests.

The price for this support was the appointment of a police chief responsible, not to the Mayor or the Police Commission, but to the Los Angeles Times. So long as the Times could have its own police chief, it did not care what type of administration governed the city of Los Angeles.

The year, 1933, was a sorry one in Los Angeles. The depression had made its mark on the city. There were breadlines and soup-kitchens and haggard, weary faces of desperate men and women who had no jobs, could find no jobs and were beginning to feel they would never again have jobs. The economic life of the city was in a state of stagnation.

During the first three depression years, banks and mortgage companies had failed. Hundreds of businesses had closed their doors. Forced sales and liquidations were daily occurrences. City, county and state were unable to appropriate money for any decent form of relief.

The desperate situation was obvious to everyone except Harry Chandler, to everything except the Los Angeles Times. Chandler, and the paper he owned, would never admit that a depression existed or that it had affected Los

Angeles. Instead, the Times continued to print its booster editorials, to close its eyes to starvation, bankruptcy and a collapsing economic system.

Since the depression hadn't hurt Chandler, it did not seem a calamity to him.

Therefore, the Times could, on Christmas Day, 1931, print this editorial as a holiday message to the hungry, the hopeless and the frightened :

"Merry Christmas! Look pleasant! Chin up! A gloomy face never gets a good picture. The great battles are fought by Caesars and their fortunes, by Napoleons and their stars. Faith still does the impossible. Merry Christmas! You may be down on your uppers; but that is better than being up on someone else whom you have downed on his uppers. Maybe you did lose money a year ago; then you did not have as much to lose in the Guaranty debacle. Merry Christmas! Catch the tempo of the times. You have your life before you; and, if you are growing old, the greatest adventure of all is just around the corner. Earth may have little left in reserve, but heaven is ahead. Merry Christmas!"

There is nothing in American journalism to equal such callousness. It did not matter that the Times carried, hidden away, on an inside page of course, the story of a man found dead from starvation. It did not matter that the Times carried, once again on an inside page, a report that "Among the 1300 men working (in state labor camps) for food and tobacco are former army officers, professional men and college graduates."

No, to the Times such things were of no moment. After all, weren't the Chandlers doing all right? What else

mattered? Besides, the Times had found a way to keep profits up. Just cut wages. The labor supply was large, these days, and unorganized, thanks to the Times. Now, the paper was finally cashing in on its fight against labor. After all, that was the only reason for the fight anyway.

There was one great irony in that Times editorial. As a finale to its words of cheer, the Times had adopted the war cry of its old enemy, the Wobblies. The Times chorused, to those seeking the bare necessities of life, that there would be "pie in the sky by and by." If they wanted some of it, all they had to do was drop dead!

During the depression, the Times, as always in its long and case-hardened history, worshipped Mammon. Its god was profit. Its concern was property.

No matter how bad conditions might be, the Times could not admit it. It had to paint a false picture, depict Los Angeles as a land of plenty, so as to attract emigrants. Like *Candide*, the Times must say that "Everything is for the best in this, the best of all possible worlds."

And that went for crime, corruption, vice, dishonesty and graft. Other cities might have municipal scandals, but Los Angeles couldn't, because that might be bad for business.

Two things the Times feared above all else: Bad publicity and any change.

It feared economic, political and social change. The *status quo* was good enough for the Times, so it ought to be good enough for everyone.

Sometimes, it seemed as though this fear of change colored the Chandler intelligence, as though wishful

thinking had taken the place of reason. It could not conceive of anything being true that it did not want. That probably explains an editorial which appeared on April 28, 1932. It read:

"Governor Roosevelt (F.D.R.) seems unduly excited as to whether he or some other Democrat is to be beaten at the polls by Hoover. You can bet your best hat that Hoover will be the next President of the United States. There is always considerable harmless entertainment in panning the occupant of the White House; but the American public has no real intention of changing horses in a stream as tumultuous as this."

The Times had good reason for hoping that Hoover would win in 1932. After all, Hoover held to the economic theory that the way to water the economic tree was from the top, a belief the Times shared for it was at the economic top. Hoover was subject to pressure from the most important Republican newspaper in the West; FDR would, of course, not be. Hoover was as much a champion of private power, of *laissez faire*, as the Times; Roosevelt threatened to take seriously the general welfare clause of the Constitution.

However, much as the Times feared change in the national administration, it feared it even more locally.

During this depression period, the power of the Los Angeles Times was at one of its periodic peaks. There was a subservient City Council, presided over by a dependable errand boy of the Times, one Howard Davis. In 1931, Davis was busily arranging for the city to buy the old Times building at an exorbitant price.

A docile and inept Mayor, John C. Porter, was sitting idly by as a syndicate of gangsters and hoodlums ran a vice and crime empire whose take amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Board of Supervisors took its cues from the Times, doing nothing that might rouse that paper's anger.

The Board of Education was dominated by Times-chosen members, who insisted the schools follow a curriculum laid down by the Times, in the interest of the Times.

In the eyrie atop the Times building, the eagle, looking more like a buzzard than ever, preened its feathers. It looked down on a city that was in the grip of an underworld mob, but it did not care. Did not the mob help in keeping the city open shop? Did not the mob provide scabs and strike-breakers whenever the need arose? It did. And the price exacted for such favors was only the right to run the rackets without molestation.

Porter had been elected in 1929 as a semi-reform candidate. He beat me in a run-off in which he was backed by the Times. He had not been the Times' original choice, but Harry Chandler preferred anyone to me.

Porter may have meant well. However, being well-meaning did not mean he knew how to govern the city. The most charitable view that can be taken of Porter was that the job was too big for him. During his tenure, the crime syndicate took over. The leaders of the syndicate included Robert (Bob) Gans, Kent Parrot, Guy McAfee, "Farmer" Page, Tutor Scherer, Charlie Crawford, Tony Cornero, Chuck Addison, Charles Cradick and Frank (Rusty) Williams.

These men formed a shadow government which ruled the city. Their steadiest and largest income came from control of the slot and pinball machine rackets. No one, of course, ever knew the exact figures, but Ernest R. Chamberlain, a Los Angeles statistician, estimated it at \$80,000,000 a year. A higher figure was placed on it by the Better Business Bureau. Certainly it was an enterprise with diversified sources of income.

Commercialized vice was open and protected. Counterfeit love was for sale at any price that it could bring. Panderers paid off the police and the girls paid off the panderers.

Gambling was rampant on the "Strip," the unincorporated section of the city connecting it with Beverly Hills. That part of the county was, ostensibly, policed by the Sheriff's office.

Bootlegging, then in its hey-day, yielded a profit of millions, corrupting police and other law-enforcement agencies.

New industrial rackets, fostered by protected and professional strike-breaking, were being formed.

The widespread corruption was not completely unnoticed. There were some persons in Los Angeles who were aware that they were living in a wide-open town which had two governments, one that of the elected mayor and the other, that of the underworld bosses who derived their power from slot machines, book-making and vice.

A group of responsible citizens had been quietly investigating graft, corruption and mis-government for

more than a year. Late in 1932, they formally incorporated as the "Minuteers Association," and issued their findings.

The Minuteers, or Minute Men, as they were more popularly called, charged that the city was in the grip of a vice ring, that the police department, the District Attorney's office and the courts were ineffectual, if not worse, in performance of their duties, and that certain special interests were unwilling to do anything about these conditions so long as they could pile up private profits.

The people of Los Angeles were startled by the report. They wanted to know if it was true. After all, most of them had heard rumors for a long time; some of them had been crushed by the gangsters.

Here was the chance for the Times to take the lead in a public demand that these charges be investigated. True or untrue, the charges demanded some action. And what was the Times' reaction? An editorial that read, in part:

"It is evident that these young men (the Minuteers) are attempting to make personal capital and heroes of themselves at the expense of responsible government . . . They may become a community nuisance."

The Times was not interested in whether the charges were true. It might even know them to be true, but it did not care. It did not want any publicity which might hurt its booster philosophy. It did not want to upset a *modus vivendi* that gave the hoodlums what they wanted in return for giving the Times what it wanted.

The Minute Men had hit the Times in a vulnerable spot. In their report they had declared that municipal

corruption could not exist without either outright connivance on the part of the so-called "better people," or a willingness by these same people to exchange favors with the underworld.

Since the Times was the self-anointed spokesman for the "better people," it had to take umbrage. Since it represented the business community, it had to accept the fact that the Minute Men had attacked the Times. And it reacted quickly and viciously.

When it tried to destroy the Minute Men, the Times said one thing editorially that was to be proved completely correct. It said that these men might "become a community nuisance." They certainly did. They were either too dumb, or too courageous, to be scared off or laughed off by the Times.

It is interesting to note that, at the same time that an investigation of corruption in Los Angeles was being demanded, the same thing was happening in New York City. There, all the newspapers were united in demanding that the truth be discovered. The New York newspapers placed decency above politics, responsibility above any tawdry financial or political profit.

But the Times had no such sense of municipal responsibility. It aligned itself with an inept administration and a syndicate of hoodlums. It chose to fight those who wanted honest government.

One of the great ironies of our time is that the Times, with this record of venality, sometimes seeks to make itself out the champion of honesty in government. At times, and, ironically, this year is one of them, the Chand-

lers seek to don a shop-worn suit of armor and sally forth as knights errant.

I can say categorically that any time the Times announces itself as fighting corruption, it is actually seeking some special privilege. Any time it declares against a candidate on the basis of "morality," it actually means that that candidate does not believe it moral to give special privileges to the Chandlers. But, back to the record for the factual evidence.

In 1933, the Minute Men appealed to the State Legislature, the Governor and the Attorney General to launch an investigation of conditions in Los Angeles. It appeared, for a short time, that a Legislative investigation might be ordered. However, before a vote was taken, the Los Angeles newspapers threw their full weight against the investigation and frightened off some of California's easily frightened legislators.

They received their reward. The Times stated, on July 22nd: "One would judge that the Minute Men have been listening to some excited and somewhat hysterical individual telling fairy tales. The legislature is wise in shelving the matter."

The Times also sought to add satire to its weapons in the fight against the Minute Men. In another editorial it declared:

"One wonders if the fact of Los Angeles being in the midst of a political campaign has anything to do with the time chosen for the resolution (to investigate corruption) . . . Good subjects for investigation readily suggest themselves. It might be determined, for example, why

there is not a traffic signal on every corner in Los Angeles instead of every other corner; how often a screaming siren means a fire or an accident or just a police commissioner going out to lunch; or why members of the City Council persistently refuse to reduce their own salaries. . . . A good time could be had by all—except maybe those taxpayers who have to finance these investigations."

The more charitable might say that the Times did not know what was going on in Los Angeles. They might say that the attitude of the paper was the product of stupidity and lack of editorial sagacity.

Let us be charitable. Let us say that, in 1933, the Times was merely stupid. But, how then, does one explain the conduct and attitude of the Times in the next five years?

During that period, Los Angeles was in the grip of gangland terror. There were murders, shootings, bombings, kidnappings. Vice and crime increased geometrically.

The Times-chosen District Attorney, Buron Fitts, was involved in one scandal after another. The Times-chosen Chief of Police, James E. Davis, violated civil rights of American citizens, ignored the Constitution, and permitted hoodlums to run the city. The so-called "Red Squad" of the Police Department became an organization for the recruitment of scabs and strike-breakers. Graft was discovered in virtually every city department.

How could the Times close its eyes to these developments unless it did so deliberately? Was this the price demanded, and paid, for special favors to the Times? No other rational explanation has ever been offered.

What favors, one might ask, were being shown the Times?

Well, among the demands being made by the Minute Men were these :

An investigation into the waste of millions in the County Flood control project and the San Gabriel Dam construction projects. One County Supervisor had been sent to jail for bribery and another was accused of gross waste of public funds. However, no one had yet shown where the wasted funds went or who provided the bribe money that went to the jailed Supervisor. (Was it possible this would hit close to the Times?)

An investigation into the sale of the old Los Angeles Times building to the city. (The Minute Men charged an excessive payment was to be made to the owner-publisher of the Times.)

An investigation of the police force, especially of Chief Davis, his "confidential squad" and his "Red Squad." (Was it possible the Times did not want the activities of these two squads made public?)

An investigation of District Attorney Buron Fitts. (A new District Attorney might take the charges of the Minute Men seriously and actually do some investigating.)

No wonder the Times fought the Minute Men, played down their charges, did its best to make them ridiculous in the eyes of the citizens of Los Angeles. The Times had too much at stake. It could lose prestige and power. It could lose something even more important than either of these—it might even lose money.

No wonder, then, that it supported the administrations

of Shaw and Fitts. No wonder the Times screamed editorially that the Minute Men were "nuisances." No wonder that it unlimbered all its artillery in the 1937 election and stridently demanded Shaw's re-election.

No wonder that, toward the end of Shaw's term, it turned its fire on a new organization, an outgrowth of the Minute Men, which was called the Citizens Independent Vice Investigating Committee, better known as CIVIC, a combination of the first letters of its longer name, and CIVIC's head, Clifford E. Clinton.

Clinton, as a Grand Jury member, had turned in a minority report castigating the city administration. The Times declared that made Clinton a strange citizen, attempting "to discredit this city's government." It added he must have some "unworthy political motive."

The Times was able to register a temporary political victory in 1937. In that year's election, Shaw, with the Times as his loudest and most potent supporter, emerged the victor. It appeared that the lid was going to stay on Los Angeles, that the stink was going to stay undeodorized.

Jim Davis would remain head of the Police Department. He would continue his fight against labor, at the behest of the Times.

The hoodlums would retain their grip on the city.

It appeared that the Minute Men, that CIVIC and Clinton had all been defeated, beyond hope.

But then something happened that made the charges of gangster rule impossible to ignore. A bomb exploded

and, with it, the Shaw-Chandler-Times hold on the city of Los Angeles blew up into small bits.

A multi-million dollar set-up was destroyed over a matter of some \$2990.

CHAPTER 6

A SLIGHT CASE OF ATTEMPTED MURDER

On the morning of January 14, 1938, a man named Harry A. Raymond stepped on the starter of his automobile. As his foot pressed down, a shattering explosion occurred, wrecking the car and garage and leaving Raymond unconscious and suffering scores of wounds in his head and body.

Los Angeles had known a considerable number of such typical gangland atrocities. Victims had included gangsters, pimps, stool-pigeons, and high-jackers. Harry Raymond was none of these. He was, at the time of this attempt on his life, an investigator for Clifford E. Clinton and CIVIC.

Harry Raymond survived the explosion and his wounds. He, and the Los Angeles Times, are the only surviving principals in this, the worst of Los Angeles' scandals.

As Raymond's unconscious body was rushed to a hospital, the word was already spreading that he had been "knocked off" by members of the Los Angeles Police Department.

District Attorney Buron Fitts started an immediate investigation. He was the only top law-enforcement official in the City at the time. Mayor Shaw, then in Washington, later flew back and told inquiring reports that he knew of instances where men had been killed or injured by dynamite charges they had set themselves and believed "dead."

Chief of Police Davis was in Mexico City. He, too, hurried home and issued the following statement on his arrival:

"I will go into this case from its start and will personally investigate every possible source of information without fear or favor."

District Attorney Fitts had to walk a narrow line. On the one hand there was no way to avoid investigating the Raymond bombing. On the other, he had to make certain that his investigation did not get out of hand and implicate the real bosses of Los Angeles and the real master-minds behind the bombing.

A great deal was at stake.

To start with, there were the millions of dollars that the rackets yielded annually.

Then there was the relationship between Shaw and a certain group of favored contractors, suppliers, insurance men and banking groups.

Thirdly, it was obvious that a complete revelation of the facts behind the Raymond bombing would reveal the rotten, decayed system under which the Police Department of Los Angeles was operating.

Nevertheless, in this instance, Fitts did push through indictments and, ultimately, convictions. It took a long time and he had to endure harassment from the Police Department, from city officials, and from that outstanding pillar of virtue, the Los Angeles Times.

Within days after he began his investigation, Fitts revealed the following facts:

Earle E. Kynette, acting captain of detectives in charge of the Intelligence Squad, had been keeping Raymond

under surveillance for three months prior to the attempt on Raymond's life.

Kynette was acting on direct orders from Chief Davis.

Kynette had rented a house close to Raymond's from which he and his men had spied upon Raymond. This house was connected by dictaphones with Raymond's home.

Raymond's private telephone was tapped.

George Sakalis, a peddler who lived near Raymond, was overheard discussing the bombing. Warned to "keep his mouth shut or else," Sakalis refused to be intimidated. He was severely beaten and he charged the men who administered the beating were Kynette and Police Lieutenant Roy G. Allen.

When Kynette was first asked to testify about the bombing, he pleaded the Fifth Amendment, stating that he could not be forced to incriminate himself. (The Times, at that time, saw nothing wrong with a citizen invoking this constitutional provision.)

Even to the stupidest it soon became apparent that the motive for the bombing was Raymond's investigation of the link between gamblers, politicians, and special interests. The attempt on his life had been made to prevent further disclosures of this tie-up by CIVIC.

There were, however, a few who found it impossible to accept this fact. Among these few were Mayor Shaw, Chief Davis, and the Los Angeles Times.

The Times, unable to stop the investigation, turned its guns on the publicity resulting from it. Editorially, the paper said:

"Has it ever occurred to any of the instigators of this

Roman holiday that we are making ourselves slightly ridiculous? As large cities go, Los Angeles has heretofore enjoyed a pretty good name in the country at large. We have spent considerable money trying to maintain and to deserve that reputation. Even from the sordid commercial standpoint (sic), it is one of our chief assets. When we permit it to be thus publicly inferred to the world that conditions here are so incredibly rotten as to require all our own facilities, and a good part of the State's, even to find out how bad we are, what is it going to do to that reputation?"

This editorial was too much even for Chandler's fellow publishers to stand. Judge Harlan Palmer, publisher of the Hollywood Citizen-News, at that time a fighting, crusading hard-hitting newspaper, talked right back to the Times.

In a Citizen-News editorial, he remarked that the Times was expressing worry over exposure of corruption in Los Angeles City and County. "That newspaper," the editorial continued, "has always sought to cover up political corruption and praise the corruptionists and the corrupted."

The Citizen-News then went on, "Whether our City had a reputation of being fairly decent may be doubted. The Los Angeles Times has praised crooks in office, and if people believe that publication, they would believe that we had a good reputation. But multitudes throughout the country have always looked upon Los Angeles as having one of the most corrupt of all city governments. But if we were to consider that we once had a good reputation, are we to consider ourselves good citizens when, knowing the

facts, we would seek to condone corruption in order to maintain a reputation to which we are not entitled?"

The Times was alone among all Los Angeles newspapers in its effort to save the Shaw machine, the stupid if not criminal Chief of Police, and the gangster hierarchy which could order policemen to attempt to kill a man investigating corruption.

What was behind the desperate attempt of the Times to keep the lid on corruption, to maintain a crooked administration in office?

The answer, as closely as one can come to it, is that the Times was afraid.

It was afraid for a good many reasons, not the least of which was that too many of the friends of the Times—if not the Times itself—were involved in the scandalous administration of Frank L. Shaw.

It was afraid because an airing of the true conditions in Los Angeles might hurt property values, and property values were far more important to the Times, with its vast realty holdings, than honest government.

It was afraid because an investigation might dig into public utility deals, special franchise deals, real estate purchases and construction contracts. In all these, by reason of outright ownership or stock holdings, the Times was involved.

Of course, the Times would not admit any of these facts. Instead, the Times took the position that bombings, murders, abductions and frame-ups were figments of the imagination. Or, if they were realities, then they were of minor importance. And, in addition, the Times didn't want any investigation because it would cost money.

Fitts intermittently hinted that he would implicate the powers behind the Raymond bombing. However, these hints never turned into reality. Fitts was hardly the man to take a stand against those who wanted a quick white-wash.

Certainly, one of the would-be white-washers was the Times. At every possible opportunity it declared that there was nothing to investigate. Its influence was sufficient to choke off any chance of a legislative investigation or some action by the Governor and the Attorney General. Its reasons were both shocking and ironic.

First, it maintained that there was no need to investigate and, later, it held that the city was quite capable of doing its own investigating. The Times held that the proper persons to serve as judge and jury, as well as prosecutor, were the accused.

So great was the power of the Times, and its friends, that no thorough investigation was ever undertaken. One thing it either could not prevent or did not want to prevent—the prosecution of Kynette and his aides.

Fitts was given limited permission to investigate and prosecute. He obtained indictments against Kynette, Lieutenant Allen and Detective Fred A. Browne. They were accused of “attempted murder, intent to commit murder and malicious use of explosives.”

Kynette had the support of his superior, Chief Davis. The latter declared that Kynette had acted under his orders. Since everyone knew that Davis took his orders from the Times building, the only possible inference was that a direct line existed, leading from the Times building to Kynette.

Bits and pieces of information were doled out to the public. For instance, it was learned that Raymond had been seeking to collect \$2990 from one Harry Munson, a politician. Munson, later testimony revealed, had been a collector of campaign funds for Shaw in the 1937 campaign. Among those from whom he had received “fistfuls of \$100 bills” were Guy McAfee and Bob Gans.

Munson, it was charged, had hired a Los Angeles realtor named Ralph Gray to assist him in his fund-raising activities, promising to pay Gray \$2990. When Gray did not receive payment, he asked Raymond to help him collect.

By this time, as a reward for his faithful service during the campaign, Munson had received a political appointment—he had been named to the Police Commission!

Testimony given at the trial of Kynette and the two others accused with him, was to the effect that Munson had pleaded lack of funds as his reason for not paying Gray. Munson had gone so far as to enter a bankruptcy plea in Federal Court. A hearing date was set.

Raymond and Gray were prepared to go into court and fight this bankruptcy plea. What was more, they were going to call as witnesses such characters as McAfee and Gans. It was their intention to show the connection between the Shaw administration, its backers, and the underworld group that controlled the city.

It was known that Raymond was “hot,” but no one expected that the crooked political-gambling machine would have the audacity to get members of the police department to try to kill Raymond. How wrong they were!

Raymond was in the hospital for months, but was finally well enough to be able to go to court and testify against Kynette, Allen and Browne.

Testimony revealed that the "confidential squad" had tapped numerous phones, had conducted investigations into the private lives of hundreds of Los Angeles citizens whose only common characteristic was that they were opposed to Shaw and his friends. Included were public officials, like John Anson Ford who had dared run against Shaw; Clifford Clinton, who had dared attack Shaw; and Judge Palmer, of the Citizen-News, who had been the strongest, most outspoken foe of corruption in the publishing world.

It was revealed that hundreds of thousands of dollars of public funds had been spent, without any accounting, by the "confidential squad." The police officers had taken unto themselves the power to violate local, state and federal laws.

One consistent thread ran through most of the testimony. In addition to the political enemies of the Shaws, the "confidential squad" had been investigating labor leaders. Here was the link between the commercial and financial powers of Los Angeles, whose mouthpiece was the Los Angeles Times, and the racket-ridden administration with its gangster friends.

Repeated efforts to investigate further were checkmated. This was something that Fitts didn't want to go into too thoroughly. He knew what had happened to Asa Keyes, when Keyes had dared to investigate the connection of certain business interests with alleged corruption.

Side issues, all pointing to widespread corruption, arose. There was the peculiar case of Council President Howard W. Davis, the long-time friend of the Times. Davis faced charges of "bribery and misconduct in office" as the result of acting in behalf of some oil company clients in a series of doubtful land purchases.

There was a cry of "throw the rascal out," but the Times took no part in that cry. Instead, the Times printed a laudatory editorial. That editorial said, in part :

"To those familiar with the long and creditable record of . . . Davis, his quick, official exoneration on all charges of bribery and misconduct in office were hardly necessary. Such allegations of recreance to a public trust were too much at variance with his many years of honest and unblemished service . . . In his ten years in the municipal legislature, he has demonstrated an ability, energy and understanding of the needs of the city and of his district that have made him one of that body's most valuable members. The Times believes that service should be continued."

The people, however, disagreed with the Times. At the first opportunity they voted him out of office, apparently feeling that if the Times approved of his actions they must, necessarily, have been actions not in the general welfare. Or, perhaps, the people recalled how Davis had been instrumental in getting an exorbitant price from the city for the Times' old building.

But, back to the Kynette trial. The evidence piled up against Kynette and one of his accused henchmen, Allen. Finally, it was all in and the case went to the jury. Six-

teen hours later the verdict was given. Kynette and Allen had had been found guilty; Browne was acquitted.

The first reaction to the trial was public disgust with the administration. The evidence that had been offered, and never contradicted, aroused a feeling of civic indignation. The links between administration, crooks and special interests were now completely obvious. The maladroitness, if not the dishonesty, of Chief Davis had been revealed.

Four of the five Los Angeles newspapers backed a recall movement which was begun as the trials ended. Only the Times stood aloof. As far as the Times was concerned, there was no need to change the administration, no need to clean up the mess in City Hall.

When signed petitions piled up, all calling for a recall election, the Times stood its ground. When, despite every attempt to prevent a recall election, it became obvious that one was inevitable, the Times lined up on the side of Frank Shaw. Editorially, the Times said :

"Entirely apart from the merits of the vague charges set forth in the petitions, the present anti-vice crusade has evolved nothing more inept or less calculated to improve civic conditions than the attempt to recall Mayor Shaw. . .

"There may or may not be grounds for the Mayor's counter-charge that the real inspiration of the recall move comes from the vice interests themselves . . .

"Mayor Shaw was re-elected less than a year ago and by an emphatic majority of Los Angeles voters. If, as the present recall petitions allege, his successful candidacy was supported by underworld racketeers, then, and not now, was the time to act upon the charge. If anything has

happened since to justify so sweeping a reversal of that popular verdict as this recall seeks, it has not become public."

Here, boldly, the Los Angeles Times sought to justify an administration which had just been found guilty of attempted murder. It could find nothing wrong with a police department that was linked to gamblers, crooks, bombers and racketeers. It did not regard the Kynette case as evidence of anything except a personality difference.

The Times, which had supported Shaw a year earlier, still supported him. It blandly ignored the fact that it had brushed aside the charges of gangster influence. It, instead, implied that the charges were new and unsupported.

Only the Times could have the gall to write such an editorial. This was the newspaper which had attacked the Minute Men and CIVIC. This was the newspaper which had called the leaders of the reform movement "publicity-seekers" and enemies of good government.

This was the newspaper which had put Chief of Police Davis in office and still wanted him in office.

This was the newspaper which could back public officials accused of graft and corruption.

Why ?

The best answer goes all the way back to Harrison Gray Otis. Otis had set an anti-labor policy for his newspaper. Fifty years later, that newspaper still continued the same policy.

So long as a city administration and a police chief were willing to play the anti-labor game of the Times, the Times was willing to pay, in return, for favors received.

That payment consisted, in part, of condoning dishonesty, malfeasance and misfeasance. That payment included supporting attempted assassination. That payment included fighting any reform movement.

Was the Times paying for value received?

The following chapters will give a pretty good idea.

THE LABOR-HATERS

The Los Angeles Times and the dynasty which has controlled it for three generations are noted for inconsistency in many fields and consistency in one.

That one is an almost psychotic hatred of labor.

From the time of egocentric Harrison Gray Otis, through domineering Harry Chandler, to dominated Norman Chandler, the Times has fought the right of labor to organize, to seek higher wages or better working conditions, or to ask redress of its grievances.

A fiction has been permitted to grow that this is a matter of principle, that the owners of the Times believe so devoutly in the divine right of management that they would even lose money to uphold their belief.

The truth is something very different, and far more in character. The Times has been anti-labor since the 1880's because its owners felt, and still feel, that they can make bigger profits that way. Unorganized labor is cheap labor; cheap labor cuts costs.

The Times feels that there is money in being anti-labor. So much money, in fact, that it has compromised any real principles it may ever have had in its fight against labor. The Times has supported thieves in government, racketeers, inept police officials, stupid office holders because this motley group would go along with the Times in its anti-labor program.

The Times has indulged in, and condoned, violations of civil rights so long as these were the rights of the work-

ing men and women. It has often bragged that it has kept Los Angeles a "white spot" in the country by reason of its being "open shop." The La Follette Senatorial Committee, investigating civil rights violations in Southern California, declared:

"Our society has judged them not 'white spots' but cancer areas."

The history of the Times and its vicious fight against labor goes back to 1890. In that year, the Typographical Union called a strike against the four Los Angeles papers. The strike was called because the papers, caught by the collapse of the real estate boom, decided to cut wages a minimum of 20 per cent.

The strike was effective—so effective that the publishers of the Herald, the Express and the Tribune soon reached a settlement with the Union. Only the Times held out.

Of all the publishers, the one who should have best understood the problem of the printers was Otis. After all, he had long held a union card, benefitted from union action, and been paid union wages. Obviously, he knew that unions helped workers. That meant they cost publishers money and now he was a publisher. Well, he wasn't going to let a union do to him what it had helped him do to other publishers.

In order to continue publication, Otis imported eight members of the "Printers' Protective Fraternity" from Kansas City. The "PPF" was composed of men who had

been expelled from the International Typographical Union or had never been able to gain membership. Its primary purpose was to break strikes.

The importation of strike-breakers, special police and scabs was to become standard operating procedure in Los Angeles. Fostered by Otis, it was to be used by him, his friends, and his successors. It was to lead to violence, to vast property damage, to killings and maimings.

But the first use of strike-breakers gave no real portent of the long struggle ahead. The PPF, finding a new sponsor in Otis, and a new field in Southern California, moved its offices to the Times building where it remained until the organization itself petered out. Its members became the composing room staff of the Times.

The Union chose to boycott Times advertisers as the best way to win the strike and quickly gained the upper hand. Many advertisers, disgusted with the Times, cancelled their ads. Others, like Moses Hamburger of the "People's Store," continued to advertise, but insisted that the Times reach a settlement with the strikers. If the Times did not, Hamburger told Otis, he would have to cancel his own ads.

Here the Times set a precedent which it has since followed whenever possible—the use of a well-meaning individual as catspaw. Otis, after talking with Hamburger, agreed to meet with the strikers. With Hamburger as mediator, and guaranteeing the good faith of both sides, an agreement was reached.

The Times pledged to hire immediately four union printers and promised to replace its non-union, scab employees with union men over a period of time.

The Union, in return, pledged that it would call off the boycott.

At the outset, it appeared the agreement would be honored. Otis did hire four union men. The Union called off the boycott.

As time passed, however, it became apparent that the Times, having put an end to the boycott, had no intention of living up to the agreement. Months dragged on, meetings were held, but nothing came of them. Finally, the Union ordered its four members off the job, and reinstated the strike. That strike is still in effect!

The Times, by acting in bad faith in its first conflict with labor, was setting another pattern which it was to follow through the years. There is no example of the Times ever keeping its word to labor.

Otis, and the Times, had learned the strength of the boycott during the printers' strike. From that time on, the Times fought against labor being able to use that weapon. However, the Times has, since 1897, used the boycott itself. It has done so by means of its creation, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association. This group, known as "M. & M." was the spearhead of the Times' anti-labor crusade.

The M. & M. is just what its name implies, an organization made up of the business interests. It was brought into being by Otis and Harry Chandler and is now, as it has always been, a front organization for the Times and its owners.

Soon after Otis created the M. & M., he imported into Los Angeles an organizer for his own "employers' union." He was a representative of the so-called Citizens' Alliance,

a national open shop organization. The Times carried stories about the organizer and his work and remarked complacently, "He is finding Los Angeles a fertile field."

Within a few weeks, the Citizens' Alliance had more than 6000 members, all paying dues and assessments. Otis, apparently, could not bear to see so much money leaving Los Angeles for Denver, where the Alliance had its national office. So, just as he had created the Los Angeles chapter of the Alliance, he now destroyed it by absorbing it into the M. & M.

Otis, who never believed that union men should pay dues, insisted upon collecting dues from the unionized employers.

A contemporary description of the M. & M. of that era was given by the San Francisco Bulletin when it declared:

"The Merchants and Manufacturers Association has one confession of faith, one creed: 'We will employ no union man.' The M. & M. also has one command: 'You shall employ no union man.' The penalty for disobedience to this command is financial coercion, boycott and ruin. 'You hire union men and we'll put you out of business,' says the M. & M., and the employer knows that the oracle speaks. 'You declare an eight-hour day, and we'll stop your credit at the banks,' and the M. & M. does what it says.

"The M. & M. sandwich man does not walk up and down the streets. He walks boldly into the front door, and puts his ultimatum on paper. The merchant who disobeys the M. & M. command runs into something

which robs him of his business, holds up his payment for work when it has been completed, and frightens him out of his power of speech to rebel."

Such was the creature created by the Times, dominated by the Times and perpetuated by the Times.

The M. & M. worked in tandem with the Southern Pacific Railroad. Otis and Chandler had joined forces with that road and its corrupt political machine as a matter of self-interest. The Southern Pacific, like the Times, was anti-labor. The S. P., like the Times, wanted special privileges. The S. P., like the Times, believed in government for special interest groups, not for the people.

The railroad, through its political fixer, William F. Herrin, controlled the Governor and the legislature. And it intended to keep that control.

In 1910, however, a man rose to challenge the S. P. machine, Otis and Chandler. He was Hiram Johnson, who had succeeded the wounded Francis Heney as prosecutor in the San Francisco graft trials. It was Johnson who had insisted upon probing the source of corruption—the "respectable" businessmen and the members of "good families."

And Hiram Johnson had become a target of Times editorial vituperation for his daring. When, contrary to the wishes and desires of the S. P. and the Times, Johnson presumed to run for Governor, the Times was outraged. It began one of the most reprehensible newspaper campaigns in its reprehensible history.

This campaign was climaxed when the Times printed a story about Johnson's father. The story had been sent

by Johnson's enemies to every newspaper in California, but only the Times printed it. Soon after the story appeared, Johnson came to Los Angeles and made a speech at Simpson Auditorium. Discussing the Times and its owner, he said:

"... we have nothing so vile, nothing so low, nothing so debased, nothing so infamous in San Francisco as Harrison Gray Otis. He sits there in senile dementia, with gangrened heart and rotting brain, grimacing at every reform, chattering impotently at all things that are decent; frothing, fuming, violently gibbering, going down to his grave in snarling infamy. This man Otis is the one blot on the banner of Southern California; he is the bar sinister upon your escutcheon; my friends, he is the one thing that all California looks at when in looking at Southern California they see anything that is disgraceful, depraved, corrupt, crooked and putrescent—that is Harrison Gray Otis."

It was the first time in a generation that the Times was in trouble. True, Otis and Chandler had been quietly accumulating great wealth in the form of real estate and industrial enterprises. Their newspaper had become a valuable property. Their influence marked the city government of Los Angeles, determined who would govern the city and what laws would be passed.

But it appeared that the Times and its owners had passed their crest. There was a spirit of revolt in Los Angeles. Its people were tired of being run by Otis and Chandler. The class warfare, inspired by the Times, was taking a steady toll; Los Angeles did not care to be an eternal battleground, with casualty lists each day.

Mayor Alexander was a pliant tool of the Times, but the general belief was that he had little or no chance of re-election. And, strange to relate, the Socialists were making great strides in the Times' private preserve. They would probably elect the next Mayor.

On the state level, Johnson appeared a cinch to be elected Governor. The Times knew he could not be bought, coerced or frightened.

And, on the national level, prominent citizens were declaring that Otis was an enemy of democracy and progress. No voice was louder, or drew more applause, than that of Theodore Roosevelt, when he wrote in Outlook magazine:

"He (Otis) is a consistent enemy of every movement for social and economic betterment; a consistent enemy of men in California who have dared resolutely to stand against corruption and in favor of honesty. The attitude of General Otis in his paper affords a curious instance of the anarchy of soul which comes to a man who, in conscienceless fashion, deifies property at the expense of human rights. . . . It may be quite true that the paper (the Times) has again and again shown itself to be as much an enemy of good citizenship, honest, decent government, and every effective effort to secure fair play for the working men and women, as any anarchist . . ."

There is no question but that, on October 1, 1910, the Times and the men who made its policy were in danger of losing much of their power. Something spectacular was needed to turn the course of events in favor of the Times. Just such a thing happened shortly after one o'clock in the morning on that date.

At that moment, the Los Angeles Times building either blew up or was blown up. Twenty people were killed in the explosion and 21 others were injured.

The Times, from the instant of the explosion, charged that the blast had been caused by dynamite, planted by unionists. It still maintains this position and offers as solid proof the guilty pleas of the two McNamaras, J. B. and J. J., who were sent to prison for planting the explosive.

Other persons, also from the moment that the building was destroyed, have held that the explosion was caused by the ignition of escaping gas.

It is not my purpose to judge who and what caused the explosion. More than 40 years have elapsed since it occurred. The courts of public opinion are still divided, but that division can have many causes, including wishful thinking as well as solid facts.

Whatever the truth behind the blast, certain results soon became apparent.

First, the Times was able to bolster its charges against labor.

Next, when the McNamaras confessed their guilt, they ruined the chances of Job Harriman, their attorney, becoming Mayor of Los Angeles. Alexander was re-elected and the Times' hold on the city government of Los Angeles was strengthened. It was a grip that was not to be shaken until 1938, when Fletcher Bowron beat Frank Shaw in a recall election.

Third, the Times was in a position to re-double its efforts in its war against labor. It could get anti-labor laws passed and enforced, without regard to their constitutionality.

The most important result was the retention of the grip of the Times on City Hall. Alexander, anxious to please the Times, turned his administration into an anti-labor crusade.

Thus, a pattern was set whereby the police department of Los Angeles became the private army of the Times in its fight against labor. It became an instrument of union-busting, drawing pay from private industry and private interests. It acted in behalf of those private interests and sold the people of Los Angeles down the river of corruption.

There was no other possibility. Once the police force learned that it could collect pay—and take orders—from someone other than all the citizens of Los Angeles, it began to look for further sources of income. This income ultimately came from racketeers and hoodlums.

So, the police force ultimately was on three payrolls—that of the public, that of the Times and its cohorts, and that of the gangsters. And the Times found itself in a position where it could do nothing except support administrations that were gangster-ridden. It could not attack protection money and graft payments when it was as guilty as any hoodlum of paying that same protection money.

Such a situation, like any infection, was bound to come to a head. It did so during the administration of Frank Shaw and the period when James Davis was Chief of Police.

It took federal investigators to reveal how completely the Times, the M. & M. and the special business interests had taken over control of the police department. There is no space to detail here all that was discovered by the special Senatorial Investigating Committee, headed by the late Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr. Here, however, are some highlights:

All of the special employer groups, spawned by the M. & M., subsidized the police.

The so-called "Red Squad," of Los Angeles Police Department, under Captain Red Hynes, hired itself out by the hour or day for strike-breaking purposes. In 1934, these police were paid \$145,000 for special "after hours" services, performed during the harbor strike.

In 1935, Hynes was paid more than \$1500 by just one employers' group, the Store Fixtures Association.

The "Intelligence Division" of the Police Department (some of whose members set off the bomb in Harry Raymond's car) had a special plan of operation which detailed how policemen were to act as agents of business interests in disrupting trade union organization and membership.

(The LaFollette Committee quoted part of a letter found in the files of the Intelligence Division. It read:

"The captain will vouch for the fact that agents always bend every effort to disrupt the union and close

the case as quickly as possible. They do not string-out the job as there are many firms in need of their service at the present time.")

The M. & M. coerced fair-minded employers, of whom there were many, into following the M. & M. program.

These, as I said, are not all the facts elicited by the La-Follette Committee, but they are sufficient to give a picture of what was discovered.

Both labor and management were victimized by the unholy alliance between the Times and its stooges, and the police department. Though employers may have saved by reason of their forced anti-union stand, they lost far more to the hoodlums, silent partners of the Times, by force of circumstances.

In nothing else has the Times shown its cupidity and avarice so blatantly as in its fight against labor. History will probably show, if it has not already revealed, that the Times did far more harm to its cause than it did good.

But the Times was always incapable of thinking of long-term public values. It was always too busy seeking an immediate profit. And it did not care what means it used to obtain that profit.

Witness the instances of Frank L. Shaw, former Mayor, and James Davis, twice Chief of Police.

WHEN THE NEGRO VOTE WAS SMALL

In 1927, Los Angeles was on a prosperity jag. A real estate boom was on. The stock market was rising each day. The population was growing. Profits were increasing steadily and the Los Angeles Times assured all who read it that even better things were to come.

That this was the time of the Julian stock scandal did not bother the Times. Nor did the fact that Los Angeles was rapidly gaining a reputation as the worst governed city in the United States. Each day, it seemed, there was a new scandal. Either some official was being arrested or indicted, or he was denying accusation for which he should have been arrested or indicted.

I was at that time, and had been since 1922, teaching political science at Occidental College. Daily, I told my classes what good government should be like and, daily, I was asked why I didn't do something about the bad government so evident in Los Angeles.

Too often, I was taunted with the old saw. "Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach."

I decided to see if I could "do." I filed my candidacy for the city council.

George Cryer was Mayor at the time, and the man behind the scenes, the manipulator, was Kent Parrot. I announced myself as an anti-administration candidate and set out to learn something about the practicalities of politics. I knew all about the theories; I taught them.

In the course of my campaign, I visited Harry Chandler to ask if the Times was going to support me or my opponent. I found him friendly, affable and non-committal. His manner was impersonal. He said that the paper would make no advance commitments, but that I would hear from someone on the Times soon.

A short time later, I received a long questionnaire with the request that I fill it out. I was asked about my personal history and background, my personal habits, where I stood on certain issues and about my political philosophy. I answered those questions I could and returned the document.

I subsequently learned that this delving into a candidate's background and personal life was an old custom of the Times, dating back to the time of Harrison Gray Otis. There was a period when it was done entirely by Times reporters, but now candidates are asked to help fill out the dossiers which the Times keeps on all persons in public life.

The Times would never, of course, stoop to blackmail, but a big, thick dossier might prove helpful under various circumstances, I suppose. I have often wondered if this does not explain otherwise inexplicable actions on the parts of many elected officials.

However, in 1927, I had no knowledge of this operating procedure. I was a neophyte in practical politics. I was most pleased when I received the Times' endorsement. It has plagued both the Times and me ever since.

I was elected to the Council, thanks to the efforts of volunteer workers, who formed an organization almost overnight. They did a magnificent job. Many years have

elapsed, but most of those volunteers, who are still here, continue to work for me in every campaign in which I am a candidate.

After the election, the Council held an organization meeting. Among the Council members was Frank Shaw, jovial, a back-slapper, a hard worker, and an ambitious man. Shaw was one of those who voted to make me, a newcomer, President of the City Council. It was the first time a new member had ever been elected to this job.

In addition to chairing meetings, I would name committees and take over as acting Mayor whenever Cryer was out of town.

I hadn't been in office long before I began receiving complaints about the way the Police Department was operating under its chief, James Davis. Many persons came to me, asking that they be protected, and their names not be revealed, with information about police collusion with vice, gambling and racketeering.

Less than a month after I took office, I placed before the Chief a list of twenty-seven disreputable houses, with their addresses, and demanded that he raid and close them. The Chief said he was shocked that such things could be taking place during his administration and that he would take immediate action.

I waited for the action. Nothing happened. I telephoned the Chief and asked for an explanation. I was informed that his men were "collecting evidence."

Shortly afterward, I received a call from a member of the Times staff. He talked of a number of things and then brought the conversation around to Davis. He said

Davis was a good police chief, held in very high esteem by the Times. The Chief was doing a fine job in keeping "agitators, Reds and labor thugs" under control.

"A lot of people are out to get Davis," he said, "because he won't stand for any union organization. Don't let them fool you."

I brought up the list of twenty-seven names and addresses I had turned over to the Chief.

"You know how those things are," he said. "It's better to keep that kind of thing under control. Besides, you can't ever put a stop to it."

I answered that I could try.

"Forget it," he said. "After all, your job isn't to close whorehouses."

I didn't forget it, but I didn't get any action. When, in 1929, I left the City Council, Chief Davis had yet to move against even one of the places on my list.

That was only the beginning of my differences with Davis. I learned very speedily, from other sources, that the Times was the power behind Davis. Through its influence with the Police Commission, which appointed the Police Chief, the Times was able to keep Davis in his job. It didn't matter what evidence against Davis was produced, the Times was unimpressed. Davis was doing its kind of job.

Meanwhile there were daily complaints about the workings of the "Red Squad," under Hynes, and the "Confidential Squad," under Kynette. I quickly learned that these groups were "untouchables," that any attempt to

investigate them or to interfere with their actions, would bring stern, and effective, action from the Times, the M. & M. and the Chamber of Commerce.

They were a private domain, within the force. They made their own rules and were responsible, not to elected or appointed officials, but to private individuals and groups.

The stink in the police department was so bad that it couldn't all be deodorized, not even by newspaper chlorophyl. New scandals came to light daily. A Grand Jury, fettered by a prosecutor who was hardly anxious to delve into the police-hoodlum relationship, nonetheless indicted four police officers, charging them with conspiracy, involving racket and vice payoffs. Davis attacked the Grand Jury and eagerly and ardently defended the indicted police, just as he was later to come to the defense of Kynette.

And the Los Angeles Times took occasion to call the Grand Jury "busybodies" and declare that only disloyal elements would attack the police force.

But, surprisingly, the worst instance of police dereliction did not concern itself with graft, protection or police dishonesty. Instead, it was a case of police brutality, so cruel and flagrant that it caused almost unanimous demand that Davis be removed from office. It would have been a unanimous demand except for the Los Angeles Times. That newspaper stood alone.

The case concerned James H. Bate.

Bate was an elderly Negro county employe. He was so respected that he had been made an honorary deputy

Sheriff. One night, while on his way to a lodge meeting, he was assaulted without excuse by four policemen. He was beaten until he was semi-conscious and then thrown into a cell "on suspicion." Later, he was released and told to "forget it."

Bate didn't forget it. He instituted action against the men who had beaten him, but he died as the result of the beating before the case could be adjudicated.

In 1929, the California Superior Court issued a decision declaring that James Bate had been the victim of an "unwarranted, inexcusable and cowardly assault."

Mrs. Bate, widow of the elderly man, and her attorney, brought the case to my attention. An immediate investigation was begun and it was learned that not only had no action ever been taken against the four police officers who had assaulted Bate, but that all of them were still on the force. The case had been side-tracked by the Chief and he said he had no interest in it.

The facts were assembled and laid before the Council. Once again I received a call from a Times emissary. "This is ancient history, why don't you lay off it. The old man is dead. Besides, nothing will come of it. Davis has the Police Commission in his back pocket," I was told.

I had no intention of laying off. I introduced a resolution in the Council, calling for the immediate dismissal from the force of the men involved, including Davis. The evidence was so strong, and public opinion so aroused, that the Council voted unanimously in favor of the resolution.

By this time, I had few illusions. I knew that I was fighting the Times when I was fighting Davis, but, it

seemed to me, that here was a case which was so blatant that not even the Times would have the nerve to try to cover it up. I was wrong.

The next day the Times carried a story about the resolution and it was headed, "Council Shakes Bones of the Past." It then went on, without giving any of the facts we had learned, to declare, "Police Commissioner Mark Pierce says Bate died of old age."

Pierce had not yet received the vast accumulation of evidence. He could hardly have been aware of the facts, yet, at the Times' bidding, he had given them a quotation they could use to defend Davis.

Even while this was going on, there were a series of other cases, all involving police brutality. The public couldn't read about them in the Times. However, other persons took them far more seriously. The Bar Association demanded that there be an investigation of the police department. Civic groups made the same demand.

The Times remained adamant. Davis could do no wrong. On November 1, 1928, the Times declared editorially that the series of charges and accusations, made by the City Council, the Bar Association and virtually every responsible civic group in Los Angeles, were the product of a "small but noisy group."

In the meanwhile, the Times and its friends were working assiduously to cover up for Davis and his friends. A letter-writing campaign was begun. Stories praising Davis continued to appear in the Times. The newspaper declared that an attack on Davis was an attack on the city, that it hurt the reputation of Los Angeles and thereby was bad for business.

The ethics, the morality, of the issue involved meant nothing to the Times. It had its own higher ethic: Anything that hurts business is innately bad.

Some of us fought right down to the end of the line, but we couldn't win. The Times had a majority on the Police Commission and that majority used stalling tactics to delay any action on the the Council resolution. Week after week, the Commission "put over" the resolution. The Commission was working on the theory that if something was dragged out long enough that the public would lose interest.

Unhappily, the Commission was right. And, some months later, the Times was able to report jubilantly on its front page, "Davis Cleared; No One Rises to Speak Against Him."

A cynical politician told me there was a very good reason why the Bate incident was closed without action by the Police Commission. "Bill, you were up against a lot of powerful interests. Now, there is only one thing that can defeat such interest and that is votes. Unfortunately for you, there are few Negroes in Los Angeles. They have no power in the voting places."

Through the years, I have realized that he was right. As the Negro population of Los Angeles has grown, and its power has increased, the Times and the special interests have changed their attitude toward them. I think, should there be another Bate case today, the Times would not be so blatant in its defense of the police. But, in 1928, the Times had no financial interest in civil rights for Negroes.

However, even though the Times was able to defy a Grand Jury, the City Council and public opinion, it could not, forever, keep hidden all the rottenness in the police department. It took an outsider to give his evaluation of the police department of that day. The outsider was Ernest Jerome Hopkins, who did a nationwide research of police departments, the results of which were published in his book, "Our Lawless Police."

It was Hopkins' research which later formed the groundwork for the Wickersham Commission's report on law enforcement in the United States, a report prepared at the request of then President Hoover. The Wickersham report verified and reinforced such conclusions as these which were reached by Hopkins:

"... Los Angeles police ... still use the old-fashioned methods in dealing with crime ... expressing a theory of law enforcement more openly opposed to the Constitution than any I had yet encountered.

"... There had been a series of abnormal pressures ... The first ... exerted by a dominant financial group, fanatically anti-labor, which utilized the police as an adjunct to its open-shop industrial policies.

"Very early, the Los Angeles police ceased to distinguish between the economic dissenter and the criminal. This line of activity, kept alive by hysterical propaganda, passed through successive phases: Assistance in strike-breaking, espionage upon labor-union organizers, suppression of free speech ... and a continuous series of unlawful beatings and assaults ... This 'Red Squad' activity was undiminished in 1931 ...

"... False arrest, brutality with arrest, unlawful de-

tention, incommunicado, and the third degree, with the relative incompetence at skillful or lawful detective work which these imply, tended to last as basic police conditions. . . .

"The Bar Association's Committee on Constitutional Rights unearthed 200 complaints of police brutality in eighteen months' time and found 50 of them well-grounded.

This was the police department, headed by Jim Davis, praised by the Los Angeles Times.

And, of course, this was the police department which was making deals with the underworld through Kent Parrot.

Now we come to the peculiar thinking of the Los Angeles Times. It was opposed to Mayor Cryer. It carried on a feud with the administration. Yet it supported the police chief appointed by that administration.

Sitting in the Council, I was able to see the complete pattern. The Times was against Cryer because he showed a certain independence. He supported the Municipal Water and Power Department. He did not consistently favor those projects which the Times backed. Because he had to be elected to office, he had to act occasionally in the interests of the people. He was thinking in terms of possible re-election and 1929 was a city election year.

Davis, on the other hand, was completely satisfactory to both the Times and to Cryer. He carried out the orders of the Times and the open-shop interests. He had created an early lend-lease arrangement with them, whereby they controlled the force.

And, at the same time, Davis did not interfere then—as he was not to interfere during the later Shaw administration—with the underworld of Los Angeles, the big bootlegging interests, the gamblers, the vice kings. The Parrot group and the vice groups could make their deals and be assured that no untoward police action would cause difficulty.

My two years on the City Council were highly educational. I learned things that weren't in the books I had used as texts. I saw Frank Shaw, working toward a definite end, build up his political following. I saw Cryer lose his hold on the public.

And I learned, the hard way, that eternal vigilance is as necessary for honest, efficient, municipal government as it is for the retention of liberty.

My Council service was a post-graduate course for me. I was ashamed, angered, and excited by the things I saw and learned. And politics had gained a grip on me which is still strong.

Politics has been defined as a great many things. "The art of government." "The art of compromise." "The business of rascals." It is all of these things and many things more. We are all of us, one way or another, engaged in politics. The man who doesn't vote is, alas, more deeply involved than the one who does. He lets his government go by default.

Above everything else, politics, to me, is combat. I love a fight and politics is a continual fight. A man fights for his principles and his beliefs. He fights against other individuals, or against special groups. If he has integrity

—and I believe I have—then he has a consistent philosophy of conduct and government and does what he can to live up to it.

In politics, a man doesn't win every fight. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt lost in 1920 when he ran for the Vice-Presidency. But, back in 1929, I was full of confidence. And, at the same time, full of anger.

I was angry at the vice-ridden city administration. I was angry at the corrupt police department. I was angry at those who wanted to wreck our municipal enterprises and turn them over to private interests.

And I was angry at the Los Angeles Times, which had such an air of piety, but which would not fight corruption if it would hurt its business interests.

So, when a group of people came to me and suggested that I run for Mayor, I agreed. It seemed to me that I would make a good Mayor. Egotistical, perhaps, but a man must believe in himself or he cannot expect others to believe in him.

So, I entered the race and I was beaten in the run-off after finishing second in the primary election. The Times was against me in both instances. Their original candidate was John R. Quinn who was knocked out of the race in the primary. Then the Times threw its support to John C. Porter, a former Grand Jury foreman. Earlier, the Times had bitterly attacked Porter, but now, when it was a direct issue between Porter and me, they supported him.

I had fought the Chandlers too hard as head of the City Council. They wanted no part of me in the Mayor's office. After all, one of the planks in my platform was

the immediate removal of Davis as Chief of Police. The Times, I suppose, hoped that Porter, if he won, would retain Davis in office.

They were wrong. Porter removed Davis and it was almost five years before he again took over the Police Department. By that time, Frank Shaw was Mayor and he wanted the support of the Times.

To get it, he moved Davis back in as head of the Department.

There is quite a story in the relationship between Shaw and the Times. Part of it has already been told, but now is the time to complete it.

CHAPTER 9

BOMBS AND BOODLE

If I were asked the one instance that epitomized the peculiar morality of the Los Angeles Times when Harry Chandler ran it, I would choose the relationship of the paper with Frank L. Shaw.

This relationship etched sharply the type of twisted thinking, the self-serving and the lack of civic consciousness which has marked the paper since 1882. However, under Chandler, the Times had an effrontery that it lacks now. Chandler had the gall of the man who killed his parents and then asked for mercy on the ground that he was an orphan.

It was in 1933 that Shaw ran for Mayor against John C. Porter, whose four years in office had been marked by docility toward the Times. The paper attacked Shaw with the virulence it always uses when someone dares seek office without its permission.

Highlight of the Times' campaign against Shaw was a story that Shaw, a native Canadian, had never become an American citizen.

On June 5, 1933, the Times printed an editorial that said :

"In tomorrow's election, Los Angeles voters will select a Mayor, perhaps . . .

"The 'perhaps' is used advisedly. If Mayor Porter is re-elected there will be no perhaps about it. If Frank L. Shaw should get the most votes, he is likely to be unseated for lack of citizenship . . . The testimony of the

official records, plus the evasiveness and misinformation that have characterized the outgivings on the citizenship by Shaw or his supporters, all render it highly probable that no such evidence exists and that he is, in fact, not a citizen and is, therefore, ineligible . . .

". . . Even if Shaw were technically eligible, he still would not, in the opinion of the Times, be entitled to election on his record . . ."

The editorial then went on to cite certain portions of Shaw's record. These included :

The charge that Shaw, as a City Councilman, had been "a cog in the Kent Parrot machine."

That Shaw, both as Councilman and Supervisor had consistently voted for special assessments and condoned extravagance.

That Shaw had "traded on human misery" in the manner in which he administered relief funds.

This editorial was the culmination of the campaign against Shaw. Here, as in other editorials, the Times stressed the one great virtue it had found in Porter's administration. It had been economical, had cut the budget and lowered the tax rate.

This was true, but it was hardly a virtue during the dark years of 1929-1933. The city budget, during that period, ignored the unemployed, the dispossessed, the aged and the hungry. The city did less for its people than did any other major city in the United States.

City services for the poor were cut, instead of expanded. Food relief was so bad that there were actual cases of starvation.

The Times buried stories of starvation deaths deep inside the paper, if it printed them at all.

I suppose Harry Chandler, like all the rest of us, would not turn a starving man from his door. But he could never conceive that it was the responsibility of government to help those who were unable to help themselves. Such help would obviously cost money. Money would have to come from the taxpayers. And Harry Chandler had a distaste for taxes, especially those he had to pay.

Besides, Harry Chandler didn't think that poverty was so bad—for others. In a lyrical editorial, written when the depression was at its worst, the Times rhapsodized:

"Turn back the creaking hinges and let Poverty in. Make room for her gracious presence in the guest chambers of your heart."

Thus, in 1933, the Times could cheerfully overlook mass poverty and point to the administration of Porter as one in which "the taxpayers are reaping very real and very substantial benefits . . ." It made no mention of those thousands who were no longer taxpayers or realty owners.

In speaking of taxes, the Times never mentioned that its owners were among the largest taxpayers in Los Angeles, and that what was good for the smallest taxpayer was far better for the largest.

The people of Los Angeles did not feel as did the Times. They were aware of the breadlines, the flop-houses, the tarpaper shacks. They didn't know what kind of mayor Shaw might prove to be, but they were willing to bet their votes that he couldn't be worse than Porter. They elected Shaw.

At first the Times did not approve the people's choice. After Shaw took office, he was subjected to an editorial barrage. The moot citizenship was referred to frequently. Those City Councilmen favorable to, and favored by, the Times made Shaw's official life difficult.

Then Joe Shaw, the Mayor's brother, appeared on the local scene. An ex-officer in the Navy, he resigned his commission to become his brother's confidential aide. It was reported that he had arranged a peace conference with Chandler. Soon rumors circulated that an agreement had been reached.

These rumors became accepted as fact when Davis was reappointed Chief of Police, a step not even the docile Porter had permitted. While Porter was Mayor, Davis had been in charge of traffic.

The attacks on Shaw ceased. Instead, words of praise became common in the Times editorials and political notes. And some of the Times' pet city projects, like the peculiar amendments to the 1928 lease on the city's airport, at Mines Field, were pushed. It appeared the perfect marriage of convenience. The honeymoon lasted until 1938.

When Shaw's first term neared its end in 1937, he was enthusiastically endorsed for re-election by the Times. County Supervisor John Anson Ford, who was the candidate of CIVIC and the reform groups, became the target of the Times' practised vituperation.

On April 4, 1937, the Times printed a two-column picture of Shaw and captioned it, "HIS RECORD COMMENDS RETENTION."

The same day there was an editorial which stated :

"... Wild and reckless charges are being hurled these last few days of the campaign . . . The voter is being given the 'rush act.' He is not allowed to ponder the fact that, on the whole, the city administration is satisfactory, that no accusation of malfeasance can be substantiated against our city officials.

"Let the voter . . . observe the balanced city budget, the surplus in the city treasury . . .

"... A part of the campaign of Ford is the charge that city officials allow vice to flourish and he will clean it up. Reform, like charity, should begin at home. Let Mr. Ford attend to the Santa Monica Boulevard 'strip'.

"The Times believes the best interests of the City will be served by the election of Mayor Shaw, City Attorney Chesebro and Controller Hoyer . . ."

In 1937, the Times once again had an "economy" candidate. Shaw, like Porter, had achieved a balanced budget at the price of human misery. True, Los Angeles conditions had been alleviated by New Deal funds and the recovery begun in 1933, but not at the price of increased local property taxes.

There were many reasons for the Times to prefer Shaw to Ford. The latter was a Democrat and, while the Mayor's office is non-partisan, the Times has always preferred that it be occupied by a non-partisan Republican.

In addition, Ford, as Supervisor, had dared to ask that the Chamber of Commerce account for the hundreds of thousands of dollars which it received from the city and the county. Ford thought that the Chamber had no more right to a blank check than anyone else who dipped into

public funds. The Times thought differently. After all, an accounting might result in a cut in appropriations, thus decreasing the amount of advertising the Chamber bought in the Times.

Ford, too, had dared attack Davis and say that Davis and his police force were violating the civil rights of the citizens. The Times examined that situation and rendered a verdict :

"Withal, the police department has not interfered unnecessarily with the citizens."

When Ford brought up the question of Shaw's citizenship, and called attention to Kent Parrot's influence on Shaw, the Times ignored both points completely.

With the Times and Chandler on his side, Shaw was returned to office in 1937. The Times cast a benign smile in the direction of the voters. They had done well; they had heeded the master's voice.

But the serenity did not last long. Scandals that had been hushed up and glossed over, or even ignored by the Times, now broke into the open. The people, led by the Minute Men and CIVIC, decided they had made a mistake in 1937. A recall petition was circulated, signed and legalized.

A new election was ordered for 1938, with Judge Fletcher Bowron as the candidate behind whom the anti-Shaw, anti-Times elements of the city united.

The recall, never a favorite of the Times, for it cost money and jeopardized its power, brought forth this shrewish comment from the paper :

"The Times is convinced that the best interests of the

city will be served by emphatic defeat of the recall movement.

"The issue is one which the Times considers itself qualified to view from an entirely unbiased and non-political viewpoint. It has not always agreed with, nor supported Mayor Shaw, but . . .

"Conceding that Los Angeles suffers from the average ills of the average large city, the Times still believes that it is unnecessary to burn down the barn to get rid of a few rats . . .

"Mayor Shaw . . . has served the community in major capacities for 13 years, continuously, faithfully and well . . . By and large, his is an unusual record of exceptional qualifications and experience . . . It is only fair to say that in all his public career no reflection has ever been cast upon his personal character, his official integrity, his capability and efficiency . . ."

This really represented a 180-degree turn in the thinking of the Times. Moreover, it demanded that the Times' readers also make the same turn. After all, they had been assured by the Times in 1933 that Shaw was a boss-controlled, inept politician with a sad record in public office and a blot on his claim to citizenship.

The people were certainly entitled to some explanation for the reversal by the Times. After all, if the Times had told the truth about Shaw in 1933, it was lying about him now. And if the Times and Harry Chandler had maligned Shaw in 1933, why did they not say so now?

If they expected an explanation, they were disappointed. And only those who didn't know Harry Chand-

ler could expect an explanation. Those who did know him, knew he never explained. Things were as he wanted them to be.

The simple truth, of course, is that in 1933 it suited Harry Chandler's purposes to attack Shaw. In 1938, it suited them equally to come to his defense.

This leaves unanswered the question as to which Frank Shaw was the real Frank Shaw. The easiest way to find that answer is to go to the record and compare it with the position taken by Chandler and his newspaper in 1938.

Just before the recall election, the Times declared editorially that Shaw had governed the city well. "The city government," it said, "works evenly and smoothly. The police department . . . has reduced the rate of crime and has prevented the disorder characteristic of other major cities."

What does the record show?

Certainly a major element of the city machine was the police department. How evenly and smoothly did this work under Shaw and Davis?

As far as Chandler was concerned, quite well. Davis granted Hynes and his "Red Squad" and Kynette and his "Confidential Squad" autonomy. This permitted Hynes to turn the men under him into a private police force, working for various special interests, among them anti-labor groups and Santa Anita race track, both close to Harry Chandler's heart.

Kynette was able to turn his men loose so that they could pry into the private affairs of labor officials, anti-Shaw and anti-Chandler leaders, and others who might

seem to him likely subjects. Before he was finished, he almost succeeded in turning the group into a "firing squad." It was not Kynette's fault that the job was bungled.

And it was Davis who sought to impose a boycott against the movement into California of those who had been forced from their homes in Oklahoma and Arkansas and other devastated sections. In violation of Federal law, he attempted to prevent the free movement of American citizens from one state to another and, if others had reacted as the Times did, he might well have succeeded in thus breaching the Constitution.

It took Federal action to put a halt to the police blockade.

Of course Davis was only doing, by illegal force, what Harrison Gray Otis had sought to do by editorial, some fifty years earlier. Otis didn't want this type of settler to come to California either. He didn't include him in a list of those whom he favored.

Now to the claim by the Times that the police had "reduced the rate of crime."

The record reveals something quite different. What the police had done was to so alter its records and statistics that Federal authorities refused to accept them as valid. It is very easy to reduce the number of felonies by listing them as misdemeanors and this was what the Los Angeles Police Department, under Davis, was doing.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was unwilling to accept Davis' figures and it was not until some years later,

under another police chief, that the statistics of Los Angeles crime were brought up to a level where they were honored by other law enforcement agencies.

It may have been that Chandler and the Times were unaware of the truth when they boasted of Los Angeles' crime record. Their error was a serious one. The crime rate in Los Angeles was one of the highest in the country, if judged by the same yardstick used by other major cities.

Now, for another statement made by the Times. "No charge of incompetence or corruption has been sustained against any of the city's far-flung activities and departments."

What does the record show?

First, that there existed widespread vice, gambling and corruption within the city. The evidence offered by the Minute Men and CIVIC was in the public record, carefully ignored by the Times.

Then, a member of Shaw's Police Commission had been revealed as attorney for some of the members of the syndicate who controlled vice and gambling.

Also, Police Lieutenant Pete Del Gado and the Mayor's brother, Joe Shaw, had been indicted for their connection with vice and the sale of city jobs. Del Gado, free on bail of \$15,000, chose to escape to Mexico and forfeit his bail, rather than face trial. The District Attorney then blandly asked that the indictment against Joe Shaw be dismissed, on the ground that without Del Gado's testimony, the State had no case against Shaw!

And Al Lushing, appointed to the Board of Water and Power Commissioners by Shaw, was indicted and convicted of running a protection racket.

Shaw's reaction to Lushing's arrest was, "I always regarded Mr. Lushing as a good citizen."

This list is far from complete; it is intended only as evidence that the Times erred purposely when it declared "no charge of incompetence or corruption has been sustained . . ."

Now, all this was before Earle Kynette and his accomplice triggered the bomb that almost killed Harry Raymond. Certainly that explosion should have proved to Harry Chandler that he could fool all the people of Los Angeles only some of the time. It didn't.

The Times continued to stand behind Shaw and all the crookedness, violence and corruption that marked his administration.

The question is: Why?

The answer must be complex, as Harry Chandler was complex. In the first place, Chandler knew he had great power. No matter what happened to Shaw, to his henchmen, or to the police department, Chandler was certain that nothing would happen to him. After all, he had already beaten one Federal indictment and further indictments probably held no terror for him.

But what did he have to gain from aligning himself with proved corruption?

One point has already been covered. He believed that any means was justified so long as the end was the destruction of labor unions and the organization of laboring men and women. This, above all, was important to him.

If it were done illegally and immorally, he did not care. After all, the punishment would fall upon his instruments, not upon him.

Further, property was his god. He judged all things by their material value. His importance was built upon the property he possessed. As it grew in value, so did his importance and power. Since much of his wealth was centered in and about Los Angeles, he must do everything possible to make Los Angeles bigger and richer.

He, therefore, used the Times to cover up crime and corruption. He shut down on bad publicity, thus making it easier for the criminals and the vice kings to operate. They were given a newspaper curtain of darkness behind which to work. After all, the Chamber of Commerce might have difficulty getting new industry to locate here if it were printed that a City Commissioner was the head of a shake-down ring.

The cover-up had other virtues. The Times was a powerful weapon for Chandler's friends and against his enemies. Each time the Times played down, mocked, or ignored charges against Shaw, Chandler put Shaw further into his debt. And Harry Chandler was not one to let a debt go unpaid.

When big contracts were let, when supplies were purchased, when new projects were begun, the Times and its friends could be assured they would receive favorable treatment. With the vast and diversified holdings that the Chandler interests possessed, there was hardly a public dollar spent from which they did not manage to profit.

These conclusions are justified by the record. The Times and its owners could not have been so blind as not

to see what was obvious to everyone else in Los Angeles. They could not have been so stupid as to misunderstand the facts. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that they reversed themselves on Shaw because it was to their interest and their profit.

Over a period of time, Shaw had been converted into a negotiable asset by Chandler and the Times. They did not want to lose this asset. After all, it represented money. That, at the same time, Shaw was able to cash in on it didn't matter to Chandler. He was not one who contributed to Shaw.

Therefore, the Times, to protect its asset, backed Shaw against Ford in 1937 and Shaw against Judge Bowron in 1938. The Times won the first time and lost the second.

Bowron was to remain Mayor for fifteen years, during which the Times would be opposed to him more often than not. Ultimately, the Times would lead the unsavory coalition which defeated Bowron, which is part of the story of Norman Chandler and it is not yet time for that.

Now, we are still dealing with Harry Chandler, a man who was able to work miracles. Like changing a desert into a profit of \$100,000,000 merely by passing ordinary water over it. Someone else, of course, paid for the water.

MILLIONAIRE WATERBOYS

On July 1, 1935, the Los Angeles Times printed a special edition to mark the dedication of its new building, the one which it still occupies. In an editorial replete with self-praise, the Times boasted:

" . . . In these major developments which have contributed most to the city's (Los Angeles') growth—its harbor, its present and potential water supply, its industrial policy, the great highway system of which it is the center, the world-wide exploitation of its manifold attractions and the upbuilding of its agricultural hinterland—the Times has played a consistently leading part . . ."

The Times, with unusual modesty, did not take credit for its part in the building of the new Civic Center, possibly because the stench arising from the sale of the old Los Angeles Times building to the city still lingered in the nostrils of the public.

It might have been modesty, too, which prevented the Times from using the most fitting adjective when it declared that it had taken a "consistently *leading* part" in all these major developments. The proper word should have been "profitable."

To the one-track minds of Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler, a civic project became worthy only when it tended to enlarge their fortunes. And, in this light, the claims of the Times, in its editorial, will be examined.

The Times did play an important—possibly even the

decisive—part in the creation of the great man-made harbor at San Pedro.

The harbor was to become the necessary facility which made it possible for Los Angeles to develop into the largest city on the West Coast. It helped enlarge Los Angeles from a town into a city. It helped move the industrial heart of California from San Francisco to Los Angeles.

Only the Times, of all the newspapers in Los Angeles, fought for San Pedro as the site of the harbor.

And it fought against a most redoubtable foe, Collis P. Huntington of the Southern Pacific. Huntington wanted the port to be located in Santa Monica. His reasons were many. To start with, Huntington and some close friends, including one U. S. Senator, owned all the land whose value would be increased by building a harbor at Santa Monica. Secondly, it would have been impossible for any other road to build tracks to the harbor. A sheer cliff prevented that.

The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, on the other hand, wanted the harbor to be built at Redondo Beach. The Santa Fe insiders and their friends owned all the real estate whose value would be increased if Redondo Beach became the harbor site.

Should Santa Monica be chosen as the harbor site, the Santa Fe stood to lose millions of dollars worth of business. Who would ship on a railroad that had no seaport terminal? So, while the Santa Fe would have preferred Redondo Beach, it was only too happy to join forces with the Times, which favored creation of a port at San Pedro.

The best sites in the San Pedro area were, of course, held by the Otis-Chandler group and many of their associates. If any profit was to be made by reason of realty speculation, this group would make it. But, Santa Fe reasoned, half a port was far better than none.

In this battle of the titans, the Otis-Chandler power met a stern test. Huntington had many of the friends that money could buy in Washington. Others were on the side of the San Pedro development.

Huntington even invaded the Otis-created Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Since not all of its members had been let in on the San Pedro deal, a small group was quite willing to go along with Huntington. The majority, however—knowing that no matter what happened in this instance, they would have to exist in the same city as the Times—stayed with the San Pedro project.

The Times won in Washington, thus assuring the Santa Fe of equality with any other road in harbor facilities. The harbor was built at San Pedro. The real estate speculators who had been let into the deal made their profits.

Let it not be said that the Santa Fe has failed in gratitude to those who fought with them against Huntington. After all, is not Norman Chandler a director of the Santa Fe?

Also on the list of developments for which the Times took credit was the "industrial policy" of the city. This must be granted without argument.

If anyone was responsible for what the Times called the "Forty Years War" between labor and management,

it was the Times. And the Times can take credit for continuing that war down to the present day.

It is a dubious honor. It has brought censure from a Senatorial Committee, caused death, injury and untold violence. It has destroyed civil rights in Los Angeles, helped demoralize the police department, and aided the growth of protection rackets.

Obviously, its anti-labor policy has been profitable for the Times. What it has cost others does not matter to the Times.

Nor is there any question but that the Times played an outstanding part in the "world-wide exploitation of the manifold attractions" of Los Angeles. Much money has been spent in advertising these attractions, a good part of it in the Times. Its creatures, the Chamber of Commerce and the All-Year Club, have been allowed to tap the public till and spend public appropriations in a manner pleasing to the Times.

The tourist industry brings hundreds of millions of dollars into Southern California. The Times, as well as other Chandler interests, gets a good share of those dollars. So long as this continues, the Times will maintain its "booster" campaign.

And the Times has also played a large part in the "up-building of the . . . agricultural hinterland." The Chandlers own a good deal of that hinterland. They control a ranch of almost 300,000 acres which straddles the Los Angeles-Kern County line. They have vast holdings in Baja California and in the Imperial Valley.

They also own a 275,000-acre ranch in New Mexico, but not even the Times, which claims almost everything,

has yet dared to claim that sovereign state as the "hinterland" of Los Angeles.

This boast, then, also stands up. Agriculture has made the rich Chandlers richer.

So, too, does the claim that the Times should be credited for helping develop the city's great highway system. This is especially true in relation to the San Fernando Valley, about which more very shortly. It can be said safely there is no piece of Chandler property, no matter where located, which is not near or on, a road built by public funds, either local, county, state or federal.

Some of these roads were built after the Chandlers bought the property, thus increasing its value, but that could be a happy coincidence.

One other item remains: the part the Times played in the development of the "present and potential water supply" of Los Angeles. The Times did play a part—and what a part. It is a question, however, whether the Times and its owners have any right to point with pride, in this instance.

The water project was more Harry Chandler than Harrison Gray Otis. It called for finesse, for devious thinking, for vision. It called for scheming and planning and cunning. Chandler possessed a greater store of these qualities than did his father-in-law.

Los Angeles today gets its water primarily from the Owens River. By reason of the water supply, Los Angeles has been able to grow in population from 102,479 in 1900 to about 2,000,000 persons today, and to increase in area from 43 square miles to 455 square miles in the same period.

Owens River water has made Los Angeles an industrial city.

Because of that water—and note this well—the San Fernando Valley was turned from desert to a land of plenty, populated by a million people.

Nothing wrong with any of these, of course. Each point can be marked down as an asset.

On the other side, because Los Angeles got the Owens River water, the beautiful Owens Valley in Central California near the Nevada border was made barren.

Once—before Los Angeles gained a monopoly of Owens River water—the Owens Valley was a lush, green oasis, supporting some 10,000 people in prosperous farming communities. Fields were high with corn and wheat. Cattle grazed on good pasture land.

Today, the Valley is a graveyard, where the hopes of many men and women are buried. Here and there, a chimney still stands. Only cactus and sage grow where once corn flaunted its golden tassels in the wind.

Nothing to be proud of here. Especially when it was unnecessary.

One more point. If Los Angeles had not found a way to get the water of the Owens River for its thirsty, ever-growing population, the Chandler fortune would today be considerably less than it is.

Morrow Mayo, in his book, "Los Angeles," declared, ". . . It may be said that Los Angeles gets its water by reason of one of the costliest, crookedest, most unscrupulous deals ever perpetrated . . ."

That indictment has never been challenged. Instead, there has been a type of *sub rosa* suppression of the book. Is the indictment true?

The best way to judge is to examine the facts.

I would first like to make clear that I believe it was most fortunate that Los Angeles was able to acquire an adequate water supply, and that I think the Municipal Water and Power Department has done a fine job against great odds.

I have fought long and earnestly for that Department, nearly always in opposition to the Times. The record shows that the Department gives excellent service at rates lower than those charged by comparative private utilities. That may be why the Times would like to see the city's water and power turned over to a private utility, preferably, I suppose, one in which the Chandlers have an interest.

Mr. Mayo also grants these points. His indictment is based on the men who were behind the procurement of the Owens River water and the methods they used. Here, briefly, is the story of those men, among whom Harry Chandler loomed large, and their methods.

At the turn of the century, it was apparent that Los Angeles needed water in order to grow. If it did not grow, then property values would decline and the local economy stagnate. A group of bankers, industrialists and business men began to seek ways to get more water. They discovered the potentialities of the Owens River and decided to get that water for their city.

They are not to be condemned for getting the water but for the manner in which they got it.

The Owens Valley is 250 miles north of Los Angeles. Just 20 miles north of Los Angeles, however, is the San Fernando Valley. In 1900, a bare expanse, its land incapable of producing anything more than sandstorms

when the wind blew, the San Fernando Valley appeared to be just 150,000 acres of futility. But Harry Chandler, and a few of his chosen associates, saw it differently. To them it seemed a new Comstock Lode, just waiting for their picks to dislodge its untold wealth.

For their plan, conceived in secret and executed in secret, called for using the water of the Owens River for irrigating this land. They saw, and grasped, an opportunity to combine private profit with a "public" service.

The plan broke down into three parts:

Get control of the Owens River.

Buy up large parts of the San Fernando Valley at rock-bottom prices.

Get the city to build an aqueduct that would run, not 250 miles to Los Angeles, but 230 miles, to the head of the San Fernando Valley, so that the water could be made to flow through the Valley.

There were simple, honest, straightforward means which could have been used to effect the first part. An equitable arrangement could have been made. The settlers of the Owens Valley could have been compensated for any loss and guaranteed sufficient water to maintain their farms and ranches. Such a fair plan, however, would have let the public in on the profitable enterprise, and that couldn't be.

Instead, the planners deemed it necessary to corrupt officials of the United States Reclamation Service, the city officials and Washington office-holders to assure themselves of private gain.

They secretly hired the chief engineer of the Reclamation division and sent him to the Owens Valley, ostensibly as a reclamation official, but actually to survey what

land and what water rights had to be obtained so that the city of Los Angeles (when it was let in on the plan) would have to spend the minimum of money for this land and these rights.

Next, they made a deal with the then Mayor of Los Angeles, Fred Eaton, whereby he would be let in on the good thing. This enabled them to get all the help they needed unofficially. Later, when Eaton's term expired, he was sent north to buy up land and water rights. He was permitted a fair profit for himself.

Thirdly, the group prevailed on the United States Forest Service, by means of pressure in Washington, to declare the desert land of the Owens Valley a Federal forest district!

All this time, an inner clique, headed and directed by Harry Chandler, M. H. Sherman, Henry Huntington, E. H. Harriman and the banker, Joseph F. Sartori, were buying up land in the San Fernando Valley for prices ranging from \$5 to \$20 an acre. (Sherman, by the way, was a member of the Los Angeles water board.) Eventually, the group gained control of 108,000 acres.

Since all the maneuvering took years, there were some leaks. People in the Owens Valley became suspicious when they saw Los Angeles officials and Los Angeles bankers prowling through their country. By the time they knew what was happening, however, the Forest Service had done its job and Eaton had completed his.

And the other Los Angeles papers also heard that a big project was under way and demanded to know what it was. They were told, under a pledge of secrecy. The promise was given by city officials that, when it came

time to break the story, all papers would be able to print it at the same time.

Next, it was necessary for the group to condition the city of Los Angeles to vote for a bond issue of millions to finance the aqueduct from the Owens River.

Stories began to appear in all the papers, reporting that the city faced a water shortage. The Times wrote editorials warning that the people faced death from thirst. The other papers followed suit, not knowing they were being used by the Times and its owners.

Large quantities of water were diverted from the reservoirs and storage dams, creating a water famine. This was done through the Water Board, of which Sherman was a member.

Then, on July 29, 1905, the Times, ignoring its agreement with the other papers, printed the story of the vast supply of water in the Owens Valley available to Los Angeles. It filled three pages with facts, figures and fancy. Nowhere, of course, did it mention that the water would also be used to irrigate the San Fernando Valley.

The other newspapers shouted their anger and frustration. They accused the Times of lacking integrity. Since that charge had been made so many times before in the history of the paper, and it was almost universally accepted by the people of Los Angeles, the repetition had little effect on either the owners of the Times or its circulation.

In the weeks preceding the balloting on the bond issue, the water shortage grew ever more acute. Just before Election Day, the City Council passed an ordinance prohibiting spraying of lawns and gardens!

The bond issue, calling for expenditure of \$4,250,000, carried overwhelmingly. Before the aqueduct, the dams and the necessary reservoirs were concluded, there would be more bond issues, reaching a grand total of \$22,500,000.

Next, a law was passed which called for building an aqueduct from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles. Here was the roadblock in the plan of the Chandler, Sherman, Sartori group.

It might have stumped lesser men, but it barely tapped the resources of this group. They came up with a ready solution: annex the San Fernando land to Los Angeles. This took only a short time to be effected. A goodly section of the San Fernando Valley found itself within the city limits of Los Angeles and, included in that section, were the 108,000 acres owned by the syndicate.

Another impediment suddenly appeared. The bill that President Theodore Roosevelt recommended to legalize the Los Angeles aqueduct, included a prohibition against using the water for agricultural purposes. Should the bill become law, all the planning and scheming would have proved futile. And the schemers knew that they could not reach the President.

But they could reach Senator Frank P. Flint, a puppet who had been sent to the United States Senate by a group of special interests, primarily the Times and the railroads. Flint was given his instructions and he raced to the White House and pleaded against the provision, saying it would debar the citizens of Los Angeles from using Owens River water even for their lawns and gardens.

Roosevelt later declared that Flint assured him the water would be used for domestic purposes only, that there was no way for it to be used in agriculture. On the basis of Flint's assurance, the President had the offending paragraph deleted from the bill as it was finally passed and signed.

However, the syndicate had made no promises and had no intention of keeping any Flint had made. They were ready to shoot the works.

Almost immediately, the syndicate began to advertise its San Fernando holdings for sale. One of its biggest sales points was that the land would soon be irrigated by water from the new aqueduct, whose terminal would be at the upper end of the valley. Another sales argument was the accessibility of the land. For, almost as soon as they arranged for the Valley area to be annexed, the syndicate also arranged for a road to be built its entire length.

The new road, fittingly, was named for M. H. Sherman. Sherman Way is still one of the better roads in the San Fernando Valley. A far better road, for instance, than Chandler Avenue, about a mile to the south.

By the time the syndicate had sold all of its land, some years later, the profits totaled about \$100,000,000. The last sales were made at about the time that the settlers of Owens Valley, living in a gigantic man-created sand-pile, were packing their few belongings into the backs of wagons and preparing to leave their homes.

The destruction of the farms and ranches of the Owens Valley was as heartless as any single action ever performed by one group of American citizens against another. Heartless and unreasonable.

It would have been a simple matter to have so built the aqueduct that the Valley would have a supply of water. After all, the Owens River still supplies enough water for the 2,000,000 inhabitants of the city of Los Angeles with plenty left over to care for many times the number of persons who might populate the Owens Valley.

But the promoters had no interest in the rights of others. They wanted the water, all the water, for their own purposes. Human beings were of no consequence to them.

The people of Los Angeles, I sincerely believe, would never have permitted the Owens Valley settlers to be treated so cruelly had they known the truth. However, the Times never printed the facts, nor did the other newspapers. Perhaps it was a sense of shame on the part of the other papers. In the case of the Times, it was merely a case of self-protection.

So, while the desert that was the San Fernando Valley bloomed, the oasis that had been Owens Valley turned to desert. While the Chandler-Sherman-Huntington syndicate made profits in the tens of millions, the people of Owens Valley spent their last few dollars in a futile fight against the financial giants and the city of Los Angeles.

There is a saying in California about what happened in the once fertile Owens Valley. It goes, "The Federal government held Owens Valley while Los Angeles raped it." That is only half true. It ignores the men who planned the rapine.

The Los Angeles Times was quite correct when, in 1935, it took credit for helping get the city "its present

and potential water supply." In 1935, as in 1905, it said nothing about the cost to Owens Valley or the profits of Chandler and his friends.

Not then, nor at any time since, has the Times told how much its owners and their associates profited from the actual building of the aqueduct, the dams and the reservoirs. It never told the public that Chandler interests sold supplies to the builders, named the architects and engineers and got special privileges.

These things, like the part the Times played in running up the cost of the new Civic Center, went unmentioned. After all, it might have been embarrassing to tell the full story.

They have left that task to me, just as they left the full story of Los Angeles' "present and potential water supply" to Morrow Mayo and other writers.

CIVIC CENTER SHAKEDOWN

The Los Angeles Times prides itself upon being the faithful watchdog of the public purse. At the drop of a dollar sign, it will fight to reduce budgets and expenditures.

Whenever money is sought for relief purposes, whether to aid the indigent, the aged or the unemployed, the Times has an editorial declaring piously that the purpose for which the money is sought is good, but that the city, or county, or state, or federal government just cannot afford the expenditure. The taxpayer must be protected.

When money is sought to expand the Municipal Power and Water Department, the Times fights against this "unnecessary" expense. The Times holds that any expense for this department is unnecessary.

Whenever the people of Los Angeles invoke their right to hold a recall election, the Times bewails the cost of such elections and suggests that it might be a good idea to do away with the right of recall altogether.

However, there have been instances when the watchdog has dozed, and at least once it fell completely asleep. Perhaps the reason was that the recipients of the public funds involved were the owners of the Times, the Chandler family.

In the year 1919, the population of Los Angeles neared the million mark. The city sprawled in all directions as it annexed territory after territory which wanted a share of the Owens River water.

The growth of the city was so rapid that municipal, county and state facilities were unable to keep up. Public buildings were scattered about downtown Los Angeles, most of them out-dated, ornate structures that belonged to the past. They were inadequate in size, costly to operate, and inefficient in location.

Once again a group of public-spirited citizens got together and produced a plan. This called for the creation of a Civic Center in downtown Los Angeles.

It was a worthy project. In addition to beautifying the district, it would enable government to function more efficiently. Thus, there would be a happy marriage of esthetics and practicality.

One effect of the Civic Center that was given little publicity was that it would boost property values in the district considerably. Slums and out-dated buildings would be removed. Commercial property and office property would become more valuable.

It may have been only a coincidence that one of the city planners was Harry Chandler and only a further coincidence that the Chandlers owned and controlled much commercial and office property in the vicinity. However, as a sign of the disinterest of the Times and its owners, the point was made that the Civic Center would abut, but not include, the site at First and Broadway on which the Times building stood.

The Times stated that it did not wish to sell its property and that it would not be included in the plans for the Civic Center.

However, late in 1919, according to the Times, the Board of Supervisors had a change of mind and decided to include the Times site in its plans.

In the next ten years, the Civic Center plan progressed slowly. It was not until 1929 that anything affecting the Times occurred. In that year, the Board of Supervisors bought the site immediately north of the Times property for \$725,000 and, according to the Times, notified the newspaper that it must vacate its own property.

Such notification, of course, if it ever happened, was illegal. The due process clause of the Constitution prevents such arbitrary action and the Times owners know that clause, and its relation to property, even though their knowledge of other Amendments to the Constitution may be hazy. The "notification," as the Times' attorneys must have told the newspaper, had no legal standing. Moreover, no record of such a notification has ever been discovered.

Nevertheless, according to the Times, Publisher Chandler acted on the basis of the order from the Supervisors and hastened to purchase a site, known as the Nadeau property, just to the north of the Times building. He paid a little less than \$500,000 for this property.

Soon thereafter a group of appraisers—appointed by the Board of Supervisors and the Times—placed a value of \$1,846,000 on the Chandler property.

On September 3, 1930, according to the Times, it was notified by the Board of Supervisors to proceed with the erection of a new building on the Nadeau site. Once again the Times claims that an act took place for which there was no authority. The Board of Supervisors could

not give such an order to any private citizen or corporation.

Moreover, it would be a gratuitous insult to the legal ability of the Times' attorneys even to suggest that they could or would let such an order go unchallenged.

The only conclusion one can draw is that the Times had an assurance that its property would be condemned and at a price satisfactory to the Times. Substantiation of this belief came in October, 1931, when the City Council ordered that condemnation proceedings be begun for the acquisition of the Times site and another site known as the "Klinker property."

This action required county concurrence, since the city would pay only forty per cent of any condemnation judgment, with the county paying the rest. Such concurrence soon came. The proceedings were begun.

On January 25, 1933, Judge George K. Scovel awarded the Times \$1,021,345 for the land and building. Such a figure should have been quite satisfactory to the Times, for it was about twice as high, per foot, as the price the Times had paid for the Nadeau property. In addition, 1933 was the bottom of the depression and realty prices had been falling steadily in the almost three years since the Times had made its purchase.

However, the Times did not feel that way. It didn't like the award at all and it especially disliked that part of Judge Scovel's decision which declared:

"... the processing equipment and machinery contained in the building located upon the premises ... designated ... and used in the business conducted therein,

are not fixtures or improvements pertaining to the realty, but are the personal property of the defendant (the Times) and because of their personalty do not constitute compensable items."

The Times immediately announced it would fight this award. It insisted that the old and obsolete equipment be included in the condemnation award and, further, insisted that the price be at least the \$1,846,000 set by the appraisers.

Now the Times attorneys finally took some action. They filed an appeal with the State Supreme Court. In October, 1933, that court rendered a verdict unique in the annals of condemnation law. The Court set aside Judge Scovel's verdict and ordered a new trial, ruling that the processing and other equipment must be considered in any condemnation award! This was like saying that the furnishings and the junk in the attic must be considered in the condemning of a residence.

It would have been most interesting to see what would have happened to that decision had it ever been carried to a higher court, but it never was.

Instead, City Attorney Ray Chesebro, long a favorite of the Times, decided to arrange an out-of-court settlement. His plan was to have the Realty Board and the Chamber of Commerce each choose an appraiser and have these two choose a third. This was like telling the Times to set its own price, for both the Chamber and the Realty Board were beholden to the Times and to Harry Chandler.

The City Council, whose president then was Howard

Davis, always available to do the Times' bidding, readily agreed to the plan.

The appraisers brought in their decision: the Times should be awarded \$1,875,000 — an amount \$29,000 higher than any price ever before mentioned!

Members of the County Board of Supervisors promptly balked. After all, the County was obligated to pay sixty per cent of the cost of condemning the building and this newest figure was obviously out of line. So, the Supervisors hired an independent appraiser, Alexander Mackeigan, a real estate man of wide experience and repute, and asked him to set a price.

Mackeigan submitted his report in detail. He cited the price paid for the Nadeau property and other comparative realty. He included expert opinion on the value of the printing and processing equipment. His conclusion was that \$600,000 was a fair price for the real estate and building and that the equipment, if it had to be purchased, should be bought for what it would bring as "junk" in the open market.

Mackeigan's report put the Board of Supervisors on the spot. The discrepancy between the figure of the Chamber of Commerce-Realty Board appraisers and that of their own appraiser was so large that one of the two was obviously prejudiced. And Mackeigan, reputable real estate man though he might be, had no political power, while the Times and the two associations wielded tremendous power.

The Supervisors, after seeking some way to save face, finally just pigeon-holed the Mackeigan's report, hoping that everyone would forget it.

The Times now suggested a compromise figure. It would be willing to accept \$1,630,000 if it could keep part of the processing equipment.

The Times, in an editorial on July 6, 1939, explained why it was willing to lower its price. It declared, "The best interests of Los Angeles are paramount to the Times. They always have been. This city and this newspaper grew up together."

The Times apparently placed a value of \$245,000 on this stirring sentiment.

Now it was the city which balked. The City Council decided to seek a new trial and ask a court to set a price which would include the processing equipment, in accordance with the unappealed Supreme Court decision.

Another factor then entered the picture—the Los Angeles Municipal League, a reform organization which didn't like the smell of the whole deal. The League asked the Council to abandon the idea of condemning the Times property, pointing out that the property, including all equipment, was carried on the tax rolls at only \$300,000 and all the figures mentioned so far were much too high.

The League suggested that an initiative measure be placed on the ballot to determine if the people of Los Angeles wanted to buy the Times property. It filed a petition to that effect, with sufficient signatures to place the proposal on the ballot.

The Council immediately adopted an ordinance similar to the one for which the League had applied. This, in effect, meant abandonment of any new condemnation suit until the people had an opportunity to vote.

Now the Times reversed its position completely. Until that moment, it had taken the position that it was being forced to move and build against its will. It was accepting this as a public necessity. However, when it appeared that the City might not buy the property, the Times quickly forgot that pose. Instead, Times attorneys went to the courts to seek a writ of mandate which would compel the City to buy the old building.

Once again, the Supreme Court came to the rescue, ordering the City to buy the Times property. The Times was jubilant about the decision, declaring editorially:

"... The ruling of the State Supreme Court in the Times condemnation case is of considerably more significance than the legal points determined and the issue directly involved. . . .

"... By inference it has set a limit on the extent to which intimidation and misrepresentation may interfere with the orderly processes of government . . .

"... The Times has been subjected to every variety of abuse and misrepresentation by hostile political interests, which, well knowing the facts, have sought to make it appear the Times is trying to unload its property on the public at an inflated price."

The City had to reinstitute the condemnation suit. However, before the case came up for trial, there was a municipal election in Los Angeles which saw at least five anti-Times City Council members elected and made a lame duck of Howard Davis.

Also, the Minute Men, who had been organized to fight corruption in city government, were beginning to take an interest in the Times condemnation suit. Their

concern was increased when Howard Davis, in a moment of abstraction, gave the lie to the Times which had so long maintained that it had been forced out of its home. Davis inadvertently remarked, in demanding that the sale be consummated, at the Times' figure, "We've been working on this a long time."

Now the Times, Davis and Chesebro had to act in a hurry. The new City Council might very well vote against accepting any condemnation award. The whole deal could go up in the air, leaving the Times with two buildings.

The old Council held tenure until July 1, 1935, and final action had to be taken before it was replaced. Chesebro met in secret session with the lame-duck council and recommended a new compromise. He had no trouble convincing Davis the compromise was a good idea. Davis immediately agreed and asked his colleagues to approve.

The new figure was set at \$1,193,345. This was \$436,655 less than the Times had asked so short a time before and that figure, according to the Times, had been set out of sentiment, not out of business acumen. Each of the five new City Councilmen was worth a little more than \$87,000 in savings to the taxpayers of Los Angeles!

How was the new figure reached?

First, the original award of Judge Scovel, \$1,021,345.

Next, the expected legal cost of the condemnation suit, \$40,000.

Thirdly, the city assumed the \$132,000 expense of moving the Times equipment, which the Times had characterized as "immovable" in its Supreme Court petition.

The Hollywood Citizen-News took tart recognition of the realty deal of its downtown rival. In an editorial, the Citizen-News said:

"... the Times' defense amounts to nothing but further evidence of its willingness to outrage a public from which it has gathered millions of profits . . .

"The people of this city have seen for years the Times defend those in public office who bent the government to the demands of the greedy interests. Many people have opposed the Times in this. The same people today oppose the Times as it seeks to gouge the citizens of this city . . ."

But neither the Times, nor its attorneys, had any time to answer criticism. There was a deadline to meet. The Times and City Attorney Chesebro went before Superior Court Judge Edward T. Bishop and asked to have the judgment entered immediately.

Representatives of the Municipal League made a last-ditch effort to upset the deal. They declared that, since this was a contract to buy, thirty days must elapse, under the law, before it could go into effect. Before that time expired, the new Council would be in office and it might even be possible to get sufficient signatures on a petition to force a referendum on the issue.

Judge Bishop, however, declared that the League had no standing in the case. He ordered the judgment entered.

So, at long last, the sale of the old Los Angeles Times building was consummated. Almost fifteen years had passed since it was first decided upon. In that period, the Times had sought various sums in payment of its

property, the least of which was almost a half-million dollars more than it finally hastened to accept.

By any fair standard of judgment the Times received a good price for its property.

But it had attempted, all these years, to get far more than a fair and reasonable amount. It had brought pressure to bear on the City Council, the City Attorney, the courts, and the Board of Supervisors. It had attacked those who said its price was too high as "hostile political interests." These interests, the Times had said editorially, had "sought to make it appear that the Times . . . (was) . . . trying to unload its property on the public at an inflated price."

All the evidence, including the Times' haste to make a deal with a "lame duck" Council, proves that the "hostile political interests" had been completely correct. The Times was trying to soak the taxpayers.

Even the final judgment did not put an end to the squabbling about the property. The City, having paid the agreed-upon price to the Times, now sought reimbursement of sixty per cent of that price from the County. The Supervisors balked, maintaining the City had made a unilateral agreement by which the County was not bound.

There followed years of wrangling. Ultimately, after the City sued the County, an agreement was reached. Instead of giving the City cash, the County turned over some realty it owned.

All in all, the Times did exceedingly well for itself. It received \$1,193,345 in cash for a site valued at \$600,000 by an independent expert appointed by the County Board of Supervisors. The taxpayers paid \$593,345 more than

the appraisal—and considered themselves lucky that the Times was prevented from getting the entire \$1,875,000 price set by the Times and its associates!

The Times also gained on other parcels of property which it owned and still owns in the Civic Center area because of the increased property values resulting from the razing of ancient slums and honky-tonks to make way for the handsome new public buildings.

And the Times' interests and the Times' friends were enabled to make goodly profits from the actual building of the Civic Center and the bonding and insurance that went with it.

Today, the parcel of land on which the Times Building stands is assessed by Los Angeles County at \$154,000. That same parcel of land was purchased by the Times some 25 years ago for approximately \$500,000. Real estate values in recent years have increased enormously—that is, apparently, real estate other than the site of the Times Building.

It is remarkable how tame, how friendly, how barkless the watchdog of the public purse can be when it's busy with a juicy bone.

CHAPTER 12

ARE BRIBE-GIVERS GENTLEMEN?

The Los Angeles Times is a unique phenomenon. It is the only newspaper in the United States ever to have absorbed a political party. The task required almost three quarters of a century but, today, the Times is the Republican party in Southern California and the party is the Times.

Many factors have worked to produce this result. One is the psychology of Los Angeles. It was not so long ago that this city was a small town, in awe of such giants among municipalities as San Francisco, St. Louis, Kansas City, Chicago and New York. It possessed an inferiority complex and when a loud, brash champion rose to speak for it, Los Angeles was pleased.

Then, too, it was a heterogeneous section, filled with newcomers who broke up into small, conflicting units. The Times shrewdly seized upon this, assuming the position of spokesman for all groups.

Los Angeles came to maturity during an era of materialism. First, there was the age of what has been called the "Robber Barons," the age when the theories of Darwin were applied to politics and economics. The Times preached the survival of the fittest and the destruction of the weak as holy writ. It offered this as a pious excuse for its own use of power.

Later, there was the "Boom or Bust" age, which culminated in the great paper prosperity of the 20s that turned into the great depression.

As the voice of materialism, the Times became a spokesman for an era. The fact that this era has been dead a quarter of a century has not caused the Times to change its philosophy one whit. The Times works on the theory that the whole world is out of step with it and some day will get back into step.

The economics, the psychology and the viewpoint of the Times are relics of the dead past. In order to preserve these, the Times has had to separate the United States from Southern California. To some extent, it has succeeded. However, the great emigration of the last decade may put an end to the isolation. I believe such signs are already apparent.

Above all else, the continual increase in the power of the paper and its publishers has been due to the political system of California. Party responsibility has never existed in the state. First, it was because of the Southern Pacific Railroad, which held the state in an iron grip. Later, it was because of the cross-filing system.

A power vacuum was thus created and the Times was quick to fill it.

To the Times, politics is a business. I believe that if there was no such thing as a public treasury, disbursed by politicians, the Times would have no interest in politics. The Times, like any other political boss, is interested in cashing in on its power.

There is no way to estimate all the money which the Times and its owners have been paid from various public funds. There is no way to total all that they, plus their friends and the businesses with which they have been associated, have profited through the years.

City, county and state, for example, have paid out millions to the Times for printing. Other millions have gone into the Times coffers as the result of legal advertising. For years, the Times had a monopoly on the printing of all ballots used in Los Angeles county.

Other newspapers and their publishers have tried to break the hold of the Times on these lucrative contracts. There have been repeated charges that some public officials bent, if they did not break, the law in order to make certain that the Times was awarded such contracts.

The first California official ever to be recalled from office was a Los Angeles City Councilman who was charged with illegally arranging for a printing contract to go to the Times. It may well be that this explains the continuing dislike of recall elections by the paper.

There is no public record of all of the Chandler interests. However, what is known reveals that they reach into virtually every industrial and agricultural field. With such a multiplicity of interests, the Chandler dynasty and its satellite court have found it imperative that they have a voice in the government which is supposed to regulate industry and agriculture.

This explains the drive for political dominance which has marked the paper and its publishers. It was begun by Harrison Gray Otis, whose ambition was limited by time, circumstance and age. Otis sought, in the beginning, only to have a voice in Republican politics in Los Angeles.

Harry Chandler began the era of expansion. As his interests spread, he moved to play a larger part in Southern California and, later in the rest of the state. Power

begot the demand for more power. Wealth made it possible to satisfy that demand.

Today that power is greater than ever and still the dynasty seeks to expand it. The influence of Norman Chandler can only be compared with that wielded by Boss Tweed, when Tweed dominated a city and sought to dominate a state.

The Chandler dynasty has done this without ever holding public office. Actually, only one member ever sought to be elected to anything. Otis ran for delegate-at-large to the Republican National Convention in 1908. He discovered that power and popularity were not synonymous. He lost the election.

Harry Chandler never put his name before the people. In 1928, he circulated an office memorandum which reported that "a friend" had suggested he run for public office. In a prose as ambiguous as one of his editorials, he told the staff, "I have the feeling that, as a result of many years of continuous work in the Times office, I am able to render service to the public that is far beyond anything that even through the widest stretch of the imagination it is conceivable that I could do at my age in an untried position."

One wonders what office he might have envisioned in that "widest stretch of the imagination."

Neither Norman Chandler, nor any member of his family, has been a political candidate. The Chandlers are content to choose the candidates, name the issues and dictate the strategy. Its editors make up the Republican steering committee. With the growth of the city and the

state, Chandler's influence now spreads across the nation into Washington.

It was not always so. Some fifty years ago, the Times was of local political importance only. The political power of the state was in the hands of the Southern Pacific Railroad and the undisputed boss of the state was William F. Herrin, chief counsel for the railroad and engineer of its political steamroller.

The dirty Ruef machine controlled San Francisco with the permission of the Southern Pacific.

Los Angeles had no machine, no strong political organizations, in line with the Times policy of "confuse and conquer." The paper was quietly at work building up its hidden power through the creation of such groups as the M. & M., and the Chamber of Commerce, both of which were errand boys for the paper and its owners.

This was the time when the fight over the location of the Los Angeles harbor was nearing its climax. It must be admitted that the Times chose no puny antagonists when it took on the Southern Pacific and Collis P. Huntington. Samuel G. Blythe thus described the political machine which Huntington had sired and which Herrin administered:

"(It is) a vast, complex holding company for the politics of the state . . . that dictates nominations, carries elections . . . uses money flagrantly . . . debauches not only individuals, but communities . . . and owns judges and courts as well as lawyers . . ."

Strong language, but it was no stronger than the Times itself used in describing Herrin. It is interesting to note, by the way, that the paper took its hardest shots at the

creature of the Southern Pacific, rather than at the railroad.

The Times said of Herrin that he was "an arch-corrupter and conspirator." Then it went on to add, "while such men . . . cumber the earth and are able to pursue their infamous conspiracies against the public good, it is the imperative duty of all honest men . . . to be vigilant in checkmating their schemes and counter-acting their influence for evil."

The Times was to have an opportunity to join the company of "honest men." The 1906 Republican state convention was soon to be held at Santa Cruz where candidates for Governor and United States Senator were to be chosen.

The incumbent governor was George C. Pardee, like all but one of California's governors in this century, a Republican. He had been elected in 1902 with the support of the Southern Pacific, but he had shown surprising independence during his tenure.

For one thing, he had fought the special rates and tariffs which the Southern Pacific, as well as other railroads, was granting the Standard Oil Company. Pardee had attacked Standard Oil as a vicious monopoly which threatened the existence of California oil companies. Pardee had even suggested that the only answer to such practices was regulation by both state and federal government.

The possibility of any regulation, from any source, was anathema to the Southern Pacific.

Pardee had also expressed his disgust at the miscarriage of justice in the San Francisco graft trials. He had joined

other conscience-stricken Republicans in condemning the special consideration shown to the rich and powerful. Pardee condemned those who had yielded to pressure. He said:

"It is a serious matter, and one that appeals to all, that justice may be laughed at, the courts mocked and the protection of our laws against criminals and criminal acts so defied."

Since it was common knowledge that judges received their appointments and promotions on orders from Herrin, the public realized that Pardee, in guarded language, was striking at the Southern Pacific.

His courage was applauded by a rising group of independent citizens and by those newspapers which cared less for the advertisements of the Southern Pacific than for decency. Even the Times made cautious reference to Pardee's revolt against domination by Herrin. It praised Pardee's "valor."

A few weeks before the convention was to meet, it was felt that Pardee would probably be renominated. A canvass of delegates revealed a large number of independents from the northern and central parts of the state who intended to vote for him. It was taken for granted that the Southern California delegates, owing allegiance to the Los Angeles Times, would also vote for Pardee.

This was based, of course, on public knowledge of the feud between the Times and the Southern Pacific and the paper's strong stand against Herrin. Here was the chance to deal a telling blow against both railroad and political boss.

Herrin, however, appeared unworried. He announced

—or rather it was announced—that the man chosen to oppose Pardee was Congressman James N. Gillett, Humboldt County. Gillett was only a name to most Southern Californians. He had no stature in Congress and his fame, if any, was local.

A third candidate was also announced, J. O. Hayes of San Francisco, entered for his nuisance value by Abe Ruef. Ruef always had a candidate whom he obligingly withdrew as soon as the Southern Pacific met his price.

Such was the situation some ten days before the Republicans were to meet. At this moment, the Los Angeles Times chose to turn critical of Pardee. It began to speak of him disparagingly. It said Pardee was "lacking in character," and possessed "no stability of purpose." It even said sadly that Pardee had shown himself "of questionable integrity."

On the other hand, the Times was giving much praise to Gillett. It told its readers, many of whom thought Gillett was a razor manufacturer, that Gillett was "independent," "magnetic," "honest," "a true servant of the people," and "a man of frankness."

The politically-wise realized what had happened. The Times, and its owners, had made a deal with that "arch-corruptionist and conspirator." It was now letting its readers into the secret by easy stages. The Times had had its chance to enter the company of "honest men" and had let it go by default.

Before the convention was called to order, its main business was already completed. Walter Parker, Herrin's first-lieutenant, told reporters that Gillett would be the nominee for Governor. Parker had to make the an-

nouncement because Herrin was a registered Democrat and, as such, could not be a Republican delegate.

As Parker had predicted, there was no contest. Ruef made his deal to withdraw Hayes at a price he later admitted was low because the Southern Pacific didn't really need his votes. Ruef said he received \$20,000 in gold.

I doubt that the Times sold out for money. It loved money greatly, but it loved the power to make money even more. By joining with the Southern Pacific, the Times was able, at last, to move into the big league of politics. It could reach into the state capital and pluck juicy plums. It was for this price that the Times turned on Pardee.

The paper did have a touch of contrition. In a mealy-mouthed editorial it defended its joining the Southern Pacific axis by declaring that the choice of the convention was "the best the Republican party ever made."

It was at the same convention, by the way, that the Times joined with the Southern Pacific in choosing Frank P. Flint as nominee for United States Senator. Liberal Thomas R. Bard, who had an outstanding record in the Senate, was shelved for Flint.

Flint worked dutifully to serve his two masters. When their interests conflicted in the harbor fight, Flint went along with the Southern Pacific. However, all was forgiven when he atoned by pushing through the Owens River legislation which enabled the Chandler clique to cash in so handsomely.

Gillett's record, in office, was remarkable. Let us see if it matched the praise accorded him by the Times before he took office. How "honest" was this "man of independence?"

The best answer was probably supplied by the Fresno *Republican* at the conclusion of Gillett's first legislative session. The paper made the flat statement that this was the "rottenest administration" in the history of California. It declared that the special interests behind the administration had permitted excesses never before known. Among them:

Eighty-three doorkeepers were hired to guard three doors, all of which led into a single narrow corridor.

Persons who could neither read nor write were hired as "stenographers."

Certain "females" unfavorably known for their nocturnal activities, were placed on the payroll as *per diem* committee clerks and granted free rein to roam the legislative halls.

The state payroll was loaded with names of persons whose only duty appeared to be to collect their pay.

The *Republican* quoted a remark ascribed to a former mayor of Oakland, who was supposed to have said, "You couldn't get the Lord's Prayer enacted in this administration without money."

The Los Angeles Times took another view of the administration. It quoted Gillett as proudly declaring, "This was one of the best (legislatures) that ever met in Sacramento."

Perhaps the Times and the Southern Pacific had reason for agreeing with Gillett. Certainly there was no favor either asked, no demand either made, that was denied. Any legislation which the Times favored, and it wanted anti-labor legislation very much, found easy going. The

first of the really restrictive anti-labor laws were the product of Gillett's tenure in office.

However, while the Times was pleased with Gillett and Gillett was pleased with himself, a large group of shocked Republicans felt that the unholy coalition of the Southern Pacific in the North, the Los Angeles Times in the South, and Gillett in Sacramento would destroy the party unless the coalition was itself destroyed.

In 1907 a group of such Republicans began to organize the Lincoln-Roosevelt League in an effort to wrest control of the party from the coalition. Most Republican newspapers joined in this "crusade." The two outstanding exceptions were the Times, under Otis and Chandler, and the San Francisco Chronicle, under Mike de Young, who was so involved in the graft scandals.

The League made rapid headway, despite continual snarls and attacks from the Times. It was able to beat a Times candidate in a municipal election.

By 1908, it felt strong enough to make a fight for delegates to the National convention of the party. Otis decided to put the upstarts in their place by running for one of the places open to delegates-at-large. He anticipated no one would dare run against him, but he was wrong. Former Lieutenant Governor Jacob Neff took on Otis and beat him.

This should have served as a warning to the Times that an era was coming to an end, but it did not. The Times then, as it does now, believed that it could turn back the clock. It was certain that reform was only a passing phase. The Times chose to continue its attacks

on the Lincoln-Roosevelt League and to continue to work in tandem with the Southern Pacific.

By 1910, the League was confident of nominating its candidate for Governor. It chose to back Hiram Johnson, who had made a reputation for himself when he served as a prosecutor in the San Francisco graft trials.

Not even the Times had gall enough to suggest the renomination of Gillett. Instead, it joined with Herrin in advocating the cause of Alden Anderson, who had been Lieutenant Governor under Pardee.

The Times sought to unite all anti-League factions behind Anderson, but failed. Instead, there were three pro-Southern Pacific, pro-special interests, candidates in the field when the primaries took place. It was during this campaign that Johnson came to Los Angeles to deliver his philippic against Harrison Gray Otis.

Johnson was a new type of antagonist for Otis. He had no fear of the bull-necked, goateed owner of the Times. He could match Otis in vituperative and invective. He had no cowardice in his make-up. Johnson delighted in choosing the biggest men among the opposition as targets for attack.

Otis had grown so rich and powerful, so accustomed to quick obeisance, that he lost his head in this fight. It was primarily his fault that a situation was created which could not be compromised. By the time the campaign was over, Johnson and the owners of the Times were forever committed to enmity.

Thus, when Johnson won, the Times lost its short-term hold on the party and was constrained to limit itself to

maintaining its local power, which was under attack by the Lincoln-Roosevelt League.

The Times, however, had had a taste of controlling a governor. It was to continue for many years to seek to regain that control. The first necessity was to get rid of Hiram Johnson.

During the period that Johnson was governor, and all during the rest of his life, while he was a senator, the Times attacked him as bitterly as if he were a Democrat. The only other man whom it ever attacked and vilified to the same degree was Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

This personal grudge was to cost the Republican party dearly. Because of it, Charles Evans Hughes was prevented from meeting with Johnson in California in 1916, when Hughes was running for President against Woodrow Wilson. Snubbed, Johnson made no effort to help Hughes. The result was that Hughes lost California, and Wilson was re-elected by the margin of California's electoral votes.

Had the Times and Johnson hated each other less, the course of world history might well have been different.

Johnson was elected to the Senate in 1916 and took his seat in March, 1917. Then began a long parade of Republican governors, interrupted only once, in 1938, when Culbert Olson became California's only 20th Century Democratic governor. But, while the governors were usually Republican, they owed allegiance to the Johnson branch of the party. The one exception was Frank Merriam, from 1934 to 1938. He was friendly to the Times, but not completely subservient to it. He was willing to give allegiance to the power of the paper and

Harry Chandler, but he would not permit the Governor's office to be run from First and Spring Streets.

Throughout the administration of Earl Warren, from his election as Governor in 1942 to his resignation to become Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court in 1953, there was a bitter struggle for power between the reactionary Times forces and the more liberal Warren group in the Republican Party.

Though Warren was occasionally forced to surrender to pressure from the Times, it was far more often through control of the State Legislature and various other State officials that the Chandlers got their way.

Now, with the new governor, Goodwin J. Knight, in the saddle at Sacramento and coming up for re-election in November, the Times is once again aiming for complete domination of the state. Whether or not the Chandlers will succeed in the case of Knight remains yet to be seen, and there is strong evidence that Knight intends to be his own boss, if he is re-elected.

But Knight has taken one pro-Chandler stand that is somewhat dismaying even to organized labor, businessmen, veterans' groups, and other organizations which have endorsed him and given him support in his political campaign. That is his stand in favor of the Chandler-inspired proposal to destroy the State Board of Equalization in an apparent move to gain tax advantage for the Times-Mirror holdings.

The scheme is very simple. The Board of Equalization acts on tax matters affecting public utilities and many other large corporations in which the Chandlers have an interest. It also acts on the issuance and control of liquor

licenses. If a change in the set-up can be made, and a new "friendly" tax commission can be established, the Chandler interests' tax savings could total millions of dollars.

So the Times-Mirror attacks the Board of Equalization, not on its tax functions, but on liquor control. It shouts "scandal" and sends investigators scouring the state for evidence to prove there has been scandal. There must be scandal—the Chandlers insist it be so.

And while the public is concerned with the headline show being staged by the Chandlers, two innocent-appearing plans are brought forward. One would establish a one-man liquor control "czar" appointed by the governor and replacing the five-man Board of Equalization elected by the people. The other would set up a "State Revenue Board" also appointed by the governor and taking over the tax duties of the Board of Equalization.

The "State Revenue Board" could provide the tax advantages sought by the Chandlers and the liquor "czar" could provide a political advantage which would enable the Times-Mirror machine to run the Republican Party and the state for many years to come. There is little doubt that the Chandlers, having initiated the scheme, would also insist on determining who should be appointed both as liquor "czar" and to the "State Revenue Board."

The Governor already has immense powers of appointment. There are many Boards and Commissions, dealing with corporations, taxes, utilities, public works, agricultural fairs and horse-racing among other fields.

There is the filling of vacancies on the bench, on

County Boards of Supervisors, and in District Attorneyships.

There is, too, the granting of hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts of all sorts, from printing to highway building.

The Times-Mirror is desperately anxious to control the governor because he appoints the officials who have these millions to spend. The people who influence the governor can thus attain great power, power they can use for their own purposes.

They can even use their political power to collect private debts, owed by one of their own employees.

To find the evidence, let us take a look at the case of Kyle Palmer, political editor of the Los Angeles Times, and the State Racing Commission and the Los Angeles Turf Club, which operates the Santa Anita race track.

SANTA ANITA PAY-OFF

On February 15, 1937, H. E. Downing, Assistant Secretary of the Times Mirror Co., addressed a letter to Dr. Charles Strub, Vice President and General Manager of the Los Angeles Turf Club, which operates Santa Anita racetrack.

The letter read :

"In order that there may be placed before you a complete transaction which has to do with the Trust Deed of the Times Mirror Co. affecting Mr. Kyle Palmer, you are informed that the principal amount of this Trust Deed is \$21,881.82. It is my understanding that you are to pay the principal only and that we are to look to Mr. Kyle Palmer for the payment of the accrued interest and costs of foreclosure."

This letter is part of one of the strangest relationships into which the Los Angeles Times and its owners have ever entered.

It involved such seemingly diverse elements as the social aspirations of the Chandlers, various state agencies, a realty deal from which the Chandlers continue to draw profits, grand opera, advertising revenue, and a re-examination of moral values in the bright, fresh light of a dollar sign.

It really had its beginning with Harrison Gray Otis, as does almost everything that has to do with the Times and

the Chandlers. From the day that Otis took over the Times, he was an earnest battler against the twin vices of alcohol and gambling. The Times was a "dry" newspaper in the years that this was a burning political issue. It was dry during the prohibition era, and it was against repeal.

The Times was one of the leaders in the fight that made Los Angeles a dry city long before the passage of the 18th Amendment. It must be remembered, of course, that for many years Southern California was populated mainly by emigrants from the deeply religious, fundamentalist regions of the United States. These people had strong convictions against both liquor and gambling and the Times, in echoing these sentiments, was in no danger of losing subscriptions.

Also, liquor advertising was rare and gamblers didn't advertise. Thus, Otis was able to satisfy his own conscience without affecting profits at the same time.

The Times is still technically against gambling. It doesn't like bookmakers, poker parlors or lottery-ticket sellers. However, the Times is strangely quiet about the biggest gambling empire of all—the racetracks. Quiet, that is, about racing being evil. It was not always thus. As a matter of fact, it once was an avowed foe of race-track gambling.

It is interesting to see how this change came about.

In 1933, a proposition to legalize pari-mutuel betting at California racetracks was approved by the people. This, despite repeated warnings by the Times over the years that legalized betting would cause many cases of hard-

ship, increase the relief rolls, divert money from legitimate business and create criminals.

In 1934, however, the Times began to look more tolerantly at the racetracks. The reason for its change of mind was consistent with its past history. The revenue the state received from the racetracks would otherwise have to be raised from such sources as income, corporation or property taxes.

All these latter taxes would hit the Times in its bank account. The racetrack revenue, on the other hand, came from outsiders. Keep in mind that the Times first accepted racing as a revenue-raising measure. This will come up again.

At about this same time, Harry Chandler received a visit from Dr. Charles Strub, a San Francisco dentist who had turned to the field of promotion. Dr. Strub, by reason of having some good friends in Northern California, had been granted a license to operate a racetrack. The license would, he was sure, prove very valuable if he could first raise the funds to erect a track.

Dr. Strub's visit to Harry Chandler was in the hope that Chandler would assist him in promoting the necessary money.

The meeting proved most satisfactory to both Chandler and Strub. As a result of it, Strub was introduced to a group of men who put up the needed capital. These men included oilmen, motion picture magnates, politicians, public servants, utility tycoons and sportsmen. They were deeply impressed by Harry Chandler's interest in a racetrack project.

Once Strub was assured of sufficient financing, he set

out to find a site for the "plant," or racetrack. By one of those remarkable coincidences which have accompanied the growth of the Chandler fortune, it just happened that Harry Chandler owned the perfect site. This was the property known as "Santa Anita Estates," and had once been part of the "Lucky" Baldwin Ranch.

Strub saw the proposed site and decided immediately that it was just the place on which to build what he already called "the finest racetrack in the United States." A deal was made, and the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. became the owner of part of Santa Anita Estates.

Construction was immediately begun, but even before the first bulldozer dipped into the earth to move the first shovelful of ground, Harry Chandler had become Santa Anita racetrack's first winner.

He had sold a portion of some outlying property at a good price. The value of the rest of his holdings was being increased, at no cost to him, by reason of the track being erected. After all, many improvements had to be put in during construction. The new good roads, the street lighting, the sewage and water mains would not only serve the racetrack, they would also serve the rest of Santa Anita Estates.

Part of the property he retained would be used for businesses which would profit from the track. The Chandlers, for instance, still own the land on which Eaton's Santa Anita restaurant stands, and they rent out the restaurant as a concession.

All in all, this was one of the more successful real estate transactions engineered by Harry Chandler. Sur-

prisingly, however, he lost out on the biggest bonanza. He bought none of the stock of the new racetrack. He was willing to tout it to his friends and associates, but he would not have any part of it on his own. It may have been that he regarded it as speculative and he liked only sure things.

It was a mistake, of course. The stock has increased in value many times over the original cost and it has paid itself out in dividends year after year.

It might be asked what was wrong with all this. Nothing, really. It was a good business deal, engineered by a smart businessman. He had every right to engineer a promotion whereby he unloaded some property he owned and increased the value of other property. He had every right to get the best price possible.

Had Harry Chandler, his heirs, and his newspaper stopped at this point, there would be nothing for which to condemn him or them. But they went much farther.

At the same time that Chandler sold his property, he sold out the people of California. And he committed his heirs to continue that sell-out. It is still continuing today, twenty years later.

Let us go back to the letter written in 1937 by H. E. Downing, an official of the Times Mirror Co., publishers of the Times, to Dr. Charles Strub, Vice President and General Manager of the Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., operators of the Santa Anita racetrack.

Who is Kyle Palmer, with whom the letter concerned itself? Kyle Palmer is now, and was then, political editor

of the Los Angeles Times. He is Grand Vizier of the Chandler royal court. What William F. Herrin was to the political machine controlled by the Southern Pacific Railroad, Kyle Palmer is to the political machine controlled by the Chandlers.

Kyle Palmer is the intimate of virtually every person in political life in California. He is the go-between in the Chandler's dealings with politicians, jurists, public officials and government bodies.

Kyle Palmer frequently has the last word in deciding which candidates the Times will sponsor and what particular causes the paper will espouse. His political column, printed only on Sundays now, but once an almost daily feature of the paper, has long been regarded as the official "word." The by-line was Palmer's, but the opinions expressed were those of the Times.

He was, and is, a man of importance, a very busy man indeed. In the year 1937, Palmer, for instance, was directing the Times campaign in behalf of Frank Shaw and against John Anson Ford.

In the year 1938, he was still fighting for Shaw, against Fletcher Bowron.

But, during those two years, and all through 1939, he was also on the payroll of Santa Anita racetrack.

In those three years, the racetracks were a matter of political importance. A move was underway to end legalized racetrack betting in California. Should such a law be enacted, the racetracks would have to go out of business. Should such a law even go on the ballot, it would prove an expensive measure to combat.

Now, could the employment of Palmer have had any-

thing to do with this threatened referendum? Did the racetrack hire him because he was the most important political writer in the State of California? Did the race-track hire him—and send his pay to the Los Angeles Times' owners—because they wanted very much to do a favor for this powerful politician and his even more powerful boss?

Nobody was informed of this employment. It was even kept a secret from the directors of Santa Anita. Some of them may not, even at this late date, be aware that it ever happened.

But it was no secret to the Times-Mirror Co. They knew because they made the deal which put Palmer on the Santa Anita payroll.

And the record shows that the attempts to get the race track referendum received scant attention—and that attention adverse—in the period between 1937 and 1939.

Let us examine a little further into this deal. Some years ago a group of stockholders wanted to know what was happening to their interest in Santa Anita and they employed a certified public accountant to check the books and statements of Santa Anita. It was in the course of this examination that they discovered the Palmer-Times Mirror-Santa Anita arrangement.

Here are the details which they were able to unearth. They found, of course, an understandable reluctance to discuss the matter.

Palmer was hired on the basis of a private agreement with Strub. There was no written contract and the files showed no record of his employment. He was not required to make any reports in writing. The auditors were told

Palmer was to be "public relations adviser, publicity writer, writer of articles in general on public relations and he was to obtain releases."

A search of the files could not turn up a single piece of work done by Palmer, but it is possible that he spent most of his time "advising," which could be done orally, and left the writing to others.

In their report, the accountants said:

"Palmer owed money to the Times on an old debt and upon Palmer's instructions, the payments were made to the Times-Mirror Co.

"Payments of \$100 per month were made to his wife (Dorothy Stewart) at the request of Mr. Palmer."

The report continued:

"It was stated to us that the corporation had entered into the agreement with Mr. Palmer to render his services for an exact period of three years and that the amount owed by him to the Times of \$21,881.82 would be paid in thirty-six equal monthly installments. The corporation's records reflect that beginning with January, 1937, and ending on December 31, 1939, there were exactly thirty-six monthly payments (to the Times) amounting to \$21,881.82.

"Concurrently for the same thirty-six months the amount of \$100 a month was paid to Mrs. Palmer (Dorothy Stewart), the total to her being \$3,600.

"The sum total of all payments under this agreement was \$25,481.82.

"We were informed that Dr. Strub would have to be consulted with in order to determine the exact advice

and services given by Mr. Palmer, as the latter reported directly to Dr. Strub."

At the same time that Palmer was on the payroll, Arthur Samish was also on the payroll, listed as an "adviser."

It is easy to see that opponents of horse racing were in a bad way, indeed, if they sought to get any publicity or assistance from the Times during this period. Not only was Palmer, the political pundit, on the Santa Anita payroll, the track was acting as collection agent for the Times-Mirror Co. in collecting what had obviously been a doubtful asset.

The lordly Times, and its more lordly owner, thus had been committed to the cause of the racetracks for a few thousands of dollars.

But this money was not the only money which the Times-Mirror Co. and the Chandlers got from the race track. Through the years it has collected some hundreds of thousands of dollars in the name of "charity."

California racetracks have put on a great public relations campaign. The most potent force in that campaign, and the one which has brought it the greatest amount of good will has been its "Charity Days."

Charity, in this case, has certainly covered a multitude of sins—and sinners.

Let's examine what this charity business is.

To start with, at the end of each regular racing season, the tracks stay open for a few extra days during which all profits are turned over to charity. These profits, of course, come from the bettors, not the tracks. The track gives up not one cent of its enormous profits.

Millions of dollars have been raised through these charity days and these funds are either disbursed directly by the tracks, or turned over to disbursal agencies.

I am all in favor of charity. There are many worthwhile agencies, like religious groups, the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, the March of Dimes, hospitals and community chests which can use the large sums of money donated to them by the tracks. Money, I repeat, which comes from the pockets of the bettors, not the treasury of the tracks.

None of these charities, of course, has ever received anything equivalent to the \$529,412 bonus which Strub received at the end of the 1946 season for his services to Santa Anita.

But, back to the disbursement agencies which are handed thousands of dollars to distribute as largesse. One of these is the Los Angeles Times. In 1953, for instance, the Times received \$40,000 for its charities.

It is not my intention to have it appear that the Los Angeles Times is the only newspaper to share in this bonanza. Others also receive such large sums. But this book is about the Times and the way it has perverted its strength and its influence in behalf of special interests.

I don't like the idea of any newspaper accepting sums of money from racetracks. I maintain, however, that no other newspaper has ever received so much, directly or indirectly, nor gone to such extremes as the Times to repay favors received.

Let us, for instance, examine some of the "charity" payments made by Santa Anita racetrack, under the broad definition of "charity" which an inept and innocuous State Horse Racing Board has allowed.

Listed as a charitable donation by the Santa Anita track is a payment of \$75,000 to the Greater Los Angeles Plans, Inc., the group which was engaged in a semi-political campaign to get the voters of Los Angeles to adopt a bond issue to finance a civic auditorium. Also listed was another \$75,000 payment, this one to the Southern California Symphony Association.

Now, how could either of these projects, worthy though they may be, be classed as a "charity?"

The explanation is simple. Both organizations had one thing in common. They were, and are, among the pet projects of Mrs. Norman Chandler! Mrs. Chandler has long devoted herself to getting the city to build her a multi-million dollar civic auditorium. She has made it a crusade. Repeated rebuffs have not daunted her.

Undoubtedly she will seek to have the issue placed on the ballot again and, there is a good chance, she will appeal to the racetracks for help on the basis that this is charity.

It will, of course, be most difficult for the racetracks to refuse. And even more difficult for the Racing Board, appointed by the Governor, to disapprove something that the wife of Norman Chandler wants.

The Symphony Association is another project dear to the heart of Mrs. Chandler. It is an organization to which all the "better people" belong and its doings are chronicled on the society pages of the Times. It is only another coincidence that the pictures of Mrs. Chandler usually show her at opening night in the company of Dr. and

Mrs. Strub. After all, a man can run a racetrack and like good music also.

But it seems very far-fetched indeed to include a gift to the Symphony Association among a list of "charity" donations.

I do not believe that the people who contributed this money in the name of charity expected it would be used for such a purpose. I believe that they thought the aged, the sick, the handicapped, the unemployed and the hungry would be the beneficiaries. The racing associations, by the way, have never done anything to shatter that belief.

I do not know whether either of these \$75,000 donations was illegal. Under the loosely drawn act which governs horse racing in this state, it is almost impossible to determine the legality of any act. Appeals to the Horse-racing Board have proved futile. That body, in all its long history, has never taken any stand against the interest of the tracks nor made any real attempt to regulate them.

The office of the Attorney General, supposed to act as the watchdog of the people, has also failed miserably. This is not hard to understand. After all, when Attorney General Edmund H. (Pat) Brown was forced to investigate one of the tracks in the state, he had to make public the fact that among the donations made by that track were \$4000 to his campaign fund. This was not listed as "charity," but as a "business expense."

The investigation came to a quick end. I do not expect that Brown will ever return to it.

Brown, of course, was not the only beneficiary of campaign contributions. The tracks have not only bought the silence of the newspapers, but also the silence of politi-

cians. And that explains the sorry mess that has resulted, a mess which deprives the state of millions of dollars annually.

So far, I have shown that the tracks placed the Times political editor on the payroll, paid off an old debt that he owed to the Times, contributed many, many thousands of dollars to the Times Charities, and, in the name of charity, paid out \$150,000 to two pet projects of Mrs. Norman Chandler.

What did the tracks get in return?

Before making a specific answer, let me quote a statement by Chief Justice Warren, made when he was Governor of California. He said:

"Profits (in California racetracks) are not only enormous, they are scandalous . . . (Through lobbying) the state has lost millions of dollars which rightfully belong to it . . . There is no reason why California should give the track-owners a monopoly and make millionaires of them. My words are not weasel words. The racetracks are California's sacred cows."

Warren usually got a good press in the Los Angeles Times. However, when he made this statement on April 7, 1953, it received scant attention from that paper. And none at all from the illustrious Mr. Palmer. Truly the race tracks are a "sacred cow" to the Chandlers.

Warren spoke so bitterly because a bill which he wanted enacted was being pigeon-holed by the Legislature. That bill called for an increase in the state's share of the pari-mutuel "take." It would have increased state revenue by some millions of dollars. One would expect

that the Times, always interested in tax revenue paid by others, would have supported this measure.

But the Times did not. Somehow its earlier rationalization that racetrack gambling was all right because it brought revenue was forgotten.

The Times was against increasing the state's share. The Times, as a matter of fact, is now, and has consistently been, opposed to any legislation or action that might cut the revenue of the existing tracks. It is no longer interested in any benefit that might accrue to the state. It is committed to the racetracks instead.

The bill for which Warren pleaded sought only to get for California the same percentage of revenue as that obtained by other states which have legalized gambling at racetracks. Right now, California starts with four cents out of each dollar bet. The tracks get nine. In other states, the "take" is so divided that the state gets a larger share and the tracks a smaller share. And there is no record of any racetrack going bankrupt in those other states.

What would a shift of two cents—still allowing the tracks the major portion of the "take"—mean to Californians? At least \$5,000,000 annually. A lot of schools and hospitals could be built with that money. There could be an increase in old-age pensions. Or, that money could be used to decrease the state income tax, paid by virtually all Californians.

But that bill, and all bills like it, had no chance. Here is what Fortnight Magazine reported happened to the bill Governor Warren wanted:

"(Assemblyman) Sherwin appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee to explain AB2644 . . .

stepping in where angels fear to tread, (he) pointed out that the track's dividends from pari-mutuel were skyhigh when considered in terms of the tracks' original investment. His learned colleagues greeted him with gales of laughter punctuated by impolite snickers from the race-track clique in the audience . . . The bill was buried with a smile . . .

"The Sherwin Bill's unhappy end was reported sparsely, if at all, by the California press . . .

"To all intents and purposes, the newspapers' lips are buttoned."

This was notably true of the Times.

That newspaper is the steadfast defender of the racing status quo. It doesn't want any changes.

It did not support the Sherwin Bill.

It has not supported any measure intended to give the State a fairer share of racetrack income, and there has been such a bill in almost every session of the legislature.

It has steadfastly opposed any threat to the present race track monopoly. Recently, a group sought a license for a new racetrack at Puente. The Times, and its writers, came out four-square against the issuance of such a license.

Nor has the Times been active in seeking a stronger, fairer, racing law. It may be that a law which included a stringent definition of "charity" would hardly work to the benefit of the Times.

There actually seems little hope that a stronger law will be enacted so long as the choice of the Times sits in the Governor's chair and so long as the Attorney General is involved in the use of racetrack finances.

Meanwhile, the people of California are the losers, to the extent of millions of dollars annually.

The Times, however, appears uninterested. It is too vulnerable to take any step which might antagonize the tracks. And the owners of the tracks are great friends and intimates of the Chandlers. Many of them owe their participation in this annual dividend windfall to the late Harry Chandler.

But the real fact is that the Times is involved in the sell-out of the interests of the people because some twenty years ago Harry Chandler saw a chance to make a profit. And, in the intervening years, the tracks have been very good to the Times, its charities, and the pet projects of its publisher's charming wife.

Quite a switch, indeed, from the editorial contention, made through the years, that taxation should be "more equitably" assessed. This is a good moment to take a look at that record also.

CHAPTER 14

TAXES ARE FOR LITTLE PEOPLE

In any list of Chandler "hates," organized labor must be placed at the top. Directly beneath, however, must come taxes.

The Chandlers and their mouthpieces, the newspapers they control and have controlled, envision Utopia as a place where everyone pays taxes but the Chandlers. Since they cannot have that Utopia, they seek to reduce their own taxes at the expense of the mass of the people.

The fight against the income tax was begun by Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler as soon as that tax was broached as a means of increasing Federal income. They described it as a tax "against those who have money just because they have money."

The first income tax bill was enacted as a regular revenue measure by Congress and signed by President Benjamin Harrison, a Republican. This didn't prevent the Times from excoriating Harrison. When the bill was later declared unconstitutional, the Times cheered the decision.

The 16th Amendment to the Constitution, legalizing the income tax, was later passed by a Republican-controlled Congress and signed by Republican President, William Howard Taft. The Times forgot partisanship and howled that the income tax was the first step toward Socialism. It campaigned against ratification by Cali-

fornia and lost again. Hiram Johnson, then Governor, favored the tax.

Some forty years have passed since the 16th Amendment went into effect. Even the Times has had to admit that it is here to stay. However, the Times, and its owners, never cease trying to amend the law so that their burden will be less and the burden of the mass of people greater. The tax bill just enacted pleases them greatly.

The Times has carried on a systematic campaign to "broaden the base" of the income tax. In simple language, the idea is that the Times and the Chandlers want a greater portion of the tax to be paid by low income groups.

At the present time there is an organization, headed by Corinne Griffith Marshall, the former movie star, which seeks a constitutional amendment limiting income taxes to twenty-five per cent of income. Every economist and student of taxation has pointed out that this plan would place an intolerable burden on the poor. The proposal has received condemnation from such conservative newspapers as the New York Times, the New York Herald-Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor.

But the Los Angeles Times is all for it. It carries the activities of Mrs. Marshall on both its news and society pages. Its editorial page has endorsed her idea.

The income tax is not the only tax which the Times hates and which it fights. It has never, for instance, liked the Social Security tax or the Federal Old Age Benefit tax. It is against taxes for unemployment insurance and, for that matter, against unemployment insurance.

As a member of the State Board of Equalization, I have

watched the efforts of the Times to lower the assessments for tax purposes placed on public utilities and large corporations. The Board, of course, is required by law to fix the valuation of these properties. Whenever the giant corporations seek assessment reduction, the Times is loyally on their side—which is its own side. After all, the Chandler portfolio includes large utility and corporate investments.

However, when these same utilities apply to the Public Utility Commission for rate increases, they forget their earlier pleas of over-assessment and ask for the right to set rates based on valuations far higher than those the Board of Equalization has set. And, of course, the Times, is again on their side. Higher rates for the public mean greater profits for the Chandlers.

It is also interesting to see the attitude the Times takes relative to the expenditure of tax funds. The paper never objects, for instance, when tax money is used to subsidize cheap mailing privileges for itself. It does not object when tax funds provide subsidies for airlines or shipping lines. After all, the Chandlers have interests in these fields and members of the family sit on the boards of both an airline and a steamship line.

The Times never approves, however, when tax money is used for the alleviation of distress. It has its own version of C. C. Pinckney's famous remark: "Millions for subsidies, but not one cent for relief." On this basis, the Times has fought every piece of social legislation on the ground that "it would cost money."

As the voice of business, the Times has long been an advocate of the balanced budget. It damns John May-

nard Keynes and the theory of deficit financing as "Socialistic." However, it has its own ideas as to how to raise the funds needed to balance the budget. It doesn't believe these should come from corporation taxes, a graduated income tax that bites big incomes hardest, excess profits taxes or taxes on dividends.

A recent Times editorial stated:

"... on theoretical or logical grounds, there is no justification for taxing the incomes of corporations; the logical place to tax income is when it reaches the hands of individuals . . ."

Another editorial on the same theme declared:

"Corporation taxes, unlike individual income taxes, are hidden taxes which are passed along to the consuming public. They do not belong in a sound or logical tax structure . . . They are justified only by the considerable amount of revenue which is usually collectable through them . . ."

"Congress pretends to consider the social effect of taxes; and the social effect of this (corporation) tax is wholly bad."

This is an entirely new concept of the theory of taxation. For the past sixteen years my work has been primarily in the tax field. I have heard many novel suggestions, but only the Times has dared suggest, in this age of industrialization, that the great industries and corporations should be exempted from paying their just share of government costs.

The Times never hesitates to plead its own special causes. A blatant example is the position which the Times has taken on the excess profits tax. This tax was de-

vised as a means of preventing large-scale war profiteering. It was intended to equalize the burdens placed on all Americans by the enormous cost of war. Nearly all Americans were united in a desire to prevent any accumulation of blood money.

To effect this end, wages were frozen; unions agreed to seek no pay increases; American business was asked to pay a tax on the excess profits it would make.

Most businessmen agreed that this tax was equitable. After all, the government did not take all the excess profits. It allowed a great many exceptions, exemptions and deductions. It put favorable depreciation and write-off provisions into the various tax bills.

As a result of these provisions, the Los Angeles Times was enabled to write off the cost of launching the Los Angeles Mirror. The American taxpayer was a silent partner in establishing this newspaper, but he has no interest in it.

The Times benefited greatly from the war. Its profits soared, as did those of all the Chandler holdings. To use an expression the Times does not like, the Chandlers "never had it so good."

But the Chandlers didn't think so.

They, and the Times, were all in favor of freezing wages and hamstringing unions. However, they resented the excess profits tax. They expressed their position thus:

"The only advantage of the excess profit tax is that it does raise some revenue. Opinions differ on how much.

"But, whatever the amount, the tax is dangerous, unfair and damaging to the nation. That is has a certain amount

of political appeal, however, is unfortunately true. People are inclined to believe that a tax on 'excessive profits' is fair."

Once again, as a tax official, I find myself astounded by the Times. The paper states that the only advantage of the tax is that it does raise revenue. They ignore the basic fact that the purpose of virtually all taxes is to raise revenue. A hard-pressed government, carrying on a war that cost hundreds of millions of dollars a day, needed revenue badly.

It levied a tax on those best able to pay, but the Times found that tax "dangerous, unfair and damaging." To whom? Probably to the Times which had to turn over a large share of its profits to the government despite every effort at tax avoidance.

On the other hand, the Times continued its fight for a balanced budget. It was against corporation taxes and excess profits taxes. What kind of tax did it favor?

One of the Times' columnists not long ago put the paper's position into these words:

"... impose a general manufacturer's excise tax which would be high enough to yield \$2,000,000,000 to \$3,000,000,000."

What was advocated here was a general sales tax which would hit taxpayers in inverse proportion to the amount of income they earned. Such a tax would take a far larger proportion of total earnings out of the pockets of the poor than it would from the pockets of the rich. That is the kind of tax the Times likes.

The paper wages a battle against equitable taxation on all fronts. Locally, no one fights harder to keep prop-

erty taxes at a minimum, and sales taxes and consumer taxes at a maximum, than does the Times. Its self-interest is evident, but never admitted.

In 1953, the Times led the fight which removed Fletcher Bowron from the Mayoralty and resulted in his being replaced by Norris Poulson, a puppet of the Chandlers. One of the editorial weapons used by the Times was the charge that Bowron was asking property and property owners to carry too much of the city's tax burden.

In an editorial titled, "Bowron and Taxes," the Times said:

"... the Mayor seems to care only about the city's revenue; if some taxpayers are soaked more than their share he is not interested. The city will fight all reductions in assessments, says the Mayor. Property owners seeking justice at least know where he stands."

This editorial appeared to align the Times on the side of all property owners. It certainly made an appeal to the hundreds of thousands of veterans, for instance, who owned property in Los Angeles. And to all those persons who, through the years, had managed to buy small homes of their own or small parcels of income property.

However, a further examination of the position of the Times gave a truer picture of just what that paper desired. A later editorial said:

"It may be . . . that a new expert and independent appraisal for tax purposes of some 20,000 parcels of Los Angeles . . . real estate (those valued at \$25,000 a piece and over) will be worth the tax money appropriated for

the purpose. There has been a good deal of complaint about inequitable assessments in this class of property."

The Times didn't say that most of the complaints came from the Times and interests associated with the Times. The paper, of course, was not interested in the small-property owner. If the big properties got their assessments cut, the small properties would have to carry more of the tax burden.

This, of course, fitted in with the theory of "broadening the tax base." It was in the same spirit that the Times fought against granting veterans the \$1000 exemptions they enjoy on property taxes. When the proposition first appeared on the ballot in 1938, the Times assailed it. The paper said veterans were seeking "special privileges." Obviously, the Times feels that only the Chandlers are entitled to "special privileges."

The Times is ever on the lookout for what it regards as wasteful or useless taxes. Nearly always, when it finds such a tax, it is one that finances social legislation.

The paper, for instance, has never conceded the necessity for social security taxes, nor seen any benefits in the social security system. In one of the many editorials attacking Social Security, the Times said:

"He (Roosevelt) got his so-called 'social security' program intact. The measure is an obscure, ponderous, involved affair covering a group of slightly related subjects, purports to provide old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent mothers, crippled children and the blind. All these are worthy objectives; but what the bill means only the courts can tell after years of interpretation; what it will cost the country, no-

body can guess, and its social and economic effects will take a long time to develop."

This whining comment was followed by another editorial which declared:

"That the social security bill . . . solves any . . . problems satisfactorily, or even tolerably, is, however, extremely unlikely. That it imposes new, large burdens on industry and the general taxpayer . . . is certain."

The Times has never ceased its complaints about the cost of social security or other social legislation. It feels that such legislation is unnecessary, and it imposes this belief on all those who seek its support for public office. When it can, it seeks to negate already enacted legislation.

So long as the Times controls the state government, unemployment insurance and other worthy legislation will be endangered. After all, didn't the Times find that a "Times survey of Unemployment Compensation payments in Los Angeles County confirms a disturbing suspicion; thousands of persons prefer to live on 'the dole' rather than take jobs that do not suit their preferences?"

Here the Times was able to unite its two pet hates in one paragraph. If it could force all workers to go into the open market and take any job offered or starve, then wages would, of course, be forced down and the union shop destroyed. At the same time, taxes would be lowered because there would be fewer persons drawing unemployment compensation.

The Times spoke more bluntly than usual when it said :

"Common sense and common justice demand that the whole scheme (of unemployment insurance) be given a good going over on lines fair to those who must find the money."

Revealed in these few words is the entire philosophy of the paper and its owners. Social legislation is bad because it costs money.

But, then, the Chandler interests have always been opposed to social legislation, not only in this country, but in foreign countries. It was just such opposition which led to Harry Chandler's being indicted by the Federal Government.

CHAPTER 15

DAMNED ACROSS THE BORDER

Harry Chandler died on September 23, 1944. He was eighty years old and almost until the day of his death ruled the Chandler empire absolutely.

The obituary which was printed in the Los Angeles Times declared :

"No history of the Los Angeles area would be complete without the name of Harry Chandler and the part he played in its growth and in its prosperity."

Farther on, the Times stated :

"He neglected few chances for making honest money."

In reciting the financial achievements of Harry Chandler, the Times reported that he had filed upon government land in Imperial Valley in 1898, and that he shortly thereafter bought from the Mexican government 862,000 acres of land in the northern part of Baja, California.

Elaborating on this, the Times said :

"(He) took a prominent part in the organization of the company which built the irrigation canal which transformed Imperial Valley from a desert into the most productive region of the continent."

The Times described its late owner as a "true friend" and "honored guest" of Mexico. There were other mentions of Chandler's business and social relations with the Mexican government and the Mexican people. Nowhere,

however, did the obituary report that Harry Chandler was once arrested on charges that he sought to foment a revolution in that country.

Such an omission is in line with Times policy. The paper rarely reports arrests, indictments or convictions of persons close to the paper or to its owners. In some instances, it has even sought to keep other papers from printing such stories when they occur.

In the case of Harry Chandler, of course, there was no possibility of suppression. Even the Times had to print the story of his indictment, his plea, and, more than two years later, his trial. However, the Times had its own version of all these and it might well be worth re-telling the story from the perspective of almost forty years.

It began with the purchase of the vast Mexican holdings in the years just before the turn of the century. At that time Mexico was governed by Porfirio Diaz who virtually sold out the natural resources and the land of Mexico to foreign exploiters. In the period after 1910, when the Mexican people successfully revolted against Diaz, the Mexican government sought to regain control of its own soil.

Among the sections of land which thus were made liable to expropriation was the vast Otis-Chandler domain in Baja, or lower, California.

This acreage had increased greatly in value during the period from 1898 to 1914. Chandler had used the waters of the Colorado River to irrigate it and had turned the semi-arid holdings into valuable agricultural property.

In many ways the story of the Chandler Imperial Valley-Lower California holdings parallels that of the Chand-

ler Owens Valley-San Fernando Valley holdings. It is almost as though Chandler, having worked a great financial coup once, was intent upon repeating it.

That parallel will be further explored after the story of Harry Chandler's arrest and trial.

In 1914, Venustiano Carranza took over as President of Mexico. He immediately announced a reform program which was later to be spelled out in the Constitution of 1917. Two of its principal points were:

National ownership of sub-soil deposits, which meant that the government maintained it had all rights to minerals or to oil beneath the surface of all land in Mexico.

Return of the *ejido* system, which called for the breaking up of the vast, absentee-owned farms and ranches in Mexico and allotting the land to the people for their use.

Should the Carranza program be put into effect, it would obviously cost Chandler his Lower California property. It was known that General Esteban Cantu, Governor of Lower California under Carranza, favored the program.

The Times, of course, editorially attacked the plan.

It demanded that private property rights be respected. No wonder, then, that when the United States Government accused Harry Chandler and six others of conspiring to start a revolution against Cantu, there were many who believed that the charges had substance.

Those indicted were a motley crew. They included, in addition to staid, propertied, Harry Chandler, the man-

ager of his Lower California holdings, the Mexican consul in San Diego, a Dutch soldier of fortune, an ex-convict, and two "promoters."

Chandler sought to have the indictments set aside, but failed. The indicted men were ordered to appear for pleading, and all but Chandler and his manager, W. K. Bowker, made a personal appearance. It was necessary for the court to issue a bench warrant to get Chandler to come into court and plead "not guilty." All the defendants were released upon posting of bail.

If convicted the defendants could be sentenced to two years in jail and fined \$10,000 each. Trial was set for two months after pleading, but it was to be more than two years before the group appeared in court to be tried. The delay was due to a succession of technical maneuvers by counsel for Chandler.

The Government, when the trial finally opened, appeared to have a strong case. A succession of witnesses gave testimony linking the group with a planned revolt.

One witness swore that Bowker, Chandler's manager, had made all arrangements for a food supply for the invading army and had boasted that Cantu would be overthrown and replaced by a Governor owing allegiance to Chandler. (Is this familiar?)

Another testified that when he demurred at taking part in the conspiracy because of the danger, one of Chandler's employees told him, "You don't have to be afraid. If we get into any trouble, we have the Los Angeles Times with us."

There was corroborated testimony to the effect that the Mexican consul in San Diego, one of those indicted,

had held meetings with the other defendants in his office and that he had purchased a large stock of arms and ammunition in Los Angeles and had transported these to the Mexican border.

There was also evidence that the group had purchased 100 pounds of "giant powder" and a supply of dynamite caps in San Diego.

The government's case would have been even stronger had the trial taken place sooner. In the years intervening between indictment and trial, one government witness had been jailed on a bad check charge and the other, B. J. Viljoen, a defendant who had pledged to turn government witness, had died under mysterious circumstances.

Nicholas Senn Zogg was the man who went to jail. He was brought down from Folsom to testify and he gave a newspaper interview to the Los Angeles Record in which he said he had been framed because he "knew too much."

Zogg was a typical soldier-of-fortune, one of many who lived by fighting for the best paying side in Latin American revolutions in the early years of this century. He told the Record reporter that he had been warned against testifying, but that threats didn't bother him.

The paper quoted him as saying, "An official of Imperial County openly enlisted men in August, 1914. Headquarters was the Oregon Hotel in El Centro, owned by General Otis. The men knew that they were going to be used for an invasion of Lower California."

His testimony never became part of the record. As soon as he took the stand, he became involved in repeated altercations with counsel for the defense. When he refused

to answer a question, he was held in contempt by Judge Farrington who was conducting the trial. Then, on motion of the defense, over Government objections, virtually all of Zogg's testimony was ordered expunged from the record.

Nevertheless, even without his testimony or that of Viljoen, the Government was able to present a strong case. Only the Record, of all Los Angeles papers, reported the story of the trial factually. The other papers, with the exception of the Times, gave it virtually no space.

The Times tried the case in its news columns. It called the Government witnesses "irresponsible," "unscrupulous" and "felons." It gave its own interpretation of the evidence. A casual reader would have believed that it was the Government, not Harry Chandler, who was on trial.

Judge Farrington finally had to censure the Times in open court for its handling of news of the trial. He pointed out that the members of the jury were not restricted from reading newspapers and that the Times, by its stories, was obviously seeking to influence them. He ordered the paper to report the evidence as presented or face a citation for contempt.

The censure had little effect upon the Times, but it had even less effect upon the jurors. They were never given a chance to weigh the evidence.

When the Government completed its case, the defense asked for dismissal of the charges on the ground that the indictment stated the alleged conspiracy was "in behalf of the people of Lower California." This, the de-

fense said, nullified the charges. The prosecution argued it was solely a matter of phraseology and not generic to the issue.

The judge, however, agreed with the defense. He directed the jury foreman to record a verdict of "not guilty."

The judge's ruling forestalled any possibility of the defendants being re-indicted and tried again. Another trial would have been in violation of the "double jeopardy" section of the Constitution.

Thus, and without ever refuting any of the charges made against him, except in the columns of the Times, Harry Chandler was freed of the charge of conspiracy.

There is little wonder that the Times, in its obituary, made no mention at all of this incident.

The Chandler family still retains title to a good portion of its original Mexican holdings. The land was twice expropriated and twice returned. However, during the Cardenas administration, one half of it was taken over by the government of Mexico and allotted to 60,000 Mexican farmers who still take their livelihood from the fertile soil.

The part still owned by the Chandlers is worth many times what all of the acreage originally cost Harry Chandler. Its value constantly increases, as does the land farther north in the Imperial Valley, which the Chandlers own. This regular increment stems, in large part, from the building of Boulder Dam and the All-American Canal.

Returning to the Times obituary, I find this statement: "He (Harry Chandler) might with justice be called the father . . . of Colorado River control. He was one

of the earliest to advocate a flood-control dam for that turbulent and destructive stream."

This is true as far as it goes. But, like so much that the Times chose to tell about Harry Chandler, it hardly goes far enough. Harry Chandler desperately favored some form of dam and some form of flood control on the Colorado River. Without such dams, and without flood-control, the vast stretch of property on which he had filed in 1898, and to which he added during the years, would have had very little value. Flood control has meant millions to the Chandlers.

But Boulder Dam and the Colorado flood control program now in operation are in the public interest, not in the specific interest of Harry Chandler. The record shows that he fought this plan for years and succeeded in delaying it for more than a decade.

Various factors motivated Harry Chandler. First, and above all, there was personal profit. The other factors, all of which were secondary, included his hatred of public power, his long feud with Hiram Johnson, and his unwillingness to back the expenditure of tax funds unless he profited directly from such expenditures.

The State of California and the City of Los Angeles have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the development of the Colorado River project. Less has accrued to state and city than has accrued to Harry Chandler and his heirs as a result of the expenditures.

Chandler and the Times were, in large part, responsible for the city of Los Angeles undertaking the building of the vast aqueduct, one of the engineering wonders of our time, that leads from the Colorado River to the city.

However, as of now, Chandler and his fellow ranchers of the Imperial Valley receive more benefit from this water than the people of Los Angeles.

In recent years, the Imperial Valley has used as much as 2,717,530 acre-feet of water annually while only 56,000 acre-feet has been diverted to the Metropolitan Water District of Los Angeles!

Some day, Los Angeles will have need of this water. It was as an insurance policy against the future need that so many millions were spent. Right now, however, it is the absentee-owners of the Imperial Valley farms who are drawing the dividends on the public's investment.

But, back to Chandler and his fight against the vast project which has proved so profitable to him.

Chandler wanted private development of the Colorado and its power resources. He fought for twenty years against the government taking over the development. As early as 1905 he raised the cry of "Socialism" when President Theodore Roosevelt suggested that the Colorado be included in federal reclamation projects.

Chandler fought against federal action in 1905 and 1906 when the worst flood in the history of the Colorado took a toll of many lives and did damage high in the millions. The flood bankrupted a private company working on the project and almost bankrupted its successor, the Southern Pacific Company.

The Southern Pacific finally realized that the project was beyond the financial limits of private capital and, in 1911, sold its holdings to the Imperial Valley Irrigation District.

In the years between 1911 and 1926, Harry Chandler and his newspaper led the fight against what is now Boulder Dam and the All-American Canal. Chandler wanted flood control, but he wanted just enough to satisfy and protect him and his holdings.

The large-scale power development of the Colorado was beyond his imagination and, incidentally, a threat to the private utilities in which he had, and his heirs still have, so large a stake.

During the long years when the issue was being fought out in Congress, Chandler had his stooges do all they could to wreck the project. His paper, so influential during Republican administrations, led the battle for the private utilities.

As part of his delaying tactics, Chandler and the paper came up with repeated plans of their own. Each plan was, of course, investigated and explored. Each proved unfeasible. However, it never took Chandler long to come up with a new one.

He managed to keep the Swing-Johnson Bill, which authorized and blue-printed Boulder Dam, locked in the House Irrigation Committee. For two years, the Committee waited for him to testify. Finally, the Committee lost its patience and wired him that if he did not "immediately" appear, action would be taken without waiting for his testimony.

"Immediately" had an elastic meaning to Chandler. It was a full month before he came to Washington, carrying with him a lengthy statement.

He addressed the Committee for hours. A reporter who covered the hearing reported, "Mr. Chandler agreed

to everything connected with the development of flood control."

Representative Swing, co-author with Johnson of the enabling act, said ruefully, "He was a model pupil while teacher was looking." Swing, like Johnson, had long been subject to harsh, vindictive battering from the Times and Chandler.

Chandler pleaded altruism as the basis of his objections.

He said there was no self-interest in his opposition to the bill. However, a report on the hearing said that Chandler told the Committee, "The All-American feature of the Swing-Johnson Bill, I regard as more political than practical."

It could have been only a coincidence that this feature of the bill threatened some of his holdings on both sides of the Mexican border.

Even after the hearing, Chandler kept up his fight against the bill. However, his testimony had proved that he had no legitimate reason for opposition and the bill was finally enacted.

Few of Harry Chandler's public acts were fought by so many people, over so long a time, as was his stand against Boulder Dam. Condemnation came from leaders of both political parties, from his fellow residents of Los Angeles and his fellow citizens of California. He was damned by those who suffered the ravages of floods and who needed the cheap power that Boulder Dam would produce.

It might be thought that this would cause the Times to make a discreet retreat. Instead, in May, 1926, just be-

fore work was to begin on Boulder Dam, the paper printed an editorial which said in part :

"With the prospect of early action toward the Colorado River development has come a revival of all the oft-exploded fabrications with which politicians . . . sought to deceive and confuse the public . . .

"As heretofore, the principal objects of these attacks are the Times and its publisher, the latter chiefly because of his association with other Americans in landed interests in Lower California.

"As usual, the most favored falsity is that these interests, through the Times, oppose the Boulder Dam undertaking because they fear it might . . . adversely affect their Mexican land holdings . . .

"To those aware of the facts and motives for these attacks neither denial nor defense on behalf of the Times is necessary . . . The Times . . . is accustomed to abuse from enemies of the public interest . . . It is opposed to and will continue to oppose the selfish scheme of individuals and local interests seeking unfair advantages . . . and those who would exploit for political purposes our greatest asset."

The Times protested too much. It called names, but it did not answer any of the charges made against it and its publisher. But, then, the Times has never believed that it has to answer charges. It places itself above the law of public opinion, as well as above the laws of the Federal Government.

With these two important additions to the obituary printed in the Times, I end that portion of this book which deals with the rule of Harry Chandler.

He was a mighty force in Los Angeles and Southern California. He took up where his predecessor, General Otis, left off and was even mightier. His efforts helped the population of Los Angeles to increase in size twenty times. His efforts enabled the area of the city to be vastly enlarged, notably in the instance of the San Fernando Valley.

He took a large fortune and made it much larger. He took limited power and expanded it. Wealth and power were always synonymous to him and he used one to create the other.

He was an economic force, a political force and a social force. His personal desires affected millions of people who never saw him. Burned-out homesteaders in the Owens Valley cursed his name. Mexican patriots referred to him as "el malo Americano," the evil American.

Harry Chandler imposed his will on the politics of his city and state. He backed corrupt officials and supported them because they helped him get richer and more powerful. He ignored the rights of the people because those rights, nearly always, were in conflict with his personal desires.

This is not to say that Harry Chandler was an intentionally evil man. He lived by his lights and these were predicated on the laws of the jungle.

He observed the technicalities of the law, even as he repeatedly violated its spirit. He was never interested in morality, only in legality.

The true meaning of democracy—government of the people, by the people and for the people—always evaded him.

He did some good, and not all of it lies interred with his bones. The evil he did, however, lives after him and continues to grow. Today, his son and successor, Norman Chandler, wields the billion-dollar blackjack.

It is time for the story of Norman Chandler and his wife, Dorothy Buffum Chandler.

CHAPTER 16 WEARERS OF THE CROWN

The long shadow of Harrison Gray Otis' eagle falls on the tower atop the Los Angeles Times building.

The spirit of Harry Chandler pervades the tower.

And Norman Chandler sits inside it.

More than either of his ancestors, Norman Chandler looks the part of the titan. He appears a veritable man of distinction, marked by wealth and position. He is the end, the distilled, product of three generations.

In his hands is all that his father and grandfather amassed. He had only to be born to find himself a prince, heir to what Otis and Harry Chandler had accumulated by sheer labor, by shrewd conniving, by brute use of power.

That is the basic difference between Norman Chandler and the two who preceded him in the throne room of the Times. They had a security born of the knowledge that everything they had was theirs by right of conquest. They were the masters of any of their possessions, whether it was the Times or the smallest tenant farm.

The inheritance that came so easily to Norman Chandler is his master.

He has nominal control of the empire that spreads over thousands of square miles and includes newspapers, lumber, banking, insurance, newsprint, television, steel, aluminum, real estate, oil, printing, department stores, airlines, shipping lines, and public utilities.

But there is a past and a history concerned with all these, and that past and that history control Norman Chandler.

His friends and his enemies were created a generation ago, two generations ago. So, too, were his obligations and his responsibilities. And his attitudes and beliefs.

He was born firmly cemented into a political, economic and social philosophy that he does not understand. Yet, he must be the spokesman for that philosophy.

He learned very early that he had power, vast power. The power of great wealth. The only use he has made of that power is to seek to create even greater power.

Norman Chandler lacks any sense of social responsibility. He was never taught, and he has never learned, that wealth and power are not ends in themselves.

It is interesting to compare him to the scions of other great fortunes. Rockefeller, Ford, Pulitzer and Mellon all made their wealth in the period when Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler were creating fortunes from real estate, oil, newspapers, water.

The heirs of Rockefeller, Ford, Pulitzer and Mellon are imbued with the knowledge that they must justify their possession of great wealth. To that end, they established the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Columbia School of Journalism and the great Mellon Art Gallery.

The Chandler name, however, is not associated with any fight against disease, ignorance, or human misery. If it stands for anything, it stands for the nineteenth century beliefs that labor must be prevented from organ-

izing and that free men must not be allowed to choose the officials who will govern them.

The first of these beliefs is slowly dying. Even the Chandlers have had to admit, in at least one instance, that working men have the right to join together to gain better wages, better working conditions and to bargain with management. After all, the Chandlers own a completely unionized television station, KTTV, and have signed contracts with the unions represented there.

The second belief, however—that free men must not have free choice of public officials—is still strong in California. The Chandler power is exerted more and more to gain political domination.

This is not to say that the Chandlers have failed to make some overtures toward "culture." But, even here, it has been a drive for control, for domination. The Chandlers are well on their way to "owning" culture as they own their newspapers.

It is probable that their cultural phase stems from Dorothy Buffum Chandler, the handsome, strong-willed, driving wife of Norman Chandler. Dorothy Chandler—she is known as "Buff" to her intimates—wields much influence in the day-to-day business life of the Chandler family, but she wields even more in the social and artistic life of Los Angeles and Southern California.

The field of music—symphony, light opera and grand opera—is her special domain.

She is President, member of the Executive Committee and member of the Board of Directors of the Hollywood Bowl Association.

She is Executive Vice President, member of the Exec-

utive Committee and member of the Board of Directors of the Southern California Symphony Association. This is the group that sponsors the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra.

She is a guarantor of the Los Angeles Civic Light Opera Association.

The columns of the two Chandler newspapers, the Times and the Mirror, are thrown wide open to these organizations. They could not afford to pay for the space given them free by the Chandler press. It is hard to say whether this gift is the reason Mrs. Chandler grows increasingly important in the local world of music, or whether it is because she grows increasingly important that this publicity is given.

It does not matter. It is obvious that one is dependent upon the other.

Mrs. Chandler labors hard in behalf of music. She seeks funds for the Symphony in the most unlikely places and finds them. Even in so unlikely a place as Santa Anita Park. There is the record, already documented, that the race track donated \$75,000 to the Symphony Association in the sweet name of charity.

Somehow, music and society go together. All the best people serve on committees with Mrs. Chandler. She is undoubtedly one of the social leaders, if not *the* social leader of Los Angeles and Southern California. For proof, all one has to do is read the society pages of the Los Angeles Times. Society, too, needs publicity or no one would be aware that it existed.

Bull-voiced Harrison Gray Otis must be laughing lustily at those Santa Barbarans who snubbed him some

eighty years ago. His granddaughter-in-law can snub Santa Barbarans now and make them like it. But, of course, Mrs. Chandler, being both gracious and charitable, does not do that. As a matter of fact, some of her best friends are Santa Barbarans.

Society, music, the arts. In all these the Chandlers wield power. In business and industry and politics, too.

Norman Chandler and his court circle, which includes Dorothy Chandler, choose who will be the Republican candidates for Governor and Senator and Mayor and Congressman and Councilman. And Mrs. Chandler decides who will be guest conductor at the Philharmonic and whose pictures will appear on the society pages of her two newspapers.

But this is not all. The Chandlers exert power in both public and private education in California.

For years, working through front committees, the Times has sought to name those who would serve on the Los Angeles Board of Education. The majority of that Board is today subservient to the Chandlers.

Dorothy Buffum Chandler was recently appointed to the Board of Regents of the University of California for a sixteen-year term. The Regents govern the policy and administration of the largest state university in the world. They hold the fate of any member of the faculty in their hands.

Dorothy Chandler is also a member of the Board of Trustees of Occidental College.

Norman Chandler, too, has connections of importance in the world of education. He is a member of the Board

of Trustees of both the University of Southern California and the California Institute of Technology.

The personal beliefs and opinions, the personal interests of the Chandlers are thus in a position to influence what is taught the school children of Los Angeles, the students on both the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, and the students at three other California institutions of higher learning.

The Times has always sought to dominate public education in Los Angeles. Its interest has not only been ideological, it has also been financial. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on school construction, school maintenance and school supplies. Other millions have been expended for furniture, fixtures and insurance. The total expenditures by the Board of Education approximate \$170,000,000 annually.

Because of the interest the Times has shown in Board of Education elections, the school system of Los Angeles has been more subservient to politics and political ends than any other in a major United States city. At this moment, the problem of employing a new Superintendent of Schools is complicated by the fact that any new Superintendent must be satisfactory to the Chandlers.

To put it bluntly, the Times wants a school system in which only those ideas it favors are taught. It wants a Board of Education that will bow to it. It wants a Superintendent who will take orders from the tower of the Times building, or from the office next to it, occupied by the "Administrative Assistant to the Publisher." This personage is Dorothy Chandler.

It is only during the decade since Harry Chandler's

death that the grabs for power in fields other than politics and finance have been so pronounced. It was as though Norman and Dorothy looked about them in 1944 and asked what worlds there were left for them to conquer.

During this decade, the Chandler empire has also seen some physical expansion. In the field of information, two large new enterprises have been launched. One is the Mirror, the evening newspaper regarded as Dorothy Chandler's personal project, and the other is KTTV, the television station with the union contracts.

It is to be doubted that the Mirror would ever have come into being if it were not for the tax laws. The paper represented a legitimate means of tax avoidance. It enabled the Chandlers to pay the government less, while making their own capital assets greater. A good part of the money that went into the bright new Mirror building was needed by Uncle Sam. He had to get it from the ordinary taxpayer.

There was no way for the little man, on a salary, to avoid paying every last cent of his taxes. When the Chandlers built the Mirror, they put an additional burden on some 150,000,000 other Americans. And it was all strictly legal.

And every device that could be used to cut down the amount of Chandler taxes was utilized in building KTTV. Again, it was strictly legal.

The Mirror is an outstanding example of a schizophrenic newspaper. It seeks mightily to give the appearance of independence, yet it knows it cannot have any. It wears a flimsy garment of pseudo-liberalism, yet it is aware that the black petticoat of reaction shows through.

It croaks hoarsely of the public interest, but it must yield, time after time, to the private interests that control it.

What value does the Mirror have to the Chandlers? Originally, it was a tax loss that the Chandlers felt could be turned into a long-term asset.

Vanity, of course, played a big part in the decision to publish the paper. Dorothy Chandler was a major factor in its conception. If she can make a success of it, then she will rank with a very few outstanding women publishers.

Expediency was another reason. The Mirror gives the Chandlers an opportunity to face both ways at the same time. There is a deep cleavage within the Republican Party and while one Chandler paper supports the Eisenhower faction, the other supports the anti-Eisenhower faction. For instance, in 1952 the Times wanted the late Robert A. Taft as the Republican candidate for President. The Mirror whooped it up for Eisenhower.

Early in 1954, the Bricker Amendment split the G. O. P. The Times, in line with its history, supported the amendment. The Mirror was mildly against it.

Today, the great divisive force in the Republican party is Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Once again the two Chandler papers take opposite sides. The Times is resolutely pro-McCarthy. The Mirror is wishy-washy anti-McCarthy.

These surface differences are supposed to be good for circulation. The Chandlers think they can fool some of the people all the time by the pretense that the Mirror is an autonomous publication. Los Angeles, which has known the Chandlers for three generations, has, so far,

refused to be fooled. The Mirror, like the Times, is for the Chandlers first, last and always.

The Mirror claims to be a "crusading" paper. Since its first issue, it has been printing a sensation a day. Its reporters play Fearless Fosdick constantly.

But nothing is said about the investigations that have been suddenly stopped. Newspapermen in Los Angeles talk about some of these abortive investigations. There was, for instance, the long and expensive study of sewer and other assessments in Arcadia. Arcadia, of course, is where Santa Anita Estates is located. It is where Santa Anita racetrack is located.

The reporters who worked on this story thought they had hit pay dirt. They turned in their long, detailed report of what they had discovered. And then they were told, without any explanation, that the Arcadia assessments were no concern of the Mirror and less concern of the Mirror's reporters.

Nothing was ever printed about the Arcadia assessments. Nothing ever will be printed by the Mirror. The reason, of course, is obvious.

Another abortive investigation was that of the Hyperion sewage disposal project. There has been a stench stronger than that of sewage about this project ever since its inception. But there won't be any story about Hyperion in the Mirror. Certainly, not as long as the Mirror is owned by the Chandlers. The reporters who investigated the Hyperion mess weren't told why they were called off the story, but they have a pretty good idea. They were stepping on toes very close to the corner of First and Spring Streets, where the Times building stands.

Then, there is the crusade the Mirror has been conducting against the Board of Equalization in general and me in particular. One of the points made in this attack is that liquor licenses have been resold at a profit.

Now, the Mirror knew before it began to print its attacks that one of its own reporters, Florabel Muir, had been granted a liquor license and had sold it at a large profit. Miss Muir so informed them. However, they didn't print this fact in their story. It could have been because Miss Muir didn't have a name that sounded either Italian or Jewish, and the Mirror was concentrating on such names.

On the other hand, it could have been that the Mirror hoped no one would ever discover that one of its own reporters had committed the heinous offense of making a profit.

Even while the stories were appearing, Miss Muir continued to write her daily column. Then, suddenly, she was separated from her job. Why? Not because of an attack of conscience on the part of the Mirror. She was fired because the Los Angeles Daily News had printed the story of Miss Muir's business deal and the Mirror was caught with egg on its face.

It may be that the Mirror believed it was performing a civic duty when it started its series of attacks. Virgil Pinkley, its publisher, has shown a remarkable naivete and even this would not be beyond him. But all that he is doing is laying the groundwork for an attempt to create a "liquor czar" in California.

Pinkley's bosses are not as naive as he. The liquor czar project is dear to their hearts. If one-man liquor control

should ever be legalized, Norman Chandler will make it his business to name the man who fills the job. Chandler is playing for big stakes, but he has nothing to lose. Only the people of California stand to be the losers.

The Mirror is a handy weapon in the Chandler drive for ever-increasing power.

Meanwhile, Dorothy Chandler, in addition to being a social leader and cultural leader of Los Angeles, has a newspaper with which to wield her share of the Chandler power. She has not neglected to use it in the field of politics.

Certainly, one of the shabbiest chapters of the whole Chandler story has to do with the defeat of Fletcher Bowron in the Mayoralty race in 1953.

CHAPTER 17

THE PUPPET IN CITY HALL

Fletcher Bowron was elected Mayor of Los Angeles in 1938, breaking the crooked link that connected the Los Angeles Times to City Hall.

Norris Poulson was elected Mayor in 1953, defeating Fletcher Bowron for the office. This time, instead of a connecting link, a chain was encircled about the City Hall and the Times.

It took the Chandlers and their allies fifteen years to get rid of Fletcher Bowron, the man who was called "fiercely honest" by the magazine TIME, and the "most respected Mayor in the United States," by the New York Times magazine.

Fletcher Bowron was defeated in a campaign based on a lie. It was a campaign in which Norman Chandler was over-all commander and in which his political generals, Kyle Palmer and Carleton Williams, held field commands. This group headed a motley army that included most of the hate and racist organizations in Southern California.

Fletcher Bowron was honest, a sincere Republican and a political conservative. What reason could Norman Chandler have for fighting him?

The answer is simple. Fletcher Bowron was his own man. Norman Chandler wanted a Mayor who was Nor-

man Chandler's man. When he succeeded in electing Norris Poulson, he had just such a Mayor.

It took more than two years, the creation of a false issue, and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars, but Chandler finally managed to beat Bowron at the polls.

When he did so, he could say that he had done something that his father had been unable to accomplish. Harry Chandler fought Bowron in 1938 and 1941. Both times, Bowron beat him.

I think that of everything the present rulers of the Chandler domain have accomplished, nothing gave them greater pleasure than the defeat of Bowron. It established their personal power for the first time. Until June, 1953, Norman Chandler had not done anything his father hadn't done before him.

Nothing shows the sheer lust for power that the Chandlers possess more than their long-time efforts to beat Bowron. They were determined to beat him at any cost.

During the fifteen years that Bowron was Mayor, I disagreed with him on many issues. We were never friends. His basic political philosophy differed from mine. However, all during those years I felt, and the people of Los Angeles felt, that he was doing an honest, effective and basically good job.

In the face of that record, the Times tried, time after time, to defeat Bowron. It wanted no part of him in 1953, even as it had wanted no part of him when he first ran against Frank Shaw and the corrupt Shaw administration that was held in such high esteem by the Times.

What were some of Bowron's accomplishments? Per-

haps there is a clue to the Chandler opposition among them.

To quote the magazine TIME again, "When Bowron became Mayor, there were 300 gambling houses, 1800 bookies, 2300 slot machines and 600 brothels" in Los Angeles. This was Bowron's inheritance from the Shaw administration.

Bowron put an end to the police-hoodlum deals. The bookies went to jail or out of business. The gambling houses were closed. The slot machines were driven beyond the city limits. The brothels disappeared.

Bowron reformed the civil service administration which had been turned into a job-selling agency by the previous administration. He put an end to the sale of zoning exceptions and variations.

In fifteen years in office, Bowron met the day-to-day problems that arose. He kept the city government clean. He increased city services to meet the needs of a constantly growing city.

It would appear that such a record could hardly call for the condemnation of any newspaper or any newspaper publisher. But the Chandler newspapers and the Chandlers were not interested in what Fletcher Bowron did for the people. They were only interested in what he did—or did not do—for the Chandlers.

They wanted Bowron to act in their interest. He was congenitally unable to do so.

The result was that the Chandlers went looking for an issue with which they could defeat Bowron in 1953. The issue they chose was that of public housing. It is a sign of their colossal gall that they picked an issue in which

they had so large, and so obvious, a financial interest.

The Chandlers, the largest single owners of real estate in Los Angeles County, have always opposed public housing. They have used the Realty Board, another of their front organizations, to spearhead the attack. They have used their newspapers to fight housing since its inception in the days of the New Deal.

The Chandlers oppose housing and slum clearance because there is profit from slum property. It brings in a high income at the same time that it is subject to low taxation.

Slums breed crime and disease as well as profits, but the Chandlers ignore the first two because of the third. After all, the people as a whole have to pay the price of disease and crime. But the people don't share in the profits from the slums.

It is a peculiarity of our times that the ultra-reactionaries have always fought public housing and slum clearance harder than any other social legislation. There is no logical reason for this. Just the same, anyone who ever takes a stand even remotely in favor of public housing is immediately called a "red." Not even so conservative a figure on our national scene as the late Senator Taft could escape the attack.

When Taft co-authored the housing act of 1949, he became the target for just this kind of name-calling. He was called a "Communist."

It is an irony that the housing contract into which Los Angeles entered with the federal government was based on the bill which Taft co-authored.

This was the contract which the Chandlers wanted dis-

solved. It was the contract which formed the basis for the two-year campaign to defeat Bowron.

The lie upon which this campaign was based was that the city could break the contract. Building from this lie, the Chandlers called the housing project "Socialistic," "Red," "Pink," and "Communistic." It began its campaign against Bowron by an attack on the Kremlin.

Next, it turned its attention to the City Council. This group had voted unanimously in 1949 to enter the housing contract. By 1951, the Chandlers, through Carleton Williams, its ambassador to the city government, had managed to get a bare majority of the Council to vote to abrogate the contract.

With this vote, the Times and the Mirror were able to scream that the Council was against housing. They carefully refrained from mentioning the earlier unanimous vote in its favor.

Bowron, who was never a violent advocate of public housing, tried to point out that the contract had been signed in good faith by both the city and the federal government. As a result, the government had spent millions, as had the city. If the contract were abrogated, the city would be obligated to repay the government what it had expended.

But, by that time, the Chandlers were in no mood either for reason or the simple facts of law. They redoubled their attacks on both Bowron and the housing development.

Day after day, the Chandler papers pounded away at the issue. They were not deterred when the State Supreme Court held that the housing contract could not be broken

and characterized the efforts of those who sought to break it as "a sordid picture of political intrigue and chicanery."

They decided to go around the courts. A plan was promulgated whereby a housing referendum would be placed on the ballot in 1952. The City Attorney had to admit that the referendum would have no legal status and would be binding on no one. The Times, nevertheless, insisted upon the referendum.

The issue was placed on the ballot and it won. It cost many thousands of dollars to qualify the referendum and many thousands more to put it across. All of the stooge organizations which spring up before every election at the behest of the Times came into being during the campaign. The interests represented by the Chandlers helped to finance them and keep them going.

Once the referendum won, the Chandlers could take the position that Fletcher Bowron was acting contrary to the expressed desires of the people. He became a "dictator."

And the groundwork was laid for the 1953 Mayoralty election. It was the moment for the Times to choose a candidate who would carry their banner in the "non-partisan" election.

The Chandler political board of strategy drew up a list of possible candidates. Contributors to the list included the Times hierarchy and their close friends. There were about two dozen possibilities before the list was completed.

Now the reason for the so-called "non-partisan" municipal elections in California is to prevent any political party or organization from running candidates who would

owe their election to a specific party. Actually, it has enabled special interests to run their own candidates and control them after election. They can do so because a candidate has to have money to run for office. Campaigns cost cold cash.

The public-spirited citizen who runs for office has to get campaign funds from some source. Where there is party responsibility and party organization, he gets the funds from them. Where there is none, he is dependent upon gifts from private sources. The men who give the money usually expect something in return.

When the Chandler board of strategy met to choose its candidate for Mayor, it also was committing itself to financing the campaign of its choice. No man would accept the "nomination" without the understanding that he would have adequate financing.

Despite the fact that the Chandlers were behind the move to defeat Bowron, and despite the fact that any man running under their aegis would have adequate campaign funds, the first fourteen men on the Chandler list had to be passed over before a willing candidate was found.

Number 15 on the list was Norris Poulson. We quote *TIME* again, he was "an undistinguished Congressman." Poulson was hardly known to the voters of Los Angeles. He had no legislative record of which to be proud. But he was willing to run and that was all that mattered to the Chandlers. He was willing to run and willing to let the Chandlers run his campaign and, if he were elected, run him.

Once the candidate was chosen, he was taken in hand and briefed by Carleton Williams. So that there would

be the minimum possibility of his making mistakes, or saying the wrong thing at the wrong time, he was sent back to Washington.

His campaign was run by the Chandlers, their newspapers and their various front organizations. There was no paucity of money, newspaper advertisements, radio, television and billboards. The Chandlers were intent upon electing their own Mayor.

Norris Poulson defeated Fletcher Bowron and, for the first time in fifteen years, special interests took precedence over the public interest in City Hall.

Virtually the first act of Poulson was to rush to Washington and sign an agreement which abrogated the housing contract. The economy-minded Chandlers weren't interested in the cost to all the people of the abrogation. They would only pay a share and that share would be miniscule compared to what they would profit from the end of public housing.

The city now possesses great tracts of property which were condemned and cleared for housing developments. The value of these tracts increases steadily. From the beginning of Norris Poulson's administration, there have been reports that these tracts would end in the hands of the Chandlers or the associates. Several abortive attempts have been made to utilize them for Chandler-inspired projects.

So far, none of these attempts has succeeded. However, it is a good bet that some day they will. The Chandlers have long had a way with real estate whose value is improved by using the public funds. The examples of the San Fernando Valley and the Imperial Valley quickly

come to mind. Will the land that was supposed to be used to replace slums come next?

It probably depends upon the word that Carleton Williams brings from the Times tower to Norris Poulson. Fletcher Bowron, during the 1953 campaign, pointed out that Williams dictated to various City Councilmen how to vote. Now, the Mayor's office has been added to Williams' other duties.

The election of Poulson accomplished one objective in the Chandlers' drive for absolute power. They had control of the city government. But Poulson's election left his Congressional seat vacant and now the Chandlers exerted their steamroller to replace Poulson with a congressman of their choice.

The Chandler hierarchy decided that the Republican candidate should be Glenard Lipscomb, an Assemblyman.

John L. E. Collier, a long-time state legislator from this district, decided to challenge the Chandler choice. Collier has many friends in the district, popularity with the rank-and-file Republican party members, and a record of party regularity. He felt that these entitled him to at least an even chance with Lipscomb for the seat in the House.

Collier was informed quietly that he must pull out of the race. He refused and then the Chandler steamroller was put to work. Men who had promised to support Collier told him they could not back him. Others, who had promised financial support told him they must withdraw their pledges.

The Times and the Mirror thundered that Collier was an enemy of the party. If he ran, he would only increase

the chances of the Democratic candidate, able young Attorney George Arnold. The papers virtually ordered Collier publicly to withdraw.

When Collier proved stubborn, the reserves were called in. The Chandlers demanded that all Republicans of consequence make public avowals of support of Lipscomb. These big-shot Republicans, beginning with Vice President Nixon and including Senate Majority Leader William Knowland, played Charlie McCarthy to the Edgar Bergen of the Chandlers.

They dutifully recited their lines. And the Times and Mirror reported their statements just as though they had not been prepared in the Times office, but were spontaneous declarations.

When the ballots were counted, Lipscomb had narrowly defeated Arnold, and Collier had run a poor third.

What happened to Collier was intended as an object lesson to any other Republicans who might have a spark of independence. The Chandlers had demonstrated that they would not tolerate anyone who was not their creature. Republicans who wanted to seek office must clear it through Norman or find themselves dumped into the political limbo.

Poulson and Lipscomb were elected by the Chandler machine. Bowron and Collier were defeated by lies, chicanery, a torrent of money and the use of brute political force. Still, neither Bowron nor Collier suffered the ultimate in attacks by the Chandlers. They were spared character assassination. In that respect, at least, they were fortunate. Others have not been so lucky.

The Chandlers are determined to increase their political

domain. With each election, they move more and more of their personal choices into office. They are the Republican party of Southern California at the same time that they represent the largest financial interest in Southern California.

It is time to examine how close they have come to absolute dominion.

CHAPTER 18

THE PEOPLE VS. THE CHANDLERS

The history of the dynasty founded by Harrison Gray Otis and now ruled by Norman and Dorothy Chandler is the story of a ruthless drive for wealth and political power.

In the beginning, Otis and Harry Chandler dedicated themselves to the accumulation of money. It was only after their first great financial coups, like the San Fernando real estate deal, that they turned to the field of politics.

It is, of course, true that Otis and Chandler exerted political influence almost from the moment they obtained control of the Times. Without that influence, for example, they would not have been able to put through the Owens Valley machinations. However, they were at that time big fish in a small pond. Los Angeles was still a secondary city and California was dominated by San Francisco and the powers that ran San Francisco.

When the owners of the Times made a partnership deal with the Southern Pacific, they moved out of the bush-leagues into the major leagues. From that day on their influence extended beyond the limited boundaries of Los Angeles.

In the half-century since that partnership was formed, the Otis-Chandler group went from junior to senior partner and, finally, to outright control.

The wealth of the dynasty has grown astoundingly during the years. The few thousands of Otis and the few thousands of Chandler have been converted into a financial juggernaut whose total assets exceed a billion dollars. The Times-Mirror Company, which first barely supported Otis, today has an annual gross income of \$50,000,000.

Minor companies show profits of more than a million dollars annually. There is no way to get the exact figures, for the financial holdings, operations and profits of the Chandlers are not open to the public.

Probably the only people who know the extent of the Chandler empire are the Chandlers themselves and the Department of Internal Revenue.

Our economic system is one that allows the accumulation of wealth and I believe it is the best economic system in the world. It is not the size of the Chandler fortune which is an issue, but the manner in which it has been used.

The record demonstrates clearly that this vast financial power has been turned toward giving the Chandlers a political power subsidized by their wealth.

The intent of this political power is not the public welfare, but the Chandler's welfare. Centralization of this power in the hands of one family tends toward the destruction of democracy. That is the evil bred by the wealth of the Chandlers.

The question now is how far have the Chandlers gone in attaining the absolute power they so obviously seek? The answer is to be found in the record.

The place to look first is Los Angeles. Here the Chandlers are strongest. They are the Republican party. They

name the candidates, finance the campaigns, and create the issues. We need go no farther than Norris Poulson to prove that point.

One of the sources of their strength, as was shown earlier, is the so-called "non-partisan" election of city and county offices. There are more Democrats than Republicans in Los Angeles county by a wide margin. It should then follow, if these elections were really non-partisan, that the Democrats would have a fair share of city and county offices.

However, what *should be* and what *is* make two widely divergent sets of statistics. Here is the actual situation :

The Mayor is a Republican.

The City Council has nine Republicans and six Democrats.

The City Attorney is a Republican.

The City Comptroller is a Republican.

The Chief of Police (appointive) is a Republican.

The City Public Defender is a Republican.

The City Clerk is a Republican.

The City Treasurer is a Republican.

The City Purchasing Agent is a Republican.

The Board of Education of made up of six Republicans and one Democrat.

Three of the five County Supervisors are Republicans.

The Sheriff of Los Angeles County is a Republican.

The District Attorney of Los Angeles County is a Republican.

The County Counsel is a Republican.

The County Recorder is a Republican.

The County Auditor is a Republican.

The County Public Defender is a Republican.

The County Treasurer is a Republican.

The County Assessor is a Republican.

The County Tax Collector is a Republican.

The County Registrar of Voters is a Republican.

Six of the seven Los Angeles members of the Metropolitan Water District are Republicans.

Three of the five members of the County Housing Authority are Republicans.

All three members of the Coliseum Commission are Republicans.

The County Civil Service Commission is Republican-appointed and consists of two Republicans and one Democrat.

The City Civil Service Commission is Republican-appointed and consists of four Republicans and one Democrat.

There are two County offices which are not held by Republicans. The County Coroner is not a registered voter and the County Clerk is a Democrat.

In addition, the Mayor has wide appointive powers. There are 18 City Commissions which control police, firemen, public works, water, power, transportation and all the other functions of municipal government. Less than one-fifth of the City Commissioners are Democrats.

The record speaks for itself. Los Angeles, both city and county, is run by the Republican party machine. That machine is housed in the Los Angeles Times tower.

Now to the national and state situations :

Both United States Senators are Republicans.

The Republicans control the Congressional delegation by two-to-one.

The Los Angeles County State Senator is a Republican.

The Republicans hold 20 of the 31 Assembly seats allotted to Los Angeles.

The Republicans hold every state-wide elective office except that of Attorney-General.

The Republicans control appointments to every State Commission.

The Republicans control both the State Senate and the Assembly.

Once again, the record speaks for itself. The Republican party controls the machinery of the State of California and the most potent force within that party is the Chancellors.

The judiciary is almost as completely one-party dominated as are the executive and legislative branches.

Six of the seven California Supreme Court justices are Republicans, as are six of the nine Appellate Court justices.

There are 71 Superior Court judges in Los Angeles county. Of these, 55 are registered Republicans, 10 are registered Democrats, four are unregistered, one registered "decline to state" and one registered "non-partisan."

There are 76 Municipal Court judges in Los Angeles County. Of these, 55 are registered Republicans, 20 are registered Democrats and one is not registered.

The figures show that California is as much a one-party state as any in the United States outside of the deep South. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be made,

to perpetuate this condition. The Republican party's most blatant mouthpiece, the Chandler press, fights any attempt to end cross-filing. It fights any attempt to end the farce of municipal and county "non-partisanship."

The fact is that the Times-Mirror interests have found it profitable to confuse the electorate of California into voting for candidates dominated by the Chandlers and the Republican Party they control under the guise of "non-partisan" offices. Not content with the grip they already have on city, county and state officials, they seek to broaden their influence until there is no place in the state that does not feel their smothering influence.

Their prime target at the moment is the office of Gov. Goodwin J. Knight, both because the powers of governor are generally important and because the Times-Mirror has hatched a scheme deserving the admiration of the most roguish rogue.

As previously mentioned, there is still some doubt as to whether Governor Knight will maintain an independent course, ignoring the demands of the landlords of the Republican Party to which he belongs, the Chandlers, or whether he will accede to their brand of pressure politics.

Perhaps one of the principal determining factors will be the outcome of Proposition 3, the Chandler-sponsored proposal to emasculate the State Board of Equalization, and how Knight eventually stands on this proposal.

A brief analysis of the Proposition 3 scheme will go far toward demonstrating how the Chandler minds—and that includes the minds of the Chandler political strategists—function.

The Board of Equalization, of which I am a member, has both taxation duties and liquor licensing duties. The Chandlers realize that, if they can obtain a taxation board responsive to their needs, they will be able to save very large sums in taxes now levied against their holdings. But a straightforward campaign to change the tax laws might be recognized as an attempt to obtain tax favors. Therefore, an indirect approach must be made.

It is smarter, and has more popular appeal, to attack the liquor control phases of the Board of Equalization. After all, among the thousands of licenses issued and renewed by the Board, there must be a few cases which can be, justifiably or not, made to appear as if something were wrong.

If even one or two mistakes have been made, or if even one or two rascals can be exposed, then the Chandlers have the makings of a major "scandal" which ignores the many thousands of cases in which the law was meticulously observed by everyone involved, down to the most insignificant clerk.

It was a clever move, because it was based on the admitted fact that a small percentage of crooks and chisellers are to be found in every walk of life from hobo to bank president. The remarkable part of it is that they have been able to find such a small percentage among such a large number of people, a fact that considerably restores my confidence in my fellowman, particularly after a day reading the Chandler press.

In any case, the Chandlers decided to attack the Board on the liquor control set-up.

Now, the fact is that I have long been on record against control of liquor licensing by the Board of Equalization. I have believed for years, and have said so on many occasions, that the tax functions and the liquor licensing functions of the Board should be separated, not along the lines proposed by the Chandlers but on good government principles. I have even made carefully thought-out and fully described proposals for dividing the two functions. But the odds are very great that you have never seen such proposals reported in the press, and especially not in the Times or Mirror!

Why? Because that would give the game away.

The Chandler game is to misdirect the public into watching the headlines on liquor control "scandals" so that they can accomplish a bigger objective in getting what they want in the form of a tax commission.

Let's go back and examine what actually happened.

In October, 1953, the Chandlers revived an ancient scheme calling for one-man control of liquor licensing, a liquor "czar" to be appointed by the governor, to replace Board of Equalization control by five men elected by the people.

Goodwin Knight, then very new to the post of Governor, was asked by newsmen to comment on the plan which had been repeatedly rejected by the State Legislature. Knight said he was opposed to any such proposal because it would "put enormous political control in the hands of one man."

What the Governor meant was clear. The liquor industry, like any other business, must operate under the laws of the State.

A few months ago, people in the liquor business paid \$35,000 at the rate of \$50-a-plate to attend a dinner for Knight. The money was to be used for campaign purposes. This occurred while regulation of the industry was in the hands of five men, all of whom are elected by and are directly responsible to the people.

How much could be—and would be—collected for political purposes if the entire liquor industry was dependent upon the will of one man, and that man was responsible only to the Governor?

Goodwin Knight recognized the obvious danger inherent in any such "czar" plan, and spoke out against it.

Other people—organized labor, veterans' groups, businessmen and, yes, a great many church groups—also recognized the danger and went on record against such a scheme.

But much has happened since Knight first spoke out. The Los Angeles Times, voice of the Republican Party line, put the Chandler position bluntly before the public in an editorial March 12, 1954. The Times stated that it had decided "one-man control is the better plan." The Times went further and proposed that the liquor "czar" should have advisors "whose advice, however, he is not bound to take."

Goodwin J. Knight then made his startling announcement that he was in favor of the one-man control plan and that there should be an advisory committee to "assist and consult" with the boss but which would have no veto power over his actions.

Subsequently, the Chandlers came up with their plan for taking away the taxation duties of the Board of

Equalization, and Knight announced that he, too, advocated a "State Revenue Board" appointed by the Governor and having the powers now relegated to the Board of Equalization.

The Chandlers, through their mammoth headline show about "scandals" in liquor licensing, had apparently gone the whole route, even convincing the Governor of the soundness of their case. The only remaining step, if they succeed in persuading the people to adopt Proposition 3 to set up a liquor "czar" and split the Board of Equalization, would be for them to name the men to be appointed by the Governor.

Since then, however, Knight has taken another action on an entirely unrelated subject which may wind up by wrecking the whole Chandler play.

Speaking on August 23, 1954, before the California State Federation of Labor Convention in Santa Barbara, the Governor firmly declared that he was strongly opposed to the so-called "right to work" bill and proposals to outlaw "hot cargo" and "secondary boycott" activities. He said he would not only work against such legislation, but that he would veto any such bill if it should be passed because these measures are unfair and discriminatory against organized labor.

At the same time, Knight made it plain that he would oppose any legislation unfair or discriminatory against business or agriculture and that, therefore, labor unions were to receive simply fair treatment, not favoritism.

Two days later, on August 25, the Times wrathfully denounced Knight and expressed its horrified disap-

proval of 'his abject bid for the backing of organized labor.'

The Times made quite a point that the Chandlers intend to continue support of Knight in his "current" campaign, but left the implication that any more of this nonsense about being fair to all sides had better stop. Particularly, any fairness to labor unions had better stop because the Times, today as always, is viciously opposed to any labor organization for protection of workers. Such protection, you remember, would cost the Chandlers money, and that is unthinkable.

From this break between Knight and the Times, it appears that the Chandlers may have more trouble controlling the Governor than they had expected. It remains yet to be seen if Knight will enforce his stand of independence by denouncing the Chandlers' scheme for a liquor "czar" and an appointed "State Revenue Board."

Another reversal in position by Knight is definitely conceivable. The bulk of his supporters—other than the Times-owned core of the Republican Party—are on record against the Chandler plan. They represent the many civic, business, labor, church, veteran and other organizations which will be responsible for voting Knight into office if he is elected. And their wishes should prevail in a democratic system.

Goodwin Knight will certainly find—as I have found—that it is impossible to make an honorable compromise with the Chandlers and that it is equally impossible to weld the Republican Party into the powerful force for

good that it should be, as long as the Chandlers exercise the dominant influence in it.

It was this fact that caused me, on January 1, 1954, to leave the Republican party and become a Democrat.

For years, it had seemed to me that the Republican Party in California was getting farther away from the principles of Hiram Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt and the other liberals who took it over in 1910. But I believed there was a chance to fight back within the party. I felt that the liberal wing of the party, the rank-and-file, could overthrow the bosses again, just as it had in 1910.

But, as time passed, it became more and more evident to me that this was not the case. The party was becoming more and more the property of just one group and that group was dominated by the Chandlers. I finally realized there was no way left to fight the Chandlers from within.

The Democratic Party of California, on the other hand, appeared to be having a new birth. Its older leaders were being replaced by younger men with a set of principles and ideals which, it seemed to me, were much like those of the old-time Republican liberals.

I felt, and I feel now, that the one hope of restoring the government of California and of Los Angeles to the people to whom it rightfully belongs, lies in the Democratic Party. The Republican Party can't rid itself of the Chandlers because they are the party. The Democratic party can only succeed in California if it defeats the Chandlers and sends them back to the money-making at which they have been so successful for so long.

I do not care if the Chandler fortune reaches two billions of dollars. I do not care if Dorothy Chandler

becomes executive vice-president of a half-dozen symphony organizations. These are matters of little moment. But it matters a great deal that democracy be reborn in California.

The history of Harrison Gray Otis and the Chandlers proves they are the enemies of all that is good in the American way of life.

Run through their sorry history. Examine their long fight against the rights of labor. Study their disregard of minority rights so long as the minorities had no political power. Catalogue the unethical, immoral manner in which they have used public funds and governmental power to increase their personal wealth. All these are recorded in these pages.

Their story is one of selfishness and brutality. The members of this family have never shown pity or consideration. The broken men and women of the Owens Valley are symbols of the Chandler greed. The land-hungry, food-hungry peons of Mexico are the victims of Chandler power.

Today, the Chandlers are more potent than ever before.

The Vice President of the United States is beholden to them.

The majority leader of the United States Senate is influenced by them.

They hold the government of the city and county of Los Angeles firmly in their claws.

They have taken over the state government of California.

And, every day, they seek to strengthen their death grip on democracy. The men whom the Republican party nominates for office must take an oath of allegiance to the Chandlers before they are given an opportunity to take an oath of allegiance to the United States or the state of California.

If the American system of government is to survive in this, the second largest state in the country, the people must break the hold of the Chandlers on their government. The people must make a fight against odds. The Chandlers will not permit the truth to be told in their newspapers and over their television station. They seek, by appealing to personal interest, by bartering public office, and by offering financial advancement, to prevent others from speaking the truth.

But they cannot conceal the truth forever. They cannot, by brute force, by bribery, or by personal attack, prevent the truth of what they are becoming known.

And once that happens, the Chandlers will lose their power.

It is as true now as when it was first written that "the truth shall make you free."

THE END

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the course of preparing and writing this book, it was necessary for me to read many volumes and research the files of many newspapers and magazines.

For the help provided by these sources, I make grateful acknowledgement. Herewith is a bibliography, by no means complete, but containing those books, magazines and newspapers which were referred to most often.

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